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An Abstract of a Dissertation Submitted to Nova Southeastern University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

An Information Security Control
Assessment Methodology for Organizations
By
Angel R. Otero
March 2014

In an era where use and dependence of information systems is significantly high, the
threat of incidents related to information security that could jeopardize the information
held by organizations is more and more serious. Alarming facts within the literature point
to inadequacies in information security practices, particularly the evaluation of
information security controls in organizations. Research efforts have resulted in various
methodologies developed to deal with the information security controls assessment
problem. A closer look at these traditional methodologies highlights various weaknesses
that can prevent an effective information security controls assessment in organizations.
This dissertation develops a methodology that addresses such weaknesses when
evaluating information security controls in organizations. The methodology, created
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB based on fuzzy theory and fuzzy logic, uses
fuzzy set theory which allows for a more accurate assessment of imprecise criteria than
traditional methodologies. It is argued and evidenced that evaluating information security
controls using fuzzy set theory addresses existing weaknesses found in the literature for
traditional evaluation methodologies and, thus, leads to a more thorough and precise
assessment. This, in turn, results in a more effective selection of information security
controls and enhanced information security in organizations.
The main contribution of this research to the information security literature is the
development of a fuzzy set theory-based assessment methodology that provides for a
thorough evaluation of ISC in organizations. The methodology just created addresses the
weaknesses or limitations identified in existing information security control assessment
methodologies, resulting in an enhanced information security in organizations.
The methodology can also be implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote
usage in practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection are
impractical. Moreover, the methodology fuses multiple evaluation criteria to provide a
holistic view of the overall quality of information security controls, and it is easily
extended to include additional evaluation criteria factor not considered within this
dissertation. This is one of the most meaningful contributions from this dissertation.
Finally, the methodology provides a mechanism to evaluate the quality of information
security controls in various domains. Overall, the methodology presented in this
dissertation proved to be a feasible technique for evaluating information security controls
in organizations.
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Chapter 1
1. Introduction

1. Background
In an era where use and dependence of computers and information systems is
significantly high, the threat of incidents related to information security that could
jeopardize the information held by organizations is becoming more and more serious.
Throughout the years, organizations have experienced numerous losses which have had a
direct impact on their information. Fraud over information is such an example. As
evidenced by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), by the end of 2009, there were
592 corporate fraud cases involving manipulation and abuse of financial information
throughout the United States (U.S.), several of which involved losses to public investors
that individually exceeded the $1 billion mark. The FBI also reported that in 2011 alone,
there were 726 pending corporate fraud cases in the U.S. involving accounting schemes
designed to deceive investors, auditors, and analysts regarding the true financial
condition of a corporation. Figure 1 shows the number of corporate fraud pending cases
investigated by the FBI in the U.S. since 2007 through 2011.
Additionally, the 2009 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (conducted on
443 information security and information technology (IT) professionals in the U.S.)
found that average information security losses in organizations, leading to computer
security breaches, reached approximately $234,300 per respondent. Along the same line,
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in a study performed by Bedard, Graham, and Jackson (2008), about 21 percent of all
deficiencies detected in selected audited organizations were related to information

Note: Adapted from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Financial Crimes Report to the
Public Fiscal Year, Department of Justice, U.S., 2011
Figure 1. U.S. corporate fraud pending cases investigated by the FBI since 2007

security. Particularly, Bedard et al.’s (2008) study noted that there were no adequate
information security controls (ISC) in place within the organizations examined, and the
ones in place were not operating effectively. This was the main reason for such
significant percentage of deficiencies identified. To further emphasize the significance of
security over organizations’ information, a 2008 survey conducted by Chief Information
Officer Research on 173 IT executives revealed that information security is by far the
single largest potential barrier to organizations (Mather, Kumaraswamy, & Latif, 2009).
Another fact in today's organizational culture is that most information security
challenges are being addressed through the use of security tools and technologies, such
as, encryption, firewalls, access management, etc. (Volonino & Robinson, 2004; Vaast,
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2007). Although tools and technologies are an integral part of organizations’ information
security plans, it is argued that they alone are not sufficient to address information
security problems (Herath & Rao, 2009). To improve overall information security,
organizations must evaluate (and thus implement) appropriate ISC that satisfy their
specific security requirements (Barnard & Von Solms, 2000; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007;
Karyda, Kiountouzis, & Kokolakis, 2004). However, due to a variety of organizationalspecific constraints (e.g., costs, availability of resources, etc.), organizations do not have
the luxury of selecting and implementing all required ISC.
The alarming facts and figures just presented point to existent inadequacies and
inefficiencies in regards to information security practices, while also serve as motivation
for finding innovated ways to assist organizations improve their capabilities for securing
valuable information. To this end, it is imperative that ISC around systems and
applications in organizations be evaluated and, most importantly, accurately prioritized so
that only the best and most appropriate ones get implemented. Adequate selection and
implementation of ISC reduce opportunities for information system failures.
Simultaneously, the effective operation of ISC assists organizations in maintaining a
well-designed and controlled information systems environment.
Research efforts have resulted in various approaches and methodologies developed to
deal with the ISC assessment problem. A closer look at these approaches and
methodologies highlights various opportunities to create new methodologies for ISC
evaluation with the potential to significantly improve the overall information security in
organizations. For instance, and as will be supported in the next Chapter, there have been
weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies that can preclude an

4
effective assessment and, therefore, implementation of ISC in organizations over their
information.
1.1 Problem Statement
Adequate evaluation of ISC is crucial to organizations in maintaining sound
information security as well as in protecting their information assets. Nevertheless, the
literature points out several issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies within
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC in
organizations. To mention one, the selection of ISC in organizations using traditional
methods has been mainly determined based on crisp or dichotomous values (i.e., yes or
no type answers based solely on decision makers’ preferences). Organizations base their
selection process subjectively on whether the ISC is either relevant or not. ISC that are
determined to be relevant will be selected and implemented. There are other reasons that
cause current ISC assessment methodologies to prompt for improvement. For example,
some methodologies do not adequately account for organization constraints (e.g., costs,
resource availability, scheduling of personnel, etc.), while other methodologies leave the
identification of ISC to users, resulting in the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC
and/or exclusion of required ones. Furthermore, there are less formal assessment
methodologies that base their ISC selection on ad hoc or random approaches, leading
once again to the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC and/or exclusion of required
ISC. To continue on, ISC assessment methodologies based on checklists could result in a
flawed information security strategy as checklists are concerned on what can be done
without any analytical stability about the kind of actions identified. For a complete
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description of weaknesses found in the literature related to ISC assessment
methodologies, refer to Chapter two.
The weaknesses identified above not only affect the ISC selection process, but also
impact the overall protection of the information’s confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (Saint-Germain, 2005). In other words, the lack of adequate information
security over valuable, sensitive, or critical financial information may allow for (1)
fraud, manipulation, and/or misuse of data; (2) security-related deficiencies and findings;
(3) bogus trades to inflate profits or hide losses; (4) false accounting journal entries; (5)
computer security breaches; and (6) false transactions to evade regulators, among others.
Traditional ISC assessment methodologies, such as, Risk Analysis and Management
(RAM), baseline manuals or best practice frameworks (e.g., OCTAVE, NIST, etc.), adhoc approaches, and checklists, among others, must therefore be strengthened and
improved to assist organizations with their ISC selection process. The existence of
weaknesses within these traditional ISC assessment methodologies does not promote an
effective assessment, selection, or prioritization of ISC in organizations over their
information. Effective information system security implementation requires
identification, assessment, and prioritization of the most appropriate ISC (van der Haar &
von Solms, 2003), taking into account the issues presented above. In order to increase the
effectiveness of the evaluation and selection process for ISC in organizations, new,
effective, and efficient assessment methods need to be developed. Development of such
assessment methodology constitutes a significant contribution to the information security
literature. The aim of this dissertation or research problem was, therefore, to develop an
ISC assessment methodology that adequately address the existing weaknesses identified
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in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in a more effective selection of
ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security in organizations.
1.2 Dissertation Goal
The goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment methodology that (a)
considers all-inclusive scenarios when evaluating ISC; (b) adequately accounts for
organizations’ restrictions and constraints; (c) significantly minimizes subjectivity and
ambiguity (via providing precise evaluation values for ISC); and (d) prevents
unnecessary and random ISC selections. The aforementioned methodology can better
assist organizations when selecting ISC in order to mitigate information security risks.
As it will be explained and evidenced in later chapters, fuzzy set theory (FST) allows
for a more adequate representation of imprecise parameters (i.e., when determining the
importance of ISC) than existing and traditional methodologies. An evaluation of ISC
using FST could therefore lead to a thorough, more detailed assessment by providing
precise values, thus, supporting a more effective ISC evaluation and prioritization,
ultimately improving information security in the organization.
1.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses
Currently, there are significant weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment
methodologies that can prevent the effective assessment, prioritization, and
implementation of ISC in organizations over their information. Failure of paying
adequate attention to address these weaknesses and/or inadequacies may open up
opportunities for information security breaches which can negatively impact
organizations, including their IT environments. Some of these information security
breaches may include security-related deficiencies and findings; false accounting journal

7
entries; false transactions to evade regulators; bogus trades to inflate profits or hide
losses; and fraud, manipulation, and/or misuse of data; among others.
The purpose of this dissertation was to develop a methodology that corrects
weaknesses identified in existing ISC assessment methodologies, and explore whether
such new methodology enhance the overall information security in organizations. A
methodology that resolve the weaknesses identified, while capable of modeling imprecise
parameters (i.e., criteria for determining relevance) when evaluating ISC will result in a
more accurate assessment, which is crucial to determine the best ISC. One technique that
can be used to address the limitations stated above is through FST.
The FST-based ISC assessment methodology is expected to address the weaknesses
identified in current evaluation processes by (a) contemplating all-inclusive ISC
scenarios; (b) employing a less-subjective, accuracy-based method; (c) preventing /
eliminating the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; (d) considering organizations’
restrictions and constraints; and (e) improving, in turn, the overall information security in
organizations.
To recall, the research problem described earlier was to develop a methodology that
addresses the existing weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, which
may result in an enhanced information security in organizations. Consistent with the
above, the research questions (RQ) to be addressed by this dissertation follow:
RQ1: How does an ISC assessment methodology that is developed using FST
address the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional
assessment methodologies?
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RQ2: To what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST
enhance information security in the organization?
In seeking answers to RQ1 and RQ2, the following research hypotheses (H) were
derived:
H1: An ISC assessment methodology that is constructed using FST contemplates
all-inclusive ISC scenarios; employs a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based
method; prevents or eliminates the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and
considers organizations’ restrictions and constraints when assessing ISC.
H2: An ISC assessment methodology developed with FST that addresses the
weaknesses identified in traditional assessment methodologies enhances
information security in the organization.
Based on the information, arguments, and claims presented above, the research model
is illustrated in Figure 2.

FST-based ISC
assessment
methodology

H1

Addresses existing
weaknesses in
traditional assessment
methodologies

H2

Enhances information
security in the
organization

Figure 2. Relationship Between a FST-based ISC Assessment Methodology and Information
Security in the Organization

1.4 Relevance and Significance
It is essential that organizations adjust their information security to meet a reasonably
expected security level. Organizations should assess regularly their information security
in order to ensure the safety of their information assets. Nonetheless, since there is a large
number of ISC that can be selected and implemented, organizations usually do not know

9
which ISC are the most effective in protecting their information. The evaluation and
prioritization of ISC conducted within this dissertation, therefore, constitute a strategic
decision making problem. An assessment methodology that evaluates and prioritizes ISC
effectively, in a more precise manner, is undoubtedly of interest to many organizations.
When evaluating ISC, organizations must evaluate and prioritize them in order to
satisfy their IT security requirements (Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007; Karyda, Kiountouzis, &
Kokolakis, 2004; Barnard & von Solms, 2000). Equally important, organizations do not
have the luxury of implementing all available ISC due to a variety of organizationalspecific constraints (e.g., costs, resources availability, scheduling restrictions, etc.).
ISC assessment methodologies, such as the one built in this dissertation, must need to be
available to assist organizations when evaluating and prioritizing ISC.
The evaluation process referred to above must be performed carefully in order to fit
the specific needs of the organization, as there is no single IT solution that can fit all
organizations (Whitman, Towsend, & Aalberts, 2001). Additionally, the assessment
methodology developed herein precisely evaluates and prioritizes ISC, according to
organizations’ specific requirements and criteria, as well as generates more accurate
assessment scores, representing a valid and significant contribution to the information
security literature.
Moreover, except for studies performed by Zlateva, Velev, and Zabunov (2011) and
Schryen (2010), which used fuzzy logic to estimate real estate investment risks, and to
present a novel fuzzy-set based decision support model for security investment decision
makers, respectively, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there have been no other
research studies within the literature that have specifically evaluated and prioritized ISC
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in organizations using FST (Otero, Ejnioui, Otero, & Tejay, 2012a; Otero, Tejay, Otero,
& Ruiz, 2012b; Ejnioui, Otero, Tejay, Otero, & Qureshi, 2012). Schryen (2010)
presented a unique fuzzy-set based decision support model for security investment
decision makers. The author proposed a formal security language by applying
propositional logic, decision theory, and FST in order to develop the decision model.
Schryen (2010) further drew on computational complexity theory to analyze the
complexity of the model. Zlateva et al. (2011), on the other hand, proposed a fuzzy logic
model for complex estimation of real estate investment risks, based on available
information sources and expert knowledge. The fuzzy logic model was designed as a
hierarchical system that included several variables. Zlateva et al.’s (2011) model was
intended to be implemented as a Web service in a cloud computing environment for
increasing the span and efficiency of real estate manager activities.
Based on the above, an assessment methodology that precisely evaluates and
prioritizes ISC using FST represents a valid contribution to the information security
literature and is of significant interest to organizations. The methodology developed in
this dissertation adds practical value, as it helps organizations in dealing with the
information security problem by accurately identifying which ISC need to be selected,
and eventually implemented in order to ensure adequate protection of the information.
1.5 Definitions of Terms
The following definitions are provided to ensure a clear understanding of some
specific terms used throughout this dissertation.
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Best Practices: Control Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT) 4.1
defines best practices as proven activities or processes that have been successfully used
by multiple organizations.
Design-Science Research: refers to, based on Hevner, March, Park, and Ram (2004), a
problem-solving paradigm. Hevner et al. (2004) also refer to Denning (1997) and
Tsichritzis (1998) when stating that Design-Science Research “seeks to create
innovations that define the ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through
which the analysis, design, implementation, management, and use of information systems
can be effectively and efficiently accomplished” (p. 76).
Fuzzy Set Theory: Based on Zimmermann (2001), Fuzzy Set Theory “provides a strict
mathematical framework …in which vague conceptual phenomena can be precisely and
rigorously studied” (p. 318). Fuzzy Set Theory is utilized to model situations in which
fuzzy relations, criteria, and phenomena exist (Zimmermann, 2001).
Fuzzy Logic: allows logical reasoning with partially true imprecise statements (Das,
2009). In other words, in fuzzy logic, propositions can be true to some degree; meaning
that truth values are no longer restricted to the two values ‘true’ and ‘false’, but expressed
by the linguistic variables ‘true’ and ‘false’ (Zimmermann, 2010). Fuzzy logic is a
complex mathematical method that allows solving difficult simulated problems with
many inputs and output variables.
Information: defined as an asset essential to organizations which needs to be suitably
protected. It can exist in many forms (e.g., printed or written on paper, electronically
stored, transmitted using electronic means, shown on films, spoken in conversations, etc.)
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(British Standard International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International
Electro technical Commission (IEC) 27002, 2005).
Information Security: according to the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005), refers to “the protection of
information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize
business risk, and maximize return on investments and business opportunities” (p. viii).
Security of information is achieved by implementing a suitable set of procedures or
controls, including, but not limited to, policies, processes, guidance, best practices, and
organizational structures, among others.
Information Security Controls: include policies, processes, guidance, best practices,
organizational structures, and software and hardware functions, among others. These
controls are established, implemented, monitored, reviewed, and enhanced, where
necessary, to ensure that (1) specific information security business objectives are
achieved, as well as (2) information security risks are addressed or mitigated (ISO/IEC
27002, 2005).
Organization: defined per COBIT 4.1 as the manner in which an enterprise is structured
(i.e., entity).
Risk: in business terms, COBIT 4.1 defines it as the potential that a given threat will
exploit vulnerabilities of an asset or group of assets to cause loss and/or damage to the
assets. It is usually measured by a combination of impact and probability of occurrence.
1.6 Summary
Chapter one stressed how critical information security is to organizations given the
current high use and dependence of computers and information systems. Specific facts
and figures identified by the FBI, the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey, and
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the literature related to fraud schemes and information security breaches, among others,
were mentioned and discussed. Such alarming facts and figures give rise to inadequacies
and inefficiencies in regards to information security practices, while also serve as
motivation for finding innovated ways to assist organizations improve their capabilities
for securing their valuable information.
As seen above, the literature argues that the current use of information security tools
and technologies (encryption, firewalls, access management, etc.) alone is not sufficient
to protect the information and address information security challenges. Another major
step towards the protection of information is the implementation of ISC. Nevertheless,
due to a variety of constraints (e.g., costs, availability of resources, etc.), business
objectives, organizational-specific criteria, etc., organizations can not implement all
possible ISC. More importantly, when reviewing traditional approaches and
methodologies used for ISC assessments in organizations, the literature shows several
issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies among these assessment methodologies
that prevent an effective ISC evaluation in organizations. This research aimed to develop
an ISC assessment methodology that adequately address the existing weaknesses
identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in a more effective
selection of ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security in organizations. The
aforementioned represents the problem that was investigated throughout this research
effort. An effective evaluation of ISC must ensure that only the best and most appropriate
ISC get implemented. Adequate selection and implementation of ISC reduce
opportunities for information system failures, potentially improving the overall
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information security in organizations. Development of such assessment methodology
constitutes a significant contribution to the information security literature.
Consistent with the above, the goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment
methodology that considers all-inclusive ISC evaluation scenarios, adequately accounts
for organizations’ restrictions and constraints; significantly minimizes subjectivity and
ambiguity; and prevents unnecessary and random ISC selections. To this end, various
research questions and hypotheses were created and proposed, respectively.
The research problem stated above was of great relevance and significance to
organizations as they constantly find themselves looking for ways to adjust their
information security plan and strategy in order to meet a reasonable information security
level. As a result, the assessment methodology developed herein that evaluates and
prioritizes ISC effectively, in a more precise manner, is undoubtedly of interest to many
organizations. The methodology helps organizations in dealing with the aforementioned
information security problem by accurately identifying which ISC need to be selected,
and eventually implemented in order to ensure adequate protection of the information.
From here on, this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter two reviews and
discusses the literature related to the evaluation of ISC in organizations. Chapter three
describes the research methodology as well as the specific research method employed.
Chapter three also explains the theory adopted for developing the ISC assessment
methodology instrument, and presents the data collection method and the rationale for its
adoption. Chapter four presents and discusses the results of this dissertation, while
Chapter five concludes this dissertation by providing the conclusions, implications,
recommendations, and summary, among others, as a result of the investigation process.
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Chapter 2
2. Review of the Literature

2. Introduction
The purpose of this Chapter is to discuss and review the literature related to the
evaluation of ISC in organizations. Following is a detailed description of the approaches
and methodologies that have been used in organizations in regards to ISC evaluations,
including several weaknesses and inadequacies identified within them.
2.1 Risk Analysis and Management
Based on Barnard and von Solms (2000), the process of identifying, selecting, and
prioritizing ISC in organizations has been a challenge in the past, and plenty of attempts
have been made to come up with the most effective way possible. Risk analysis and
management (RAM) is just one example. RAM (Methodology 1) consists of performing
business analyses as well as risk assessments, resulting in the identification of
information security risks (i.e., requirements) (Barnard & von Solms, 2000). RAM would
then list the information security requirements as well as the proposed ISC to be
implemented to mitigate the risks resulting from the analyses and assessments performed.
RAM, however, has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (van der
Haar & von Solms, 2003), not necessarily taking into account organizations’ specific
constraints. For example, through performing RAM, an organization may identify 30
ISC. Nonetheless, the organization may not be able to implement effectively the 30 ISC
due to costs and scheduling constraints, among others. Moreover, there may not be
enough resources within the organization to ensure the 30 ISC are effectively put in
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place. In this particular case, organizations list all ISC identified and subjectively
determine how critical each individual ISC is, while considering costs versus benefit
analyses. The weakness just described prompts organizations to explore new ways to
determine and measure the relevancy of ISC.
According to Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), there is no doubt that RAM has proved
useful in ensuring information security. In fact, in cases where security-related incidents
have occurred in the past, and calculation of costs is reasonable, RAM has proven to be
very practical. Nonetheless, RAM is not identified as the best or fundamental mean to
ensure information security. Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) state that organizations, when
performing RAM, establish controls that are either unnecessary or relate to trivial issues.
Furthermore, exclusive reliance on RAM has often been criticized since it has proven to
be more problematic for maximizing information security rather than beneficial.
2.2 Baseline Manuals / Best Practice Frameworks, Ad-Hoc Approach
Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks (Methodology 2) are approaches
widely used by organizations to introduce ISC in organizations (Barnard & von Solms,
2000). Saint-Germain (2005) states that best practice frameworks assist organizations in
identifying and selecting ISC. Some best practices include: COBIT, Information
Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and
Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE), and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST). Da Veiga and Eloff (2007) also mention other best practice
frameworks which have assisted the identification and selection of ISC. These practice
frameworks are: ISO/IEC 177995 and ISO/IEC 27001, and ISO/IEC 27002, PROTECT,
Capability Maturity Model (CMM), and Information Security Architecture (ISA).
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In Siougle and Zorkadis (2002), a baseline manual selection process was created to
provide data controllers with a framework for selecting appropriate ISC that satisfy
privacy protection legislation requirements, as well as the security and privacy objectives
of an organization. National and European data protection laws regulate the processing of
personal data and impose serious obligations to data controllers for their protection and
secure processing. Therefore, the response of organizations to data protection law
provisions and related user interests become determining factors, as well as improve
acceptance of their business services. Given the above, Siougle and Zorkadis (2002)
developed a model that would select ISC from a baseline manual, satisfying the legal
privacy protection requirements and any particular privacy requirements of the data
controller regarding the secure processing of personal data.
The process of selecting the most effective ISC from baseline manuals or best
practice frameworks is a challenging one (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003). Van der
Haar and von Solms (2003) state that baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave
the identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in terms of determining
the best controls to provide adequate information security for the particular business
situation. Additionally, identification of ISC via baseline manuals or best practice
frameworks does not necessarily take into consideration organization specific constraints,
such as, costs, scheduling, and resource constraints, among others. Other less formal
methods used, such as, ad hoc or random approaches (Methodology 3), could also lead to
the inclusion of unnecessary ISC or exclusion of required ISC (Barnard & von Solms,
2000).
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2.3 Information Security Checklists
Another method to identify and select ISC in organizations is through completing
checklists (Methodology 4). Chen and Yoon (2010) used checklists as a framework to
identify common ISC, including information security risks, within cloud-based
organizations. The checklists were to be used by both, internal and external auditors, in
assuring a secure computing environment. Chen and Yoon (2010) completed checklists
for the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) and Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) delivery
service models within a public cloud. Checklists were also completed for the community
and private deployment models. The hybrid deployment model and the Platform-as-aService delivery service model were not included within the checklists as Chen and Yoon
(2010) opted to address those in the future. Table 1 shows the issues specifically
addressed by Chen and Yoon’s (2010) developed information security checklists.
Numerous information security checklists have been proposed and used over the
years (Baskerville, 1993). Their importance, according to Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006),
has been focused on identifying “all possible threats to a computer system and propose
solutions that would help in overcoming the threat” (p. 294). Nonetheless, Dhillon and
Torkzadeh (2006) stressed that over the years the significance of information security
checklists has declined simply “because they provide little by way of analytical stability”
(p. 294). Based on interviews conducted by Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) on
information security managers, checklists are not considered to be the essence of
information security. Even though checklists may be viewed as good means to ensure
information security, exclusive reliance on them could result in a flawed information
systems security strategy (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006). Furthermore, Backhouse and
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Table 1. Checklists completed by Chen and Yoon (2010) to identify ISC
Model
IaaS

Issues addressed by Information Security Checklist
Data location aware, data ownership aware, data protection plan and best
practice, data processing isolation, data lock-in, IaaS IT architecture, regulatory
compliance, cloud IT technique, reporting control, cloud disaster recovery plan,
cloud business continuity, and overall IT projects costs.

SaaS

Data activity surrender, format, monitoring for availability, and performance.

Community

Community cloud IT architecture, cloud management, and exit strategy.

Private

Private cloud IT architecture, private cloud reporting control, and disaster
recovery / continuity plan.

Dhillon (1996) argued that although checklists draw concern on particular details of
procedures, they do not completely address the key task of understanding the substantive
questions. Checklists are concerned on what can be done without any analytical stability
in regards to the kind of actions identified (Baskerville, 1993).
2.4 Control Selection Process
Barnard and von Solms’s (2000) formalized control selection process (CSP)
(Methodology 5) approach for the selection and evaluation of ISC included a process that
eliminated the need for a random selection; as well as integrated information security
policies to formally identify ISC from the ISO/British Standard (ISO/BS) 7799 best
practice framework. In particular, Barnard and von Solms’s (2000) business analysis
included a set of high-level business oriented questions that analyzed the specific
business situation, and determined how important information security and information
security management were to the particular organization. The above resulted in the
determination of information security requirements that proposed the particular
information security policy to be introduced in the organization. Each of the security
requirements dictated one or more information security policy statements that became
part of the overall organization’s information security policy. Each policy statement
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within the information security policy was enforced by one or more ISC from the ISO/BS
7799 best practice framework.
Barnard and von Solms (2000) argued that their proposed CSP approach of
formalizing business analyses into security requirements and, eventually, information
security policies is essential for identifying ISC. Nevertheless, this ISC selection process
although eliminated the need for a random selection, still involved a high degree of
subjectivity when determining which ISC will be ultimately selected. An ideal case
would be if all processes involved (i.e., from business analyses to the selection of ISC)
could be tightly integrated into one formalized process subject to a methodological
approach that would address the subjectivity factor, thus, providing for a more accurate
ISC evaluation (Barnard & von Solms, 2000).
2.5 Desirability Functions
In Otero, Otero, and Qureshi (2010), an innovative ISC evaluation and selection
approach was developed to help decision makers select the most effective ISC in
resource-constrained organization environments. The proposed approach used desirability
functions (Methodology 6) to quantify the desirability of each ISC after taking into
account benefits and restrictions associated with implementing the particular control. The
above provides organizations with a measurement that is representative of the overall
quality of ISC based on organizational goals. Through a case study, the approach proved
successful in providing a way for measuring the quality of ISC (based on multiple
application-specific criteria) in organizations.
Otero et al.’s (2010) methodology took into consideration relevant quality attributes
of ISC in order to determine their relative importance. This allowed an ISC prioritization
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scheme that represented how well ISC met quality attributes, and how important those
quality attributes were for the specific organization. Desirability was defined in terms of
different features, where each feature was determined by the organization to either be
present or not. Once all features were identified, each individual ISC was evaluated
against each feature using a simple binary (boolean) scale (i.e., 0 or 1). ISC that satisfied
the highest number of features exposed a higher level of quality (or priority) for that
particular quality attribute.
Even though the above resulted in an ISC evaluation/prioritization approach based on
how well ISC met quality attributes, and how important those quality attributes were for
the organization, a boolean criteria for evaluating the quality attributes of ISC in order to
determine which ones to select, may not be considered a precise enough assessment for
selecting, and ultimately implementing ISC in organizations.
2.6 Information Security Control Attribute Profile
In van der Haar and von Solms (2003), a model was developed to derive the optimal
set of control attributes, called the Information Security Control Attribute Profile
(ISCAP) (Methodology 7) that in the end would assist the selection of ISC. The authors
examined attribute profiles to support the selection of ISC in organizations. Specifically,
they required organizations to obtain a set of attributes that should accompany every ISC
before being selected. Examples of these attributes included: strength; correct
installation; rules and procedures; clearance; and acceptance criteria. According to van
der Haar and von Solms (2003), before determining whether an ISC should be selected,
each ISC should have characteristics or attributes in place such as the above.
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As stated by van der Haar and von Solms (2003), identification of optimal security
characteristics for every ISC is crucial prior of being selected to ensure their effective and
continuous operation. In order to address the relevance of ISC, van der Haar and von
Solms’s (2003) ISCAP approach was based on the diversity and unique properties of
organizations, the environment that renders a security control adequate, the
organization’s information security goals and objectives, and the attributes that can
support information security. Through their ISCAP model, determination of the attributes
which ultimately would result in the selection of ISC was based on feedback gathered
from organization personnel, stating whether the information security attribute was either
present or not. Formalizing the ISCAP model into one methodological approach that
addresses the subjectivity involved when evaluating ISC in organizations, would provide
for a more accurate assessment of ISC.
2.7 Information Security Risk-Control Assessment Model
Ou Yang, Shieh, and Tzeng (2011) proposed an information security risk-control
assessment model (ISRCAM) (Methodology 8) to improve information security for
companies and organizations. Specifically, the authors developed an information security
risk-control assessment model that combined the Multi-criteria Optimization and
Compromise Solution technique (also known as VIKOR in Serbian), the analytic network
process (ANP), and the decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL), all
together, to assess the performance and validate the effectiveness of already-implemented
ISC in organizations and, thus, improve overall information security.
VIKOR is based on an aggregating function that represents closeness to the ideal, and
was employed to rank risk-control areas and risk values (Ou Yang et al., 2011). Ou Yang
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et al. (2011) state that the “VIKOR method introduced the multicriteria ranking index
based on a particular measure of ‘closeness to the ideal/aspired level’ and was introduced
as an applicable technique within Multiple Criteria Decision Making” (p. 2). VIKOR then
ranks a set of choices in the presence of conflicting criteria, assisting decision makers in
selecting the best alternative (Opricovic & Tzeng, 2007).
The ANP is derived from the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1980), and
has been used in Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) problems to relax
restrictions on hierarchical structure. Saaty (1996) proposed ANP as a new MCDM
method in order to resolve the problems of interdependence and feedback among criteria
and alternatives in real-world cases. ANP accounts for clusters with similar weights
(contrary to traditional normalization methods), dealing with different degrees of
influence among the clusters of criteria in real world situations. Ou Yang, Shieh, Leu, and
Tzeng (2008) indicate that “the assumption of equal weights for each cluster to obtain the
weighted supermatrix is unrealistic and needs to be improved” (p. 2). As a result, Ou
Yang et al. (2011) used DEMATEL results to improve the normalization process within
ANP. DEMATEL was used not only to construct the interrelations between criteria in
building the Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) network relations map, but also to improve the
normalization process of ANP (Fontela & Gabus, 1976; Gabus & Fontela, 1972). A
hybrid model such as the ISRCAM above has been successfully used in several fields
(Tzeng, Chiang, & Li, 2007; Liou, Tzeng, & Chang, 2007).
Biery (2006), however, stated that the risk management process is an ongoing process
composed of phases, such as, risk assessment; risk remediation; risk monitoring and
review; and risk management enhancement. Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research above
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regarding the ISRCAM focused on improving the risk monitoring and review phase by
proposing a risk-control assessment method to improve controls and reduce risk. The
purpose of their research was to develop an assessment model for evaluating and
monitoring previously implemented ISC to ensure the safety of information assets. An
empirical example for information security risk control assessment was presented to
illustrate the proposed method. Nonetheless, Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research study did
not address the selection of ISC, as their work assumed that ISC had already been put in
place by the organization. Instead, their work was focused on assessing the performance
and validating the effectiveness of already-implemented ISC, rather than evaluating from
an initial, all-inclusive set of ISC, and determining which ones are the best to implement.
2.8 Information Security Risk Management Method
In Lv, Zhou, and Wang (2011), an information security risk management method
(ISRMM) (Methodology 9) was developed for ranking ISC quantitatively with the help
of the PROMETHEE methodology, and the GAIA plane. The PROMETHEE method is a
multi-criteria analysis method based on pair wise comparisons (Lv et al., 2011). The
authors introduced the PROMETHEE methodology into the field of information security,
and proposed a ranking method for different types of ISC measurements by establishing a
group decision model. A multi-attribute model was designed based on the PROMETHEE
method to evaluate ISC to certain risks from several aspects provided by decision maker
preferences. A ranking of the measures was given accordingly, and a sensitivity analysis
was put forward based on the GAIA module, which considers specific organizations’
criteria and shows a graphical visualization tool for analyzing the ISC. The criteria used
included the cost of operating the security measurements, the effectiveness of the solution
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to reduce risks, social ethics, the organization security demand, and other requirements
the decision maker was concerned with.
Lv et al.’s (2011) contribution included a control ranking model which considered
multiple criteria analyses as well as the interests of decision makers for an information
security control plan to be implemented. However, as noted by the authors, even though
the expectation of every decision maker is to identify ISC that optimize all criteria, there
is still no absolute best solution, and the selection of ISC based on Lv et al.’s ISRMM
methodology mainly depended on the decision maker’s preference, resulting in the
potential selection of unnecessary ISC, or the exclusion of required ones. As seen,
subjectivity was a major contributing factor in Lv et al.’s (2011) selection of ISC research
study. In other words, decision makers employed a high degree of subjectivity when
implementing ISRMM to determine the criticality of each individual ISC before its
selection. Organizations must continue to explore new assessment methods to precisely
and accurately measure the relevancy of each ISC before determining their selection.
2.9 Legal Requirements Determination Model
In another study, Gerber and von Solms (2008) created a Legal Requirements
Determination Model (LRDM) (Methodology 10) for defining legal requirements, which
in turn, indicated relevant ISC to be selected from the list provided in the ISO/IEC 27002
best practice framework to satisfy the identified legal requirements. Specifically, the
authors: (1) developed a structured model to assist in establishing information security
requirements from a legal perspective; (2) provided an interpretation of the legal source
associated with information security requirements; and (3) proposed potential ISC from
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the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework to address the already identified legal
information security requirements.
Legal information security requirements were determined by devising and utilizing a
legal compliance questionnaire in combination with a legal matrix that included
mappings of legal aspects within each of the proposed legal categories to all related
ISO/IEC 27002 controls. Following determination of the legal requirements, a list of
relevant ISC from the ISO/IEC 27002 framework was produced to satisfy the previously
identified legal requirements.
Nonetheless, as identified and evidenced earlier, the selection of ISC from baseline
manuals or best practice frameworks, as it is the case with the LRDM using the ISO/IEC
27002 framework, represents a weakness. Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks
offer little guidance in terms of determining the best controls to provide adequate security
for the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003). Furthermore,
baseline manuals or frameworks do not necessarily take into consideration organization
specific constraints, such as, costs, scheduling, and resource constraints, among others.
2.10 Grey Relational Analysis
In Otero et al. (2012a), a methodology that used Grey Relational Analysis (GRA)
(Methodology 11) was developed to solve a multi-attribute decision making problem that
consisted of evaluating relevant quality attributes and features of ISC, and selecting the
best (high ranked) set based on those attributes and features.
Otero et al.’s (2012a) GRA assessment methodology used grey systems theory as the
basis for its development. The theory has been effective for decision problems with
imprecise or ambiguous data leading to conflicting situations in which the evaluation of
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alternatives becomes difficult. Such is the case when selecting and implementing ISC in
organizations. Grey systems theory, according to Liu and Lin (2011), has also provided
significant contributions in related areas such as:


Grey algebraic systems, grey equations, and grey matrices;



Sequence operators and generation of grey sequences;



System analysis based on grey incidence spaces and grey clustering;



Grey prediction models;



Decision making using grey target decision models; and



Optimization models using grey programming, grey game theory, and grey
control.

Otero et al. (2012a) performed a case study to implement and evaluate the
methodology. The first step involved identifying a set of ISC that could be implemented
in the organization. These ISC were obtained from the ISO/IEC 27002 standard best
practice framework, which includes an all-inclusive list of ISC that can potentially be
selected and implemented. The second step identified relevant quality attributes related to
information security and used them as evaluation criteria for all potential ISC. The
attributes were defined in terms of different features, where the importance of each
feature was expressed as a grey number. In practical applications, a grey number
represents an indeterminate number that takes its possible value from an interval or a set
of numbers.
ISC that satisfied the highest number of features exposed a higher level of quality for
that particular attribute. Once all ISC were evaluated and measurements computed for all
quality attributes and features, the methodology used the Euclidean distance between ISC
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being evaluated and ideal ISC to fuse all measurements into one unified value that was
representative of the overall quality of the ISC. The resulting ranking of each ISC was
derived based on the goals and specific needs of the organization.
As seen, Otero et al.’s (2012a) evaluation of ISC was fully dependent on the
particular organization and its information security objectives. Through a case study, the
methodology was proven successful in providing a way for measuring the quality of
information security controls based on multiple application-specific criteria. In regards of
contributions, first, the methodology is relatively simple, can be easily implemented in a
spreadsheet or software tool, and promote usage in practical scenarios where highly
complex methodologies for ISC selection may become impractical. Second, the
methodology fuses multiple evaluation criteria and features to provide a holistic view of
the overall ISC quality. Third, and probably the most meaningful contribution from a
practical standpoint, the methodology is easily extended to include additional attributes
and features, and can evaluate ISC in various domains. Overall, the methodology proved
to be a feasible technique for evaluating ISC in organizations.
Otero et al. (2012a) noted, however, that their methodology did not consider the true
degree of relevance (imprecise in nature) when evaluating ISC. Subjectivity was still a
factor when evaluating attributes and features of ISC to base their ultimate selection. The
above still represents a major problem for organizations that can potentially impact the
overall security over the information. While grey numbers can handle easily ambiguous
and imprecise data, grey systems still do not provide the powerful analytical tools
available in, for instance, FST, which allows for a more accurate, less-subjective
assessment of imprecise parameters. Otero et al. (2012a) acknowledged that the
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development of an assessment technique, based on FST, can better tackle challenging
problems with imprecise data such as ISC evaluations. An ISC assessment methodology
based on FST provides benefits and advantages over traditional methods, including a
strict mathematical methodology that can precisely and rigorously examine vague
conceptual phenomena (Zimmermann, 2010). FST has been used as a modeling, problem
solving, and data mining tool, and has proven superior to existing methods as well as
attractive to enhance classical approaches.
Based on the thorough literature review presented above, which resulted from
numerous search queries (including backward and forward search reviews) that included
keywords, such as, information security controls; selection, evaluation, or assessment;
organizations; and information security; among others, and to the best of the author’s
knowledge, there have been no other studies within the literature that have addressed the
evaluation and selection of ISC in organizations. Table 2 summarizes the literature
review just presented, pointing out the weaknesses/inadequacies of the aforementioned
ISC assessment methodologies.
As stated, the literature clearly evidences weaknesses in existing assessment
methodologies for ISC in organizations. Risks resulting from those weaknesses may
include inaccurate or incomplete processing of data; unauthorized access to data that
might destroy or manipulate data (or report logic) in a fraudulently or unintentionally
way; as well as the potential loss of data or inability to access data as required (Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB)). To support the above, in September
of 2011, investment banking company, UBS, lost more than $2 billions on unauthorized
trades, resulting from unauthorized access or access gained beyond necessary ones, by a
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Table 2. Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies
Table 2. (Continued). Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies
ISC Assessment
Methodology
1. Risk Analysis and
Management (RAM)
(Barnard & von Solms,
2000; Dhillon &
Torkzadeh, 2006)

Description of Weakness/Inadequacy
- RAM has been described as a subjective, bottom-up approach (van
der Haar & von Solms, 2003), not taking into account specific
organizations’ constraints (Barnard & von Solms, 2000).
- Per Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006), when organizations perform
RAM, controls that are either unnecessary or relate to trivial issues
are implemented.
- Exclusive reliance on RAM has proven to be more problematic
than beneficial for maximizing information security (Dhillon &
Torkzadeh 2006).

2. Baseline Manuals or Best
Practice Frameworks
(COBIT, ITIL, OCTAVE,
NIST, ISO / IEC 177995,
ISO/IEC 27001, and
ISO/IEC 27002,
PROTECT, CMM, and
ISA) (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000; SaintGermain, 2005; Da Veiga
& Eloff, 2007; Siougle &
Zorkadis, 2002)

- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave the
identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in
terms of determining the best ISC to provide adequate security for
the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003).
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks do not necessarily
account for organization specific constraints, such as, costs,
scheduling, and resource constraints, among others (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000).

3.

Ad Hoc or Random
Approach (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000)

- Ad hoc or random approaches lead to the inclusion of unnecessary
ISC and/or exclusion of required ISC (Barnard & von Solms, 2000).

4.

Information Security
Checklists (Chen & Yoon,
2010; Dhillon &
Torkzadeh, 2006;
Baskerville, 1993;
Backhouse & Dhillon,
1996)

- Dhillon and Torkzadeh (2006) stress that the significance of
information security checklists has declined simply “because they
provide little by way of analytical stability” (p. 294).
- Exclusive reliance on checklists could result in a flawed
information systems security strategy (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006).
- Backhouse and Dhillon (1996) indicate that checklists do not
completely address the key task of understanding the substantive
questions.
- Checklists are concerned on what can be done without any
analytical stability in regards to the kind of actions identified
(Baskerville, 1993).

5.

Control Selection Process
(Barnard & von Solms,
2000)

- Barnard and von Solms’ (2000) control selection process although
eliminated the need for a random selection, still involved a high
degree of subjectivity in the determination of which ISC will be
ultimately selected.
- Lack of integration of all processes involved (i.e., from business
analyses through ISC selection) into one formalized methodological
approach that would adequately address subjectivity (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000).
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Table 2. (Continued). Weaknesses of literature-based ISC assessment methodologies

6.

ISC Assessment
Methodology
Desirability Functions
(Otero et al., 2010)

Description of Weakness/Inadequacy
- A boolean criteria for evaluating the quality attributes of ISC in
order to ultimately determine which ones to select may not be
considered a precise enough (less-subjective) assessment for
selecting ISC in organizations (Otero et al., 2010).

7. ISC Attribute Profile (van
der Haar & von Solms,
2003)

- The objective of van der Haar and von Solms’ (2003) developed
model was to identify security characteristics that would be crucial
for every ISC prior of being selected to ensure their effective and
continuous operation.
- Determination of security attributes that resulted in the selection of
ISC was based strictly on feedback gathered from organization
personnel, stating whether the information security attribute was
either present or not. Formalizing the above into one methodological
approach that addresses the subjectivity involved when evaluating
ISC would provide for a more accurate assessment of ISC.

8. Information Security
Risk-Control Assessment
Model (Ou Yang et al.,
2011)

- Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) work was focused on assessing the
performance and validating the effectiveness of ISC already
implemented instead of evaluating from an initial, all-inclusive pool
of ISC, and determining which ones to implement.
- Ou Yang et al.’s (2011) research study did not address the initial
selection of ISC, as they assumed that ISC had already been put in
place in the organization.

9. Information Security Risk
Management Method (Lv
et al., 2011)

- Selection of ISC mainly depended on the decision maker’s
preference (Lv et al., 2011).
- Subjectivity was a major factor employed by the organization to
determine the criticality of each individual ISC before its selection.

10. Legal Requirements
Determination Model
(Gerber & von Solms,
2008)

- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks leave the
identification of ISC to the user, while offering little guidance in
terms of determining the best ISC to provide adequate security for
the particular business situation (van der Haar & von Solms, 2003).
- Baseline manuals or best practice frameworks do not necessarily
account for organization specific constraints, such as, costs,
scheduling, and resource constraints, among others (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000).

11. Grey Relational Analysis
(GRA) (Otero et al.,
2012a)

- The GRA methodology did not consider the true degree of
relevance (imprecise in nature) when evaluating ISC, as subjectivity
was still a factor involved in the evaluation (Otero et al., 2012a).
- GRA lacks the powerful analytical tools available in FST, which
allows for a more accurate, less-subjective assessment of imprecise
parameters.

rogue trader (Kantšukov & Medvedskaja, 2013). Various months after that, in early 2012,
card processor Global Payments, Inc., a provider of electronic transaction processing
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services for merchants, financial institutions, government agencies and multi-national
corporations, among others, experienced its second data breach in less than 12 months
involving sensitive customer information for millions of cardholders (Cheney, Hunt,
Jacob, Porter, & Summers, 2012).
Figure 3 illustrates the weaknesses listed earlier, as well as some of the risks just
mentioned that those weaknesses may translate into. Most importantly, Figure 3 shows
the significant contribution of the proposed ISC assessment methodology by addressing
the weaknesses identified and preventing and/or avoiding the potential risks illustrated,
resulting in a more effective selection of ISC and, in turn, enhanced information security
in organizations (research problem).
Table 3 further summarizes and combines the weaknesses into five and present them
in question format. Table 3 also shows the relationship between the traditionally-used
ISC assessment methodologies reviewed above (referred to as ‘M’ in the table) and each
weakness listed. That is, a “-” sign in Table 3 indicates that the methodology does not
address the weakness in question (i.e., the weakness is present in the assessment
Methodology); whereas a “+” sign indicates that the methodology does address the
weakness. A more significant purpose of Table 3 is that it supports how a FST-based
methodology (last column on the right) addresses all of the weaknesses identified from
the literature and, by doing this, how will it contribute favorably to the information
security literature.
As evidenced above, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology is expected to (a)
enhance current evaluation processes for the initial selection of ISC in organizations; (b)
employ a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based method; (c) eliminate or prevent the
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Literature-based weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies:

High levels of
subjectivity;
dichotomous
decision-based
approach (yes
or no).

Organizations’
constraints and
restrictions not
necessarily
considered.

ISC selection
left to users;
potential
selection of
unnecessary
ISC.

Ad-hoc,
random ISC
selections, or
checklists
provide little
analytical
stability.

Evaluation
focused on
existing ISC
does not
consider allinclusive
scenarios.

Proposed ISC Assessment Methodology
(Research Problem)

Risks:
Information security around financial systems and applications may not be enhanced, allowing for, among
others:

Fraud, manipulation,
and/or misuse of data

Security-related
deficiencies & findings

Computer security
breaches

Bogus trades to inflate
profits or hide losses

False accounting
journal entries

False transactions to
evade regulators

Figure 3. Weaknesses, risks, and significance of the research problem

random and unnecessary selection of ISC; (d) consider organizations’ restrictions and
constraints; and (e) improve the overall information security in organizations. Equally
significant, a FST-based assessment methodology allows for the modeling of imprecise
parameters (i.e., criteria for determining ISC relevance), resulting in a more accurate
assessment, which is crucial to determine the best ISC. Surprisingly, such a methodology
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Table 3. Relationship between ISC assessment methodologies and literature-supported
weaknesses (a “-” sign indicates that the ISC assessment methodology does not address
the weakness in question, while a “+” sign does)
Weakness/Inadequacy
Minimizes subjectivity
significantly? (van der Haar
& von Solms, 2003)

M1
-

M2
-

M3
-

M4
-

M5
-

M6
-

M7
-

M8
+

M9
-

M10
-

M11
-

FST
+

Considers organizations’
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-

-

-

+
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+

+

+

+
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+

+

Prevents selection of
unnecessary ISC? (Dhillon
& Torkzadeh, 2006;
Barnard & von Solms,
2000)
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-

-
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+

+

+

+

-

-

+

+

Eliminates random
selection? (Barnard & von
Solms, 2000; Dhillon &
Torkzadeh, 2006; SaintGermain, 2005; Da Veiga &
Eloff, 2007; Siougle &
Zorkadis, 2002; Baskerville,
1993; Otero et al., 2010; van
der Haar & von Solms,
2003; Ou Yang et al., 2011;
Lv et al., 2011; Gerber &
von Solms, 2008)

+

+

-

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

+

Consider all-inclusive, best
practice ISC for evaluation
rather than assessing just the
ISC already in place? (Ou
Yang et al., 2011)

+

+

+

+

+

-

-

-

-

+

+

+

Results

2+

2+

1+

3+

3+

3+

3+

4+

2+

2+

4+
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has not been proposed within the information security literature. The next Chapter will
describe the research methodology, including the specific research method to be
employed, as well as discuss and explain the theory used for developing the ISC
assessment instrument.
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Chapter 3
3. Methodology

3. Introduction
This Chapter describes the research methodology as well as the specific research
method employed. Chapter three also explains the theory adopted for developing the ISC
assessment methodology, including reasons supporting its selection, as well as the
underlying assumptions, and various benefits and advantages of a FST-based
methodology over traditional methodologies. Moreover, Chapter three presents the data
collection method and the rationale for its adoption.
3.1 Research Method
This dissertation follows the design-science research (DSR) method. Simon (1996)
states that the DSR method is fundamentally a problem-solving paradigm. DSR creates
and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve identified organizational problems. Artifacts,
as defined by Denning (1997) and Tsichritzis (1998), refer to innovations made to
develop ideas, best practices, technical capabilities, and products, among others, through
which the analysis, design, implementation, and use of information systems can be
effectively and efficiently achieved. Nunamaker, Chen, and Purdin (1991a) further state
that the process of constructing IT artifacts enables DSR researchers to understand the
problem being addressed, as well as the feasibility of the artifacts’ approach to the
problem’s solution. For purposes of this dissertation, an ISC assessment methodology
(i.e., artifact) will be developed to address the existing weaknesses identified in
traditional evaluation methodologies (the terms artifact and methodology will also be
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used interchangeably). The new methodology is expected to deliver rich information
about the research problem, as well as provide a solution (Hevner et al., 2004) by
enhancing current evaluation methods, ultimately improving information security in the
organization. The utilization of DSR is appropriate as it matches the purpose of this
investigation which is the creation of an artifact (i.e., FST-based ISC methodology) to
address a problem by providing effective and efficient solutions or improvements. Next,
the various DSR guidelines or process steps are listed along with their proposed
implementation.
3.2 DSR Guidelines / Process Steps
As mentioned, the DSR method is inherently a problem solving process. The
fundamental principle of DSR is that knowledge and understanding of a design problem
(and its solution) are obtained in the building and application of an artifact (Hevner et al.,
2004). Hevner et al. (2004) list seven guidelines that are crucial in understanding the
requirements for effective DSR. Similar to Hevner et al.’s (2004) guidelines, Vaishnavi
and Kuechler (2004) also developed a general method underlying DSR. Their method
included only five process steps, which represent a summarized version of Hevner et al.’s
(2004) seven DSR guidelines (see Table 4). Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) further
identified expected outputs for their five DSR process steps. Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s
(2004) five-process-steps General Methodology of DSR was followed in this dissertation.
3.3 Implementation of DSR’s General Methodology
Following is a description of the five process steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s
(2004) General Methodology of DSR, and how they will be used within the context of
this dissertation.
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Table 4. Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR Guidelines and correspondent Process Steps from
Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR
Hevner et al.’s
(2004) Guidelines
Guideline 1 Problem Relevance

Guideline 2 Research Rigor

Guideline 3 Design as Search
Process

Guideline 4 Design as an
Artifact
Guideline 5 Design Evaluation

Guideline 6 Research
Contributions

Guideline 7 Communication of
Research

Hevner et al.’s (2004)
Guidelines Description
DSR allows for the development and
implementation of solutions, using
appropriate technology, to address
significant business problems.

Vaishnavi and
Kuechler’s
(2004) Process
Steps

Vaishnavi and
Kuechler’s
(2004)
Expected
Outputs

Awareness
of
Problem

Proposal

Suggestion

Tentative
Design

Development

Artifact

Evaluation

Performance
Measures

Conclusion

Results

Rigorous methods are used by DSR to
construct and evaluate the design artifact.
That is, DSR requires that the artifact is
rigorously defined as well as formally
represented, and well-articulated.
An effective artifact is searched/identified
via utilizing correct actions and available
resources to develop the desired solution,
while addressing constraints within the
problem.
DSR results in the creation of an innovative,
purposeful artifact (instantiation) in the form
of a construct, model, or method.
Evaluation of the artifact in terms of its
utility, quality, and efficacy must be
rigorously performed.
Clear and verifiable contributions are
provided in the areas of the design artifact,
design foundations, and/or design
methodologies.
Effective communication of DSR results
must be presented to technical and
managerial audiences.

3.3.1 Process Step 1: Awareness of Problem
Hevner et al. (2004) define a problem as “differences between a goal state and the
current state of a system” (p. 85). Awareness of problem refers to the identification of
relevant needs, issues, gaps, or inadequacies that prompt for new technology-based
developments to get any system from its current state to a desired, goal state. In this
dissertation and as evidenced above, adequate evaluation of ISC in organizations is
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determinant in relation to information security. Nevertheless, the literature points out
several weaknesses in existing methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC
in organizations. Consistent with the aforementioned, the research problem of this
investigation calls for the creation of an ISC assessment methodology that adequately
addresses existing weaknesses identified in traditional ISC assessment methodologies,
resulting in a more effective selection of ISC. Moreover, a new ISC assessment
methodology that accounts for the weaknesses identified in traditional assessment
methodologies will better assist organizations in mitigating information security risks,
ultimately enhancing overall information security. The above is consistent with the
expected output of this first process step: Proposal of a new research effort.
3.3.2 Process Step 2: Suggestion
Suggestion represents an integral part of the DSR’s General Methodology, and refers
to recommended (or suggested) solutions, based on existing knowledge or theory base,
that can potentially address the problem at hand (Peirce, 1931). This process step
involves the engaging of rigorous research methods, utilizing available means, to identify
potential solutions and construct artifacts that can satisfy the problem and its constraints.
Suggestion results from the proper use of knowledge base-theoretical foundations, as well
as research methodologies used to discover effective solutions to problems. Hevner et al.
(2004) indicate that success within this step follows exhaustive (literature) reviews and
evaluations of existing tools and methodologies, including noting their advantages and
disadvantages (weaknesses), before developing a new artifact. Within this dissertation, a
thorough literature review has been performed in Chapter two, which is inline with, and
clearly supports, the objectives of this second process step. Additionally, the FST theory
adopted for designing the ISC assessment methodology, including reasons supporting its
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selection, as well as its underlying assumptions, benefits, and advantages over traditional
methodologies, is explained later in this chapter. The expected output for this step is the
Tentative Design of a prototype solution for the stated problem.
3.3.3. Process Step 3: Development
Development consists of implementing the tentative design of a prototype solution
(i.e., artifact) from process step 2. According to Hevner et al. (2004), the ultimate result
of DSR is a purposeful IT artifact developed to provide a solution to a significant
organizational problem. Hevner et al. (2004) define artifacts as “innovations that define
the ideas, practices, technical capabilities, and products through which the analysis,
design, implementation, and use of information systems can be effectively and efficiently
accomplished” (p. 83). In the context of this dissertation, the artifact built is a FST-based
ISC assessment methodology, which is also the expected output of this process step. FST
was used to prioritize ISC within higher-ranked information security areas identified by
the organization through completing a questionnaire (data collection method; refer to
Data Collection Method and Rationale for its Adoption section below) by fusing their
respective assessment values into a single, quantified measure using the Mamdani MaxMin fuzzy reasoning technique. This provided the organization with a measurement of
relevance for each ISC based strictly on specific criteria, including the organization’s
goals, objectives, and restrictions. The derived relevance measurement is used as the
main metric for evaluating and ultimately selecting ISC.
3.3.4 Process Step 4: Evaluation
When evaluating the artifact, Hevner et al. (2004) stress that the artifact’s
functionality, accuracy, reliability, usability, and other relevant quality attributes must be
thoroughly demonstrated via well-executed and articulated assessment methods.
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Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) also state that evaluation of artifacts must be inline with
the research problem established. The artifact must be evaluated according to
performance measures (e.g., criteria, etc.) established in the research problem. This is the
expected output of this process step. The evaluation phase also assists in addressing
research questions and in determining whether the hypotheses drawn about the behavior
of the artifact hold or not.
According to Hevner et al. (2004), there are five design evaluation methods typically
used when assessing an artifact. These are: (1) Observational (case studies, field studies);
(2) Analytical (static analysis, architectural analysis, optimization, dynamic analysis); (3)
Experimental (controlled experiments, simulations); (4) Testing (functional, structural);
and (5) Descriptive (informed arguments, scenarios).
The selection of the evaluation method must conform adequately with the artifact
being created as well as the selected evaluation metrics. In this dissertation, the FSTbased assessment methodology was evaluated through performing comparisons and
contrasts against existing ISC assessment methodologies found in the literature (Aalst &
Kumar, 2003). The evaluation method just explained refers to the “Descriptive Design
Evaluation Method” (Hevner et al., 2004). This type of design evaluation method was
selected over the other four evaluation methods to perform relevant comparisons and
determine whether the artifact created herein enhanced existing ISC assessment
methodologies, satisfying the original requirements set in the research problem.
When compared to the other four evaluation methods, the Descriptive Design
Evaluation Method was critical in evaluating and comparing the artifact’s suitability and
effectiveness against information from the knowledge base (i.e., existing ISC assessment
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methodologies found in the literature) in order to build convincing arguments and/or
scenarios and demonstrate the artifact’s utility.
3.3.5 Process Step 5: Conclusion
Conclusion is the final process step as defined by Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004)
General Methodology of DSR. Here, results (output of this step) from the research are
documented and communicated. Results are also associated with clear and verifiable
research contributions from the creation of the artifact. Results either support, firmly, the
objectives and direction of the investigation or simply evidence the opposite.
In regards to communication, Hevner et al. (2004) recommend presenting results to
two audiences: technology and managerial audiences. When presenting to technologyoriented audiences, the artifact’s benefits must be described clearly so that practitioners
acknowledge them and encourage the artifact’s use, as well as its further evaluation and
improvement. IT practitioners must also become aware of (and understand) the process
followed to create and evaluate the artifact. A full understanding of the artifact and the
process used would allow effective evaluations and further extensions or improvements
to the artifact. On the other hand, when communicating results to managerial audiences,
Hevner et al. (2004) state that enough details must be provided for them “to determine if
the organizational resources should be committed to constructing (or purchasing) and
using the artifact within their specific organizational context” (p. 90). Management
personnel must understand the significance of the research problem and, most
importantly, the advantages and solutions achieved by the artifact. Zmud (1997)
concludes by advising that presenting result details in a short, concise, and wellarticulated manner is an appropriate and effective communication mechanism for both
audiences.
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Artifacts developed effectively under DSR provide clear contributions regarding the
artifact itself, its construction (foundation), and its evaluation (methodology). Hevner et
al. (2004) summarize these three types of contributions in Table 5. Next, the concept of
fuzzy logic is explained as well as the fuzzy set theory adopted for developing the ISC
assessment methodology. Reasons supporting the fuzzy set theory selection are
described, including the benefits and advantages a methodology based on FST provide
over traditional methodologies.
Table 5. DSR’s research contributions
Contribution
Artifact

Foundations

Methodologies

Description
- The artifact itself (e.g., methodologies, design tools, and prototype systems, etc.),
designed to enable solutions to unsolved problems, represents a practical-purpose
contribution to the environment.
- The creation of effective, adequately-evaluated methodologies that also extend and
enhance existing methodologies (i.e., foundations) denotes a significant contribution.
- The development and use of evaluation methods mentioned earlier (i.e., experimental,
analytical, observational, testing, and descriptive) along with their correspondent
measures and assessment metrics are crucial contributions of DSR.

3.4 Fuzzy Logic
Based on Zimmermann (2010), the majority of traditional tools for formal modeling,
reasoning, and computing are crisp, deterministic, and/or precise in character. Crisp
refers to dichotomous, meaning yes or no type answers, rather than a more-or-less type.
When dealing with traditional dual logic, for example, statements can be either true or
false, nothing else. This implies that the decision of whether an element belongs to a set
is unequivocal and has no ambiguities. In other words, parameters within a model are
known and there are no doubts about their values or their occurrence. Zimmermann
(2010) indicates that (logic) assumptions or beliefs, similar to the above, are not correct
in order to describe reality. Zimmermann (2010) further states that the “complete
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description of a real system would often require far more detailed data than a human
being could ever recognize simultaneously, process, and understand” (p. 317).
According to Klir and Yuan (1995), logic refers to the study of methods for
reasoning. Logic can be of type classical and fuzzy, among others. Classical logic relies
on the assumption that propositions are either true or false. In fuzzy logic, on the other
hand, propositions can be true to some degree, allowing logical reasoning with partially
true imprecise statements (Das, 2009). That is, in fuzzy logic, the truth values are no
longer restricted to the two values ‘true’ and ‘false’, but expressed by the linguistic
variables ‘true’ and ‘false’ (Zimmermann, 2010).
The subsections below provide a general description of FST and fuzzy reasoning
methods, including the Mamdani Max-Min method, followed by the defuzzification
process, and the various benefits and advantages of FST over traditional assessment
methods. The understanding of these concepts is fundamental to comprehend the fuzzy
logic utilized in developing the ISC assessment methodology. To end the section, the data
collection method is presented, followed by a summary.
3.5 Fuzzy Set Theory
According to Schryen (2010), FST refers to a valuable, uncertainty theory that is
useful in the absence of probabilities and in the presence of subjective assessments. The
theory has been utilized in many decision-making processes due to its ability to deal with
uncertain conditions (Yaakob & Watada, 2009). FST considers uncertainty and
constraints to model reality better than traditional theories (Zimmermann, 2010; Schryen,
2010). The idea of FST, as stated by Schryen (2010), is “the extension of the (crisp)
membership concept in traditional set theory by providing for a degree with which an
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element belongs to a set” (p. 8). Such a degree is specified by a membership function.
The degree of truthfulness of propositions –grounded on FST– also allows parameters to
be represented with simple linguistic terms (Zimmermann, 2010). The association of
linguistic terms with membership functions forms fuzzy sets.
Zadeh (1965) defines fuzzy sets as those sets which have boundaries that are not
precise. Moreover, Klir and Yuan (1995) state that a “fuzzy set can be defined
mathematically by assigning to each possible individual in the universe of discourse a
value representing its grade of membership in the fuzzy set” (p. 4). Such a grade refers to
the degree to which that individual, entity, etc., is similar or compatible with the concept
represented by the fuzzy set. In other words, those individuals or entities may belong in
the fuzzy set, either to a greater or a lesser degree, as indicated by a larger or smaller
membership grade (Klir & Yuan, 1995). The membership in a fuzzy set is not a matter of
affirmation or denial, right or wrong but rather a matter of a degree (Zadeh, 1965).
Membership grades or functions map elements from any universal set into real
numbers within the range 0 - 1. The resulting number represents the degree of
membership of elements to particular fuzzy sets, where values closer to one represent
higher degrees of membership (Zimmermann, 2010). There are various forms of
membership functions and determining the appropriate ones is essential for making FST
practically useful (Klir & Yuan, 1995). The most common membership functions used to
represent fuzzy numbers are formed by using straight lines. They are: triangular and
trapezoidal. Triangular membership functions are usually preferred due to their
combination of solid theoretical basis and simplicity (Pedrycz, 1994). Figure 4 shows an
example of a triangular fuzzy set to denote AVERAGE as a function of estimated
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implementation costs for each ISC. Here, a cost of $25,000 fully belongs to the fuzzy set;
therefore, the degree of membership is 1.0. Costs of $20,000 and $30,000 have 0.5
degrees of membership to the fuzzy set, while costs less than $15,000 and greater than
$35,000 are not part of the fuzzy set.
Lorterapong (1995) describes a trapezoidal membership function as a function
represented by four parameters or characteristic points (i.e., a, b, c, and d), where a and d

Figure 4. Example of a Triangular Fuzzy Set

are the lower and upper bounds, respectively, while b represents the lower modal value,
and c the upper modal value. Figure 5 shows an example of a trapezoidal fuzzy set to
denote a MEDIUM classification when measuring the number of applications the
particular ISC is expected to protect (i.e., scope). Here, one (1) is the lower bound and
four (4) is the upper bound. Two (2) and three (3) in the horizontal axis represent the
lower and upper modal values, respectively. In other words, ISC that protect two (2) and
three (3) applications fully belong to the fuzzy set shown in Figure 5 and, thus, will have
a higher priority of selection; while ISC that do not protect any application (less than one
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(1)) and those that protect five (5) applications and more will fall outside of this specific
fuzzy set.
There are other situations where more complex functions may be required to
represent the degrees of membership of elements in fuzzy sets. Klir and Yuan (1995)
discuss direct and indirect methods to form fuzzy sets by gathering and processing
responses from subject matter experts, or from literature reviews.

Figure 5. Example of a Trapezoidal Fuzzy Set

3.6 Fuzzy Reasoning
Based on Das (2009), fuzzy reasoning refers to the process of developing logical
inferences from imprecise premises. Such process results from classical logic concepts.
In classical logic, a widely used inference rule is the modus ponens. The modus ponens
inference rule states that a conclusion can be inferred given a conditional proposition and
a fact. For instance, a classical modus ponens inference using the relationship between
the value (or score) of a particular ISC, and its level of priority can be expressed as
shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that if the generated value/score of ISC_1 is x
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(Proposition 1), and x implies a ‘low priority’ for an ISC, as defined by the organization
based on a specific criteria (Proposition 2), then it can be inferred that ISC_1 has a ‘low
priority’ and, therefore, must not be selected for implementation (Conclusion). Notice
that this type of inference structure deals with binary-valued propositions, meaning that
the solution set to describe the priority level of a ISC is {0,1} when using the classical
modus ponens.
Table 6. Classical Modus Ponens
Type of Statement
Proposition 1

Statement
Generated value/score of ISC_1 = x

Proposition 2

‘x’  A low priority ISC as
specified by the organization

Conclusion

ISC_1 = A low priority ISC

The classical modus ponens just described must be generalized in order to be used for
fuzzy reasoning purposes. Such generalization is obtained as follows. First, the
generalized version considers degrees of membership of elements to fuzzy sets.
Therefore, the solution set to describe the priority level of ISC is expanded from {0,1} to
[0,1]. Second, propositions showing completely true implications via the ‘=>’ symbol are
replaced with fuzzy rules.
Fuzzy rules are conditional and unqualified propositions implying fuzzy relationships
between antecedents and consequences (Klir & Yuan, 1995). This relationship, also
known as a fuzzy implication, is not explicit but rather embedded within the proposition
and determined for all values of antecedents and consequences (Demicco & Klir, 2004).
Fuzzy systems usually involve more than one fuzzy rule. The process of obtaining overall
consequences from individual consequences is known as aggregation (Ross, 2010).
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Aggregation combines several fuzzy sets to produce a single fuzzy set. Aggregation of
rules can be performed:


conjunctively: rules are jointly satisfied, using connector “AND”, producing an
aggregate output based on the fuzzy intersection of all individual rule
consequences, as well as



disjunctively: at least one rule needs to be satisfied (trough using connector
“OR”), resulting in an aggregate output based on the fuzzy union of all individual
rules.

In this dissertation, decisions were made based on the testing of all rules defined
within the proposed fuzzy inference system. Therefore, all rules were combined in order
to obtain a single fuzzy set. Through the aggregation process, all fuzzy sets that represent
the output of every single rule are combined into a single fuzzy set (i.e., determination of
whether ISC should or should not be selected).
The third step in generalizing the classical modus ponens involves the use of the
compositional rule of inference shown in equation (1).
 B ( y)

= sup min [  A

(x)

, R(x, y)]

(1)

x∈X

Klir and Yuan (1995) state that equation (1) obtains degree of membership  B ( y) for all
y ∈ Y given a fuzzy implication R; as well as degree of membership  A (x) given that R is
a fuzzy relation on X x Y and A and B are fuzzy sets on X and Y, respectively. With the
compositional rule of inference, a fuzzy conclusion can be obtained given both, a fuzzy
rule and a fuzzy fact. The generalized modus ponens form of inference (shown in Table
7) is considered by many as the foundation for various fuzzy reasoning methods
presented in the literature (Mizumoto & Zimmermann, 1982).
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Table 7. Generalized Modus Ponens
Type of Statement
Fuzzy Rule

Statement
If x is A, Then y is B

Fact

 A (x)

Fuzzy Conclusion

 B ( y)

3.7 Mamdani Max-Min Fuzzy Reasoning Technique
The fuzzy reasoning technique used in this dissertation was the Mamdani Max-Min
(Mamdani) method, which engages the generalized modus ponens process just described
for each fuzzy rule. This Mamdani method is the most commonly used fuzzy inference
technique (Kaur & Kaur, 2012) and it is performed in four steps: (1) Fuzzification of the
input variables; (2) Evaluation of rules (inference); (3) Aggregation of the rule outputs
(composition); and (4) Defuzzification. The Mamdani method follows the multiconditional reasoning structure which is illustrated in Table 8.
Based on the Mamdani method, the fuzzy implication (required by the compositional
rule of inference) equals the truth value of the antecedent. In other words, and based on
Table 8. Multi-conditional Reasoning Structure
Type of Statement
Rule 1
Rule 2
…
Rule n
Fact
Conclusion

Statement
If x is A1, then y is B1
If x is A2, then y is B2
…
If x is An, then y is Bn
 A (x)

 B ( y)

Otero and Otero (2011), the fuzzy implication for singleton fuzzy rules equals the degree
of membership of the only statement in the antecedent (Figure 6A). For non-singleton
fuzzy rules and based on operator ‘AND’, the fuzzy implication is computed as the
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intersection or conjunction of the statements in the antecedent via the minimum logical
operation shown in equation (2) (Figure 6B).



AB

(x) = min [  A (x) ,  B (x) ]

(2)

Equation (2) returns the smallest element where A and B are limited to the range (0, 1).
Fuzzy operator ‘OR’, on the other hand, is known as the fuzzy union or disjunction,
returning the maximum elements where again A and B are limited to the range (0, 1). It is
denoted by equation (3), where A and B are two given fuzzy sets with memberships
functions μA(x) and μB(x).



AUB

(x) = max [  A (x) ,  B (x) ]

(3)

An antecedent with a truth value greater than zero automatically implies that its
consequence also has a truth value greater than zero. In fuzzy reasoning terms, a true
antecedent causes a rule to fire. The fired rules are then combined into fuzzy sets which
are used to make final inferences (Figure 6C). Fired rules will be combined according to
each criteria or fuzzy set evaluated. In evaluating ISC, the methodology will require the
creation of a fuzzy set for each criteria evaluated. Evaluation criteria in this study include
estimated implementation costs, scope, compliance, and risks. Therefore, there were four
fuzzy sets created for cost, scope, compliance, and risks used to assess and determine
ultimate ISC selection. Each criteria have its own set of fuzzy or inference rules defined
to assist with the evaluation. Upon the result of truth values from antecedents, fired rules
are aggregated per criteria, and utilized for final ISC selection inference.
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3.8 Mamdani and Other Fuzzy Reasoning Methods
Other very common fuzzy implication or inference mechanism methods include the
Sugeno-Type Fuzzy Inference (also known as Takagi-Sugeno method) and the Larsen
Product Implication, both described in Table 9.

Figure 6. Mamdani Max-Min Inference

When compared to the Mamdani approach, Kaur and Kaur (2012) state that the SugenoType Fuzzy Inference method (1) works well with optimization and adaptive techniques,
which makes it very attractive in control problems; (2) has enhanced processing time
over the Mamdani’s defuzzification process; (3) is computationally efficient since it
Table 9. Common Fuzzy Reasoning Methods
Method
Sugeno-Type
Fuzzy Inference

Description
Similar to the Mamdani method in the first two parts of the
fuzzy inference process (i.e., fuzzifying the inputs and rules
evaluation). Nonetheless, its output membership functions are
either linear or constant. That is, instead of a fuzzy set (or
defuzzification) as used by Mamdani, Sugeno uses a
mathematical function (weighted average) of the input
variable to compute the crisp output (Kaur & Kaur, 2012).

Larsen Product
Implication

Larsen uses the arithmetic product operation between the two
membership functions as a fuzzy implication in the universe
of discourses (Larsen, 1980).
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works with linear techniques; and (4) may guarantee continuity of the output surface and
is well-suited to mathematical analysis. Nevertheless, the Mamdani approach is more
intuitive and has a widespread of acceptance. The major disadvantage of the Sugeno
method is that it is not well suited to human input when compared to the Mamdani
approach. Moreover, the expressive power and interpretability of Mamdani output is lost
in Sugeno since its consequents or outputs are not fuzzy, but linear or constant in nature.
The Larsen product implication method is somewhat similar to the Mamdani method
described above, but it uses the arithmetic product operation (i.e., multiplication) between
the two membership functions as a fuzzy implication in the universe of discourses
(Larsen, 1980). This way, the overall antecedent of the fuzzy rule is the maximum of the
two fuzzy propositions of the antecedent. Mamdani, on the other hand, uses fuzzy
operators ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ to obtain a single number that represents the result of the
antecedent evaluation. The operator ‘AND’ evaluates the intersection or conjunction of
the rule antecedents, while ‘OR’ assesses the union or disjunction of the rule antecedents.
The Larsen product implication, however, becomes computationally difficult as more and
more rules are added to the fuzzy evaluation system (Larsen, 1980). The Mamdani
approach may also entail a substantial computational burden (i.e., increase in computing
time) as the number of rules grows, however, the precision of the system also increase
with the increment in fuzzy rules (Bhoyar & Kakde, 2009).
The Mamdani method was chosen for this dissertation because, when producing
output for decision-making, it does so by providing fuzzy, non-linear conclusions
obtained given both, fuzzy rules and fuzzy facts. Given the high subjectivity identified in
current evaluation methods from the literature when selecting ISC in organizations,
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Mamdani offers advantages when providing for mathematical convenience due to its
simplicity and low computational complexity, high degree of accuracy when evaluating
imprecision information, and ease of implementation and testing. In Sugeno, the output
produced is not fuzzy-based (as Sugeno has no output membership functions), but
restricted to constant or linear values. In other words, outputs in Sugeno are limited,
subject to the range 0-1 (Kaur & Kaur, 2012), which makes the approach not suitable
when handling imprecise criteria as required by this dissertation.
Another critical advantage of using a rule-based approach such as Mamdani is that
processing for all received inputs, via fuzzy ‘if-then’ rules, is strictly human based. This
approach can be expressed in simple language words using the logic a human would use
to perform the tasks. Cox (2005) supports the aforementioned by stating that a
Mamdani’s fuzzy rule-based system derives its ‘expertise’ (rule induction process) from
subject matter experts. The rules represent nonprocedural statements of knowledge in the
form of ‘if-then’ sentences. The rules also reference local variables that, in turn, reference
fuzzy sets which ultimately define control regions over the variables’ domain. Cox
(2005) further states that the framework of a rule-based approach is “relatively
uncomplicated” (p.100).
As evidenced, the Mamdani approach represents a suitable method for performing an
effective evaluation of ISC in organizations. Such fuzzy reasoning technique offers
robustness, as its defined rules tolerate imprecise measurements and component
variations, and easy adaptation in terms tuning fuzzy rules as it becomes necessary
(Salmasi, 2007). According to Kaur and Kaur (2012), its intuitiveness, human-like
manner for capturing expert knowledge, expressive power and interpretability of its fuzzy
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output, as well as its widely use, particularly, in decision support applications, made the
Mamdani method the appropriate reasoning technique for this dissertation.

3.9 Defuzzification
Defuzzification converts conclusions from fuzzy sets into a real number, or a single
crisp value (Yager, 1996). Ross (2010) also defines the defuzzification process as the
conversion of a fuzzy quantity to a precise quantity, represented by the logical union of
two or more fuzzy membership functions defined on the universe of discourse of the
output variable. In other words, the purpose of defuzzification is to find one single crisp
value that summarizes the fuzzy set. There are several methods available for
defuzzification; among the most common are the center of gravity approach (i.e.,
centroid) and the weighted average method (Ross, 2010).
The centroid method is the most prevalent and intuitively appealing defuzzification
technique. This method takes the center of gravity (COG) and uses integrals to calculate
the area of a combination of fuzzy sets. Equation (4) describes algebraic expression for
this method, where  A are the degrees of membership
b

COG =

òm

A

(x)x dx

a
b

òm

(4)
A

(x)dx

a

The calculation of the center of gravity is simplified if a finite universe of discourse and
thus a discrete membership function is considered.
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In equation (5), μi is the value of the membership function of the fuzzy set rule i, Ai is the
corresponding area and  i is the degree that the rule i is fired (between 0 and 1). Figure
6C illustrates the center of gravity or centroid of a fuzzy set.
Other methods, such as the weighted average method (shown in equation 6), are
reliable, less complicated, less time consuming, and also accurate to approximate the
center of gravity (Genske & Heinrich, 2009). The weighted average defuzzification
method, based on peak values for every fuzzy set, calculates weighted sums of the peak
values. Based on those weight values and the degree of membership for fuzzy outputs,
crisp values of the output are determined using the following formula, where μi is the

  ( x)  W
i

Z0 

  ( x)

i

(6)
i

degree of membership in output singleton i, and Wi is the fuzzy output weight value for
the output singleton i (Ross, Hassanein, & Ali, 2010). The weighted average method has
also been frequently used in cases similar to this dissertation (Otero & Otero, 2011).
Nonetheless, the weighted average method is usually restricted to symmetrical output
membership functions, a limitation identified by Ross (2010). In this dissertation, the
center of gravity approach or centroid method was employed. Figure 6C shows an
example of the estimated center of gravity of a fuzzy set converted using the center of
gravity approach from two fired fuzzy rules. Figure 7 depicts, at an overall level, the
steps just described within a fuzzy inference system.
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Figure 7. Fuzzy Inference System

3.10 Benefits and Advantages of FST over Traditional Methods
Based on the above, and as supported by Zimmermann (2010), a FST-based
framework: (1) provides a natural, effective way of handling problems in which the
source of imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria; (2) offers a strict
mathematical methodology that can precisely and rigorously examine vague conceptual
phenomena; (3) has been used as a modeling, problem solving, and data mining tool, and
has proven superior to existing methods, as well as attractive to enhance classical
approaches; (4) relaxes classical and/or traditional assumptions through fuzzy reasoning;
and (5) suggests opportunities to improve existing methodologies and approaches. Kaur
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and Kaur (2012) further stress the flexibility of the fuzzy approach, particularly, when
adding more variables to a problem, as it would only require writing new rules or editing
the existing ones. The above translates into a lesser amount of effort than rewriting an
entire algorithm.
Klir and Yuan (1995) state that since FST deals with uncertainty, it is a great utility
also considered essential to science. FST assists in understanding the phenomenon of
reality (be it natural or man-made) via: (1) performing adequate predictions or
retrodictions; (2) learning about controlling the phenomenon; and (3) utilizing such
capabilities for various other ends. Furthermore, a FST-based approach leads to more
detailed and thorough assessments (Otero & Otero, 2011), while appropriately modeling
human decisions, which are imprecise in nature (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2001).
3.11 Data Collection Method and Rationale for its Adoption
To create the FST-based ISC assessment artifact, specific data from the organization
needed to be collected. The data collection method adopted for this study involved survey
approach. A questionnaire was provided to key information security management
personnel within the organization, such as, the Information Security Manager,
Information Security Director, or the Chief Information Security Officer, as applicable.
The survey/questionnaire approach is used when a series of questions are posed to
willing participants and their responses are summarized with percentages, frequency
counts, and/or more sophisticated statistical indexes (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001). Then,
inferences about particular populations are drawn from the responses of the sample.
Surveys are a common approach used with more or less sophistication in many areas of
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human activities. Survey research typically employs online assessments, written
questionnaires, face-to-face interviews, or telephone interviews (Leedy & Ormrod, 2001).
Skulmoski, Hartman, and Krahn (2007) state that online technologies facilitate the
administration and management of surveys, particularly, questionnaires, as they allow
control by the researcher. Online questionnaires have extensively been used in the
literature to collect individuals’ data (Cabaniss, 2001; Richards, 2000; Schmidt, 1995).
Administration of questionnaires was conducted through e-mail which provides many
advantages to both, researcher and participants (Skulmoski et al., 2007), as e-mails can
speed up the questionnaires’ turnaround time.
Questionnaires also examine the level of agreement or disagreement of participants
(Sekaran, 2003). Additional support for using surveys or questionnaires is provided by
Leedy and Ormrod (2001) when stating that survey approach looks more closely at
phenomena of the moment and, therefore, captures responses/feedback from a specific
moment in time.
To expand on the above, requests for participation were made for organizations
meeting the following requirements:
-

Industry: Schools, Universities, and Not-for-profit

-

Location: Puerto Rico

-

Size: Small-to-Medium

-

Convenience and Availability

A critical part of the scope of this dissertation involved the information systems (i.e.,
applications) to be in scope. The systems and applications where ISC were evaluated
comprised only financial applications. All other applications and/or information systems
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within organizations (e.g., applications, databases, operating systems, networks in place
for operational / non-financial purposes, etc.) were not included in this dissertation.
The target audience comprised information security management personnel. Due to
their knowledge and experience, the target audience reflected an accurate representation
of the population, allowing for results to be generalizable and, thus, consistently applied
to other populations with the same characteristics in different settings (Salkind, 2009).
Data collected from participants will be maintained and available only for
investigation and analysis purposes. Moreover, to increase confidence, the survey
participants were assured that no personal information will be attached nor disclosed to
their responses, and that the data collected will be strictly for research purposes. To
attract participants and encourage their involvement in the study, the study’s research
results will be made available to interested participants, as suggested by Okoli and
Pawlowski (2004).
3.12 Summary
This Chapter provided an overview of the research methodology as well as the
specific research method that was used. Chapter three also explained the fuzzy set theory
adopted for developing the ISC assessment methodology, including reasons supporting
its selection, as well as the underlying assumptions. Benefits and advantages of a FSTbased methodology over traditional methodologies were also mentioned. Moreover,
Chapter three presented the data collection method used and the rationale for its adoption.
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Chapter 4
4. Results

4. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present and discuss the results of this dissertation.
Specifically, a description of the data collection process is provided, followed by an
explanation of the development of the FST-based artifact, including descriptions of the
Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB editors and viewers used. Findings and results are
also discussed, as well as detailed evaluations of the artifact developed against (1)
traditional ISC assessment methodologies, and (2) the organization’s already
implemented ISC, to determine whether the proposed hypotheses described in subsection “Research Questions and Hypotheses” have been supported. Lastly, a summary is
presented to close the chapter.
Data for this research were collected via a questionnaire sent through email (see
Appendix A). As stated earlier, e-mails can speed up the questionnaires’ turnaround time
and look more closely at phenomena of the moment, capturing responses and feedback
from a specific moment in time. Given that the ISC and Security Areas included in the
questionnaire were adopted from the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005) Baseline Manual or Best
Practice Framework, which is well known and a widely accepted model, the validity of
the questionnaire was acceptable. Additionally, the content of the questionnaire was pretested as well as edited, as necessary, by three subject matter experts for semantic and
syntactic checking purposes, as suggested by Emory and Cooper (1991). The three
experts have around 15-20 years of experience and have held Management positions
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within global, also known as Big Four, accounting and audit firms. They have also
provided numerous auditing and consulting services to small-to-medium size type
organizations within the schools, universities, and non-profit industry, among others. The
experts’ experience also includes working for private industries, as well as for
information systems and technology audit departments.
The questionnaire was emailed to the Information Security Manager (ISM) of a
small-to-medium size organization within the industry of schools, universities, and notfor-profits. The specific organization is a University located in Puerto Rico that offers
associate, baccalaureate, masters, and doctoral degrees in arts, humanities, natural and
social sciences, as well as in professional areas such as business, education, nursing, law,
and medical technology. Currently, there are approximately 15,000 students attending.
In regards to IT and related support activities, the organization’s approach is
centralized. That is, the organization’s computer processing is performed by its IT
Department, which is the sole provider of technology and telecommunications for the
various departments. Furthermore, the IT Department provides data processing and enduser support for the organization's systems and applications, including training and
documentation of application system controls and procedures. The IT Department’s
organizational structure consists of approximately 30 staff, under the direction of an IT
Executive Director. For purposes of this dissertation, the organization specifically
requested to remain anonymous and not make the results publicly available. The
anonymous request just mentioned is consistent with various studies from the literature
such as Bowman (2009), as well as Wang, Xu, Chan, and Chen (2002). In Bowman
(2009), the microeconomic theory was applied to the problem of calculating the
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economic value of volunteers to nonprofit organizations. Case study and survey analysis
performed in an anonymous Australian organization supported the investigation. In
another study, critical success factors of a web-based training system within an
anonymous organization were raised and evaluated via survey analysis (Wang et al.,
2002). In a further study, both the perceived organizational support for safety and the
perceived coworker support for safety were evaluated as predictors for employee safety
voice, using survey analysis on urban bus drivers from a United Kingdom’s anonymous
organization (Tucker, Chmiel, Turner, Hershcovis, & Stride, 2008).
Upon receipt of the questionnaire and as planned, the ISM started by identifying the
ISC already in place at the organization that protect financial-related applications (Step
1). All other applications and/or information systems within the organization (e.g.,
applications, databases, operating systems, networks, etc.) in place for operational or nonfinancial purposes were out of scope for purposes of this dissertation. In other words, the
ISM only identified the ISC that were implemented to secure financial-related
applications. The purpose of identifying the ISC already in place is to compare them with
the ones generated by the newly-developed methodology and evaluate, consistent with
Hypothesis 2, whether the new set of ISC enhances information security in the
organization. The ISC were selected from an all-inclusive list of ISC from the ISO/IEC
27002 best practice framework.
Following identification of the ISC currently implemented, the ISM ranked, in order
of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice
framework (Step 2). As instructed and for purposes of this dissertation, the ISM
identified the first three ranked information security areas. These were: Access Control,
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Compliance, and Human Resources Security. As mentioned earlier, a significant
advantage of the FST-methodology built herein is that it can accept and, thus, evaluate
unlimited information security areas (not only the three included in this dissertation).
For each ISC within the three ranked information security areas, and in order to start
the assessment process (Step 3), the ISM provided specific data related to literaturesupported criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks). That is, for each ISC, the
ISM entered data related to EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks. For instance, for one
ISC within the Access Control information security area, the ISM entered the following:


EIC - $16,000;



Number of systems/applications protected by ISC (Scope) - 2;



Extent to which the ISC complies with required, external laws and regulations
(Compliance) - 20%; and



Extent to which the ISC addresses information security risks (Risks) - 15%.

With the specific information provided by the ISM related to each ISC within the
three ranked information security areas, the FST-based artifact was ready to be developed
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB.
4.1 Artifact Development
According to the DSR Guidelines in Hevner et al.’s (2004), and correspondent
Process Steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR, and
consistent with Process Step 3: Development from Chapter three, the following explains
how the FST-based artifact was developed.
Hevner et al. (2004) state that the ultimate result of DSR is a purposeful IT artifact
developed to provide a solution to a significant organizational problem. In the context of
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this dissertation, the artifact built refers to a FST-based ISC assessment methodology.
FST allows for prioritization of ISC within information security areas (identified by an
organization as relevant) by fusing their respective assessment values into a single,
quantified measure using the Mamdani Max-Min fuzzy reasoning technique. This
provides organizations with a measurement of relevance for each ISC based strictly on
organizations’ specific criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks), including goals,
objectives, and restrictions. The derived relevance measurement is used as the main
metric for evaluating and ultimately selecting ISC.
The artifact was built using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB (“toolbox”). The
toolbox is a tool for solving problems with fuzzy logic. The toolbox refers to a collection
of functions built on the MATLAB computing environment that provides tools and
technologies to create and modify fuzzy inference systems (FIS) within the framework of
MATLAB. The toolbox provides several interactive tools that allow access to many of
the functions through a graphical user interface (also known as “GUI”). These GUI-based
tools set an environment for FIS design, analysis, and implementation. A significant
advantage of the toolbox is that it links most of human reasoning and concept formation
to fuzzy rules. That is, the toolbox amplifies the power of human reasoning through
providing a systematic framework for computing with fuzzy rules.
The toolbox comes with five GUI editors and viewers defined to build, edit, and view
FIS. The FIS interprets the values in the input vector and, based on user-defined rules,
assigns values to the output vector. Using the editors and viewers within the toolbox, a
rules-set is built, membership functions are defined, and FIS behaviors get analyzed.
Table 10 lists and describes the editors and viewers just mentioned.
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Table 10. Description of Toolbox’s Editors and Viewers
Editors and
Viewers
FIS Editor

Description
Displays general information about a FIS. It is within this editor that inputs are
defined and named, as well as outputs. This editor also displays information
such as the name of the FIS, type of fuzzy reasoning that is used (i.e.,
Mamdani), and defuzzification method (i.e., centroid), among other information.

Membership Function
Editor

Allows for editing the various membership functions associated with the input
and output variables of the FIS. It is within this editor that membership
functions that describe input and output variables are either created or edited.

Rule Editor

Displays and allows for editing the various fuzzy rules using one of three
formats: full English-like syntax (verbose), concise symbolic notation, or an
indexed notation. It is within this editor that rule statements that define the
behavior of the system (also known as if-then rules) get created and modified.

Rule Viewer

Displays detailed behavior of a FIS based on the specific rules defined; also,
examines the effect and behavior of modifying input variables.

Surface Viewer

Generates a three-dimensional surface resulting from inputs in relation to the
output. The dependency of one output on any two inputs or one input is
represented by the output surface map.

Figure 8 illustrates a summary of the Toolbox editors and viewers just described that
were used to develop the artifact. Specifically, Figure 8 shows the FIS Editor (top center),
Membership Function Editor (top left), Rule Editor (top right), Rule Viewer (bottom
left), and Surface Viewer (bottom right).
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Figure 8. Toolbox Editors and Viewers

Following are snapshots, descriptions, and explanations of the editors and viewers
used specifically for building the Fuzzy-based artifact.
4.1.1 FIS Editor
For purposes of the FST-based artifact being created, there are four fuzzy input
variables defined (also known as linguistic terms), each constituting a specific, literaturesupported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated Implementation Costs (EIC), Scope,
Compliance, and Risks). Refer to Figure 9. Estimated Implementation Costs for purposes
of this assessment consider capital or operating expenditures on hardware, software, and
personnel (Gordon & Loeb, 2006). Estimated Implementation Costs represent a critical

67

Figure 9. FIS Editor

factor that must be closely evaluated and monitored by management before selecting and
implementing ISC (ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). Ou Yang et al. (2011) support this claim by
stating that “managers should consider the related costs and resources when they
implement the controls…” (p. 18). Significant implementation costs will likely preclude
the selection of ISC. The second evaluation factor, Scope, assesses the impact of the ISC
on the organization. ISC that provide security of information in multiple systems and/or
applications rather than on a minimal number of systems and/or applications will have a
higher priority of selection (Otero et al., 2012a; Ejnioui et al., 2012; Otero et al., 2010).
The third factor to evaluate when determining selection of ISC is Compliance with rules,
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laws, regulations, policies and procedures, etc. According to the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005),
ISC assist organizations in complying with legal, statutory, regulatory, and contractual
requirements, as well as with organizations’ established policies, principles, standards,
and/or objectives (collectively referred to as “policies”). Compliance, as defined by
Saint-Germain (2005), includes ensuring “that all laws and regulations are respected and
that existing policies comply with the security policy in order to ensure that the objectives
laid out by senior management are met” (p. 62). Saint-Germain (2005) also states that the
lack of security compliance, perhaps by selecting and implementing the wrong set of ISC,
can translate into business losses and, even worst, severe civil and criminal penalties,
which can include fines and prison sentences. The higher the policies the ISC complies
with, the higher its chances for selection. The last evaluation factor for purposes of this
dissertation involves the number of Risks that are addressed from implementing ISC. Per
NIST SP 800-30, risks are mitigated and/or reduced to acceptable levels through
implementing the necessary controls (i.e., ISC). The higher the number of risks the ISC
addresses, mitigates, or reduces; the higher its possibility for selection (Gerber & von
Solms, 2008). The output variable used and evaluated within this dissertation was named
ISC_Selected.
4.1.2 Membership Function Editor
Membership functions were created for each particular input considering the literature
reviewed as well as input from field experts. When evaluating EIC, for instance, the
fuzzy sets or alternatives for evaluation defined within this dissertation (i.e., low,
average, and high) determine the degrees of membership for the crisp or actual data
values obtained. The fuzzy set definitions of low, average, and high used were supported
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Figure 10. Membership Function Editor for EIC

by and validated with decision-makers within the organization. The fuzzy set for Average
is depicted in a common triangular shape form in Figure 10 (values are expressed in
thousands of dollars). As illustrated in Figure 10, the average estimated implementation
cost for an ISC is defined in the range of $15,000 and $35,000. Additionally, a cost of
$25,000 fully belongs to the fuzzy set; therefore, the degree of membership, or fuzzified
input, is 1.0. EIC’s of $20,000 and $30,000 have 0.5 degrees of membership to the fuzzy
set, while EIC’s less than $15,000 and greater than $35,000 are not part of the fuzzy set.
Table 11 illustrates the inputs and output that have been defined as relevant for the
FST-based artifact along with their corresponding ranges and membership functions.
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As stated earlier, the input and output variables defined (also known as linguistic
terms), constitute a specific, literature-supported evaluation criteria (refer to Figure 9).
The range values utilized on each of the fuzzy sets resulted from phone calls and
meetings held with decision-makers within the organization, particularly with the ISM.
The range values used, according to Management, are considered standard when
evaluating information security-related controls and procedures for potential
implementation, as well as represent current practices within the industry. A similar
approach was followed to support and validate the fuzzy set definitions (e.g., low,
average, and high, etc.) specific to the inputs and output used in this dissertation.
Table 11. FST-based FIS Inputs and Output
Inputs
Estimated Implementation Cost (EIC)
Range: $0 - $50,000
Membership Functions: 3
Low
Average
High

Output
ISC Selected
Range: 0 - 10
Membership Functions: 2
No
Yes

Scope
Range: 0 - 5
Membership Functions: 3
Low
Medium
High
Compliance
Range: 0 - 100%
Membership Functions: 2
Not-Comply
Comply
Risk
Range: 0 - 100%
Membership Functions: 2
No
Yes

Table 12 shows the membership function values for input EIC, while Figure 11 shows
the graph of all membership functions within input EIC.
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Table 12. Membership Functions of the EIC Input (values are expressed in thousands of
dollars)
Fuzzy Set
Low
Average
High

Membership Function
Trapezoidal
Triangular
Trapezoidal

Values
0, 0, 7.5, 15
15, 25, 35
30, 40, 50, 50

Figure 11. Graph of Membership Functions within the EIC Input

Table 13 shows the membership function values for input Scope, while Figure 12
shows the graph of all membership functions within input Scope.
Table 13. Membership Functions of the Scope Input
Fuzzy Set
Low
Medium
High

Membership Function
Trapezoidal
Trapezoidal
Trapezoidal

Values
0, 0, 1, 2
1, 2, 3, 4
2, 4, 5, 5
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Figure 12. Graph of Membership Functions within the Scope Input

Table 14 shows the membership function values for input Compliance, while Figure
13 shows the graph of all membership functions within input Compliance.
Table 14. Membership Functions of the Compliance Input
Fuzzy Set
Not-Comply
Comply

Membership Function
Trapezoidal
Trapezoidal

Values
0, 0, 60, 90
85, 90, 100, 100
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Figure 13. Graph of Membership Functions within the Compliance Input

Table 15 shows the membership function values for input Risk, while Figure 14
shows the graph of all membership functions within input Risk.
Table 15. Membership Functions of the Risk Input
Fuzzy Set
No
Yes

Membership Function
Trapezoidal
Trapezoidal

Values
0, 0, 50, 80
75, 85, 100, 100
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Figure 14. Graph of Membership Functions within the Risk Input

Table 16 shows the membership function values for output ISC Selected, while
Figure 15 shows the graph of all membership functions within output ISC Selected.
Table 16. Membership Functions of the ISC_Selected Output
Fuzzy Set
No
Yes

Membership Function
Trapezoidal
Trapezoidal

Values
0, 0, 6, 8
8, 9, 10, 10
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Figure 15. Graph of Membership Functions within the ISC_Selected Output

4.1.3 Rule Editor

Figure 16. Rule Editor
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Within the rule editor (see Figure 16), fuzzy rules were created considering all
possible relevant scenarios. It is within the rule editor that fuzzified inputs (degrees of
membership) are processed from the original crisp values obtained according to humanbased conditional statements or fuzzy “If-then” rules.
As stated earlier, the logical “If-then” rule syntax was followed to formulate the
conditional statements that encompass the fuzzy logic system. The first part of a rule (i.e.,
the “If” part) refers to the antecedent or the input within the rule. The input portion of a
fuzzy rule is also the membership function of an element in a fuzzy set. The second part
of the rule, called the “then” part, is known as the consequent or the system output
associated to the fuzzy set. The combination of all inputs equals the possible number of
rules. For the FST-based methodology, there are 36 fuzzy rules that have been defined.
The rule building process just described was created based on the academic literature
reviewed, as well as discussions with subject matter experts. Experts were asked to assist
in the creation and validation of every single fuzzy rule given their relevant knowledge
combined with prior significant experience. Table 17 shows the input combination that
results (or not) in the selection of an ISC according to the experts. For instance, the first
rule below is to be read as follows:
IF EIC is High AND Scope is Low AND Compliance is Comply AND Risk is Yes
THEN ISC_Selected is Selected.
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Table 17. Rules to determine ISC Selection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

EIC
High
High
High
High
High
High
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
High
High
Average
Average
Average
Average
Average
Low
Low
Low
Low

Scope
Low
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
Medium
High
High
High
Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium
High
Low
Low
Low
Medium
High
Low
Low
Medium
High

Compliance
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Comply
Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply
Not Comply

Risk
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No

ISC_Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
Not Selected
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4.1.4 Rule Viewer

Figure 17. Rule Viewer

The rule viewer in Figure 17 displays the fuzzy rules that get triggered based on the
input, and how the different membership functions affect the output. The output fuzzy set
is obtained through finding one single crisp value that summarizes the fuzzy set. This is
performed by taking the center of gravity and calculating the area of a combination of
fuzzy sets. As stated in the Defuzzification section in Chapter three, the centroid
approach (shown in equations 5 and 6) is employed to determine crisp values of the fuzzy
output, as it is reliable and accurate when approximating the center of gravity (Genske &
Heinrich, 2009). In the rule viewer, the number of rows is consistent with the number of
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fuzzy rules defined (i.e., 36 in this case). Similarly, the columns displayed by the rule
viewer refer to the defined membership functions for each input and output variable.
4.1.5 Surface Viewer

Figure 18. Surface Viewer

The purpose of the Surface Viewer is to generate and plot the entire output surface
map for the system based on any two inputs and any one output in order to see a threedimensional curve that represents the mapping from the inputs. Figure 18 illustrates the
surface resulting from two input variables (Scope and EIC) in relation to the output
variable (ISC_Selected). The Scope and EIC inputs were selected for demonstration
purposes since, as stated, any two inputs can be selected. In this particular case, the
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dependency of the output ISC_Selected in relation to the two inputs Scope and EIC is
well represented by the output surface map.
Having developed the artifact, the next steps were to execute fuzzy logic over the
actual data collected to prioritize ISC within the higher-ranked information security areas,
as well as perform the required evaluations on the artifact.
4.2 Results
As stated earlier, the ISM ranked, in order of relevance, the 11 information security
areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002. As instructed and for purposes of this dissertation, the
ISM evaluated only the first three ranked information security areas. These were (in
sequential order): Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security. A
significant advantage of the FST-methodology built herein, as stated before, is that it can
accept and, thus, evaluate unlimited information security areas (not only three as included
in this dissertation). For each ISC within the three information security areas identified as
relevant, the ISM provided specific data related to literature-supported criteria (i.e., EIC,
Scope, Compliance, and Risks).
The conclusions from fuzzy sets executed by the Toolbox were converted into real
numbers, or single crisp values (i.e., Scores) through defuzzification. Defuzzification
converts a fuzzy quantity to a precise quantity, represented by the logical union of two or
more fuzzy membership functions defined on the universe of discourse of the output
variable. In other words, defuzzification finds the one single crisp value that summarizes
the fuzzy set. The defuzzification method used within this investigation, as discussed in
Chapter three, was the center of gravity or centroid approach. The centroid approach
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determines crisp values of the fuzzy output, and it is reliable and accurate when
approximating the center of gravity.
Table 18 shows defuzzification, or the one single crisp value (Score) that summarizes
the fuzzy set of logical inference results (or output fuzzy sets) for each ISC of the Access
Control area after the FST-based methodology was executed.
Table 18. Access Control
#
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

ISC Description
An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based on business
and security requirements for access.
There should be a formal user registration and de-registration procedure in place for granting
and revoking access to all information systems and services.
The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled.
The allocation of passwords should be controlled through a formal management process.
Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal process.
Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use of
passwords.
Users should ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection.
A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage media and a clear screen policy for
information processing facilities should be adopted.
Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been specifically
authorized to use.
Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote users.
Automatic equipment identification should be considered as a means to authenticate
connections from specific locations and equipment.
Physical and logical access to diagnostic and configuration ports should be controlled.
Groups of information services, users, and systems should be segregated on networks.
For shared networks, especially those extending across the organization’s boundaries, the
capability of users to connect to the network should be restricted, in line with the access
control policy and requirements of the business applications.
Routing controls should be implemented for networks to ensure that computer connections
and information flows do not breach the access control policy of the business applications.
Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure.
All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and a suitable
authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed identity of a user.
Systems for managing passwords should be interactive and should ensure quality passwords.
The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and application
controls should be restricted and tightly controlled.
Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity.
Restrictions on connection times should be used to provide security for high-risk applications.
Access to information and application system functions by users and support personnel
should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control policy.
Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated) computing environment.
A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate security measures should be adopted to
protect against the risks of using mobile computing and communication facilities.
A policy, operational plans, and procedures should be developed and implemented for
teleworking activities.

Score
9.18
3.81
9.25
8.59
9.14
9.14
3.50
3.50
9.11
9.25
3.50
8.53
3.50
3.81

3.81
9.25
9.14
8.67
9.14
9.25
8.77
9.07
3.93
3.53
3.78
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Table 19 shows defuzzification for each ISC within the second relevant information
security area, Compliance, after the FST-based methodology was executed.
Table 19. Compliance
#
1

2

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

ISC Description
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the organization’s
approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined, documented, and kept up to
date for each information system and the organization.
Appropriate procedures should be implemented to ensure compliance with legislative,
regulatory, and contractual requirements on the use of material in respect of which there may
be intellectual property rights and on the use of proprietary software products.
Important records should be protected from loss, destruction, and falsification, in accordance
with statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business requirements.
Data protection and privacy should be ensured as required in relevant legislation, regulations,
and, if applicable, contractual clauses.
Users should be deterred from using information processing facilities for unauthorized
purposes.
Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance with all relevant agreements, laws, and
regulations.
Managers should ensure that all security procedures within their area of responsibility are
carried out correctly to achieve compliance with security policies and standards.
Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security
implementation standards.
Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should be
carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes.
Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any possible misuse
or compromise.

Defuzzification results for the last relevant information security area, Human
Resources Security, are shown in Table 20, after the FST-based methodology was
executed.

Score
9.14

8.59

8.53
7.21
7.59
3.83
8.59
9.11
9.25
9.12
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Table 20. Human Resources Security
#
1
2

3

4
5

6
7
8
9

ISC Description
Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users should be
defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s information security policy.
Background verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors, and third party
users should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations and ethics, and
proportional to the business requirements, the classification of the information to be accessed,
and the perceived risks.
As part of their contractual obligation, employees, contractors and third party users should
agree and sign the terms and conditions of their employment contract, which should state their
and the organization’s responsibilities for information security.
Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to apply security in
accordance with established policies and procedures of the organization.
All employees of the organization and, where relevant, contractors and third party users should
receive appropriate awareness training and regular updates in organizational policies and
procedures, as relevant for their job function.
There should be a formal disciplinary process for employees who have committed a security
breach.
Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of employment should be
clearly defined and assigned.
All employees, contractors and third party users should return all of the organization’s assets in
their possession upon termination of their employment, contract or agreement.
The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to information and
information processing facilities should be removed upon termination of their employment,
contract or agreement, or adjusted upon change.

Score
9.05
3.54

3.53

5.33
8.59

3.81
9.24
3.50
9.10

Only ISC with scores of nine and higher are to be selected consistent with
membership functions defined for the ISC_Selected fuzzy output variable in Table 16 and
Figure 15. As a result, Tables 21, 22, and 23 show the ISC that should be selected, within
each information security area, according to the FST-based methodology and
membership functions defined.
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Table 21. Access Control - ISC to be Selected
#
1
3
5
6
9
10
16
17
19
20
22

ISC Description
An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based on business
and security requirements for access.
The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled.
Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal process.
Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use of
passwords.
Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been specifically
authorized to use.
Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote users.
Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure.
All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and a suitable
authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed identity of a user.
The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and application
controls should be restricted and tightly controlled.
Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity.
Access to information and application system functions by users and support personnel
should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control policy.

Score
9.18
9.25
9.14
9.14
9.11
9.25
9.25
9.14
9.14
9.25
9.07

Table 22. Compliance - ISC to be Selected
#
1

8
9
10

ISC Description
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the organization’s
approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined, documented, and kept up to
date for each information system and the organization.
Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security
implementation standards.
Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should be
carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business processes.
Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any possible misuse
or compromise.

Score
9.14

9.11
9.25
9.12

Table 23. Human Resources Security - ISC to be Selected
#
1
7
9

ISC Description
Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users should be
defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s information security policy.
Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of employment should be
clearly defined and assigned.
The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to information and
information processing facilities should be removed upon termination of their employment,
contract or agreement, or adjusted upon change.

Score
9.05
9.24
9.10

Tables 24, 25, and 26 display the ISC already implemented at the organization
(before running the FST-based methodology) for each relevant information security area,
as well as those identified for selection by the new FST artifact. Differences are noted
between the two. This comparison is discussed and evaluated in detail in the next sub-
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section to base the determination of whether information security in the organization is
enhanced as a result of the new selection and evaluation of ISC (RQ2, H2).
Table 24. Access Control - Differences between ISC Already Implemented
and ISC Selected per FST
#

ISC Description

1

An access control policy should be established,
documented, and reviewed based on business and
security requirements for access.
There should be a formal user registration and deregistration procedure in place for granting and revoking
access to all information systems and services.
The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted
and controlled.
The allocation of passwords should be controlled
through a formal management process.
Management should review users’ access rights at
regular intervals using a formal process.
Users should be required to follow good security
practices in the selection and use of passwords.
Users should ensure that unattended equipment has
appropriate protection.
A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage
media and a clear screen policy for information
processing facilities should be adopted.
Users should only be provided with access to the
services that they have been specifically authorized to
use.
Appropriate authentication methods should be used to
control access by remote users.
Automatic equipment identification should be
considered as a means to authenticate connections from
specific locations and equipment.
Physical and logical access to diagnostic and
configuration ports should be controlled.
Groups of information services, users, and information
systems should be segregated on networks.
For shared networks, especially those extending across
the organization’s boundaries, the capability of users to
connect to the network should be restricted, in line with
the access control policy and requirements of the
business applications.
Routing controls should be implemented for networks to
ensure that computer connections and information flows
do not breach the access control policy of the business
applications.
Access to operating systems should be controlled by a
secure log-on procedure.
All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for
their personal use only, and a suitable authentication
technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed
identity of a user.

2

3
4
5
6
7
8

9

10
11

12
13
14

15

16
17

Already
Implemented
Yes

Selected
by FST
Yes

Difference
Noted
-

Yes

No

X

No

Yes

X

Yes

No

X

No

Yes

X

Yes

Yes

-

No

No

-

Yes

No

X

Yes

Yes

-

Yes

Yes

-

No

No

-

No

No

-

Yes

No

X

Yes

No

X

No

No

-

No

Yes

X

Yes

Yes

-

86

#

ISC Description

18

Systems for managing passwords should be interactive
and should ensure quality passwords.
The use of utility programs that might be capable of
overriding system and application controls should be
restricted and tightly controlled.
Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period
of inactivity.
Restrictions on connection times should be used to
provide additional security for high-risk applications.
Access to information and application system functions
by users and support personnel should be restricted in
accordance with the defined access control policy.
Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated)
computing environment.
A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate
security measures should be adopted to protect against
the risks of using mobile computing and communication
facilities.
A policy, operational plans and procedures should be
developed and implemented for teleworking activities.

19

20
21
22

23
24

25

Already
Implemented
Yes

Selected
by FST
No

Difference
Noted
X

No

Yes

X

No

Yes

X

No

No

-

Yes

Yes

-

No

No

-

No

No

-

No

No

-
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Table 25. Compliance - Differences between ISC Already Implemented
and ISC Selected per FST
#

ISC Description

1

All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual
requirements and the organization’s approach to meet
these requirements should be explicitly defined,
documented, and kept up to date for each information
system and the organization.
Appropriate procedures should be implemented to
ensure compliance with legislative, regulatory, and
contractual requirements on the use of material in
respect of which there may be intellectual property
rights and on the use of proprietary software products.
Important records should be protected from loss,
destruction, and falsification, in accordance with
statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business
requirements.
Data protection and privacy should be ensured as
required in relevant legislation, regulations, and, if
applicable, contractual clauses.
Users should be deterred from using information
processing facilities for unauthorized purposes.
Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance
with all relevant agreements, laws, and regulations.
Managers should ensure that all security procedures
within their area of responsibility are carried out
correctly to achieve compliance with security policies
and standards.
Information systems should be regularly checked for
compliance with security implementation standards.
Audit requirements and activities involving checks on
operational systems should be carefully planned and
agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business
processes.
Access to information systems audit tools should be
protected to prevent any possible misuse or
compromise.

2

3

4

5
6
7

8
9

10

Already
Implemented
No

Selected
by FST
Yes

Difference
Noted
X

Yes

No

X

No

No

-

Yes

No

X

No

No

-

Yes

No

X

Yes

No

X

No

Yes

X

No

Yes

X

Yes

Yes

-
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Table 26. Human Resources Security - Differences between ISC Already Implemented
and ISC Selected per FST
#

ISC Description

1

Security roles and responsibilities of employees,
contractors and third party users should be defined and
documented in accordance with the organization’s
information security policy.
Background verification checks on all candidates for
employment, contractors, and third party users should be
carried out in accordance with relevant laws, regulations
and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements,
the classification of the information to be accessed, and
the perceived risks.
As part of their contractual obligation, employees,
contractors and third party users should agree and sign the
terms and conditions of their employment contract, which
should state their and the organization’s responsibilities
for information security.
Management should require employees, contractors and
third party users to apply security in accordance with
established policies and procedures of the organization.
All employees of the organization and, where relevant,
contractors and third party users should receive
appropriate awareness training and regular updates in
organizational policies and procedures, as relevant for
their job function.
There should be a formal disciplinary process for
employees who have committed a security breach.
Responsibilities for performing employment termination
or change of employment should be clearly defined and
assigned.
All employees, contractors and third party users should
return all of the organization’s assets in their possession
upon termination of their employment, contract or
agreement.
The access rights of all employees, contractors and third
party users to information and information processing
facilities should be removed upon termination of their
employment, contract or agreement, or adjusted upon
change.

2

3

4

5

6
7

8

9

Already
Implemented
Yes

Selected
by FST
Yes

Difference
Noted
-

No

No

-

Yes

No

X

Yes

No

X

Yes

No

X

Yes

No

X

No

Yes

X

Yes

No

X

Yes

Yes

-

Next, evaluation of the artifact is performed. The evaluation is performed in two
parts. First, the newly-created artifact is evaluated against other traditional ISC
assessment methodologies to determine whether the weaknesses identified in existing and
traditional ISC assessment methodologies (refer to Chapter two) have been addressed.
Second, the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of experts
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against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such
new set improves or not the current ISC selection process, as well as whether the overall
information security in the organization is enhanced.
4.3 Evaluation of Artifact Against Traditional ISC assessment Methodologies
Following Hevner et al.’s (2004) DSR Guidelines and correspondent Process Steps
from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR, and consistent
with Process Step 4: Evaluation, procedures were performed against existing and
traditional ISC assessment methodologies. To evaluate the artifact and determine whether
the ISC assessment methodology created using FST addressed the weaknesses identified
in the literature for traditional assessment methodologies (RQ1), Hevner et al.’s (2004)
suggest five design evaluation methods that include Observational (case studies, field
studies); Analytical (static analysis, architectural analysis, optimization, dynamic
analysis); Experimental (controlled experiments, simulations); Testing (functional,
structural); and Descriptive (informed arguments, scenarios).
As stated earlier, evaluating the FST-based assessment methodology through
performing comparisons and contrasts against existing ISC assessment methodologies
found in the literature refer to the “Descriptive Design Evaluation Method” (Hevner et
al., 2004). The Descriptive Design Evaluation Method prompts for comparisons between
other existing ISC assessment methodologies, and assist in determining whether the
artifact does enhance existing ISC assessment methodologies, satisfying the original
requirements set in the research problem. The Descriptive Design Evaluation Method is
also critical in evaluating and comparing the artifact’s suitability and effectiveness
against information from the knowledge base (i.e., existing ISC assessment
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methodologies found in the literature) in order to build convincing arguments and/or
scenarios and demonstrate the artifact’s utility.
To properly evaluate the FST-based artifact developed herein, reference is made to
Table 3, which lists the weaknesses identified in the academic literature on existing and
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that preclude the effective assessment and,
therefore, implementation of ISC in organizations over their information. The weaknesses
referred to:
-

involving high levels of subjectivity and ambiguity (van der Haar & von Solms,
2003);

-

not adequately accounting for organizations’ restrictions and constraints (van der
Haar & von Solms, 2003);

-

not preventing unnecessary ISC selections (Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Barnard
& von Solms, 2000);

-

not eliminating ad-hoc or random selections of ISC (Barnard & von Solms, 2000;
Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006; Saint-Germain, 2005; Da Veiga & Eloff, 2007;
Siougle & Zorkadis, 2002; Baskerville, 1993; Otero et al., 2010; van der Haar &
von Solms, 2003; Ou Yang et al., 2011; Lv et al., 2011; Gerber & von Solms,
2008); and

-

not considering all-inclusive, best practice scenarios when evaluating ISC (Ou
Yang et al., 2011).

The weaknesses identified above not only affect the ISC selection process, but also
impact the overall protection of the information’s confidentiality, integrity, and
availability (Saint-Germain, 2005). In other words, the lack of adequate information
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security over valuable, sensitive, or critical financial information may allow for (1) fraud,
manipulation, and/or misuse of data; (2) security-related deficiencies and findings; (3)
bogus trades to inflate profits or hide losses; (4) false accounting journal entries; (5)
computer security breaches; and (6) false transactions to evade regulators; among others.
Refer to Figure 3.
Moreover, failure of paying adequate attention to address the weaknesses and/or
inadequacies mentioned may allow opportunities for information security breaches which
can negatively impact organizations, including their IT environments.
As illustrated in Table 3, as well as evidenced and discussed in Chapter four’s
Artifact Development, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology does address the
weaknesses identified in traditional ISC evaluation processes specifically by:
(a) employing a less-subjective, ISC assessment approach. Even though the criteria
input values (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risk) provided by the ISM
reflects his opinion according to the organization’s goals and objectives, those
input values did not by themselves guide the ultimate decision for determining
whether ISC should or should not be selected. In other words, the initial criteria
input values provided by the ISM for each ISC, as specifically designed, were
processed into the FST-based artifact, which contrary to traditional methods,
involves a strict mathematical methodology, allowing for more precise and
accurate ISC evaluation scores. As a result, bias and personal influences for
determining ISC selection at the organization were significantly minimized by the
FST-based artifact developed, as proposed.
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(b) considering organizations’ restrictions and constraints. The FST-based
methodology developed herein allows any organization to adequately address
their specific restrictions, constraints, goals, and/or objectives when determining
which ISC to implement. In this particular case and in order to consider the
organization’s specific scenario and environment, the ISM provided input values
for criteria considered relevant in the selection of ISC not only in the academic
literature, but to the organization evaluated in this dissertation. The criteria
evaluated herein referred to estimated implementation costs, scope, compliance
with laws and regulations, and addressing the organization’s risks, all four
representing accepted evaluation criteria for ISC assessments based on the
literature. By addressing specific restrictions and constraints (based on the above
criteria), the FST artifact precisely evaluated and prioritized ISC for the
organization.
(c) preventing or eliminating unnecessary and/or random selection of ISC. Contrary
to many existing ISC methodologies, the FST-based assessment artifact created
did not leave the identification and selection of ISC to the users. Precise
evaluation scores per ISC resulted from strict mathematical calculations
performed by FST. The use of the FST-based method developed prevented ISC to
be selected (many times at random) by organization users which typically results
in the potential inclusion of unnecessary ISC and/or exclusion of required ones.
The FST-based methodology prevented unnecessary and random ISC selections,
resulting in a crucial help to the organization to select only the most effective ISC
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to mitigate information security risks, ultimately enhancing its overall information
security.
(d) contemplating all-inclusive ISC scenarios. As evidenced, the FST-based
methodology addressed this existing limitation by considering all available ISC
for evaluation and potential inclusion. These ISC were obtained from the ISO/IEC
27002 standard best practice framework, which contains an all-inclusive list of
ISC that can potentially be selected and implemented. Having identified relevant
information security areas for the organization (Access Control, Compliance, and
Human Resources Security), ISC within these areas were included for the ISM to
evaluate by providing specific criteria information. The methodology then
incorporated all ISC on its calculation and ultimate selection determination.
The FST-based ISC assessment methodology clearly enhanced current evaluation
processes for ISC in the organization by (a) employing a less-subjective, accuracy-based
method; (b) considering all possible organization’s restrictions and constraints; (c)
eliminating or preventing the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and by (d)
contemplating all-inclusive ISC scenarios. The FST-based assessment methodology
adequately modeled imprecise parameters (i.e., criteria for determining ISC relevance),
and addressed the weaknesses identified in existing methodologies, thereby addressing
and supporting RQ1 and H1, respectively, both defined under section “Research
Questions and Hypotheses”.
Next, the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of
subject matter experts against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to
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determine to what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST
enhance information security in the organization (RQ2).
4.4 Evaluation of Artifact’s Results Against the Organization’s Already
Implemented ISC
A second and final evaluation consisted of determining to what extent the new ISC
assessment methodology enhances information security in the organization (RQ2, H2). In
order to respond to the above, subject matter experts were contacted and engaged to
provide an evaluation focusing on:
- the ISC that were already implemented but identified by the FST artifact as not to be
implemented; as well as
- ISC that were not already implemented, but identified by the FST artifact as needed
to be implemented.
These differences noted are illustrated in Tables 24, 25, and 26.
The use of a panel of experts is very common and suitable for this type of evaluation
and validation (Huang, Hung, Yen, Chang, & Jiang, 2011; Dhillon & Torkzadeh, 2006;
Emory & Cooper, 1991). The criteria used for selecting the experts required a significant
interest in the information security domain. There were three experts, each with 15-20
years of experience holding Management positions for global, also known as Big Four,
accounting and audit firms. They also had significant auditing and consulting services on
small-to-medium size type organizations within several industries, including the schools,
universities, and non-profit industry, relevant for this dissertation. The experts’
experience further included working for private industries, as well as for information
systems and technology audit departments. All experts have performed work in Puerto
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Rico as well as in the United States. The experts agreed to assist in the evaluation of the
new set of ISC (via interview meetings and/or calls), resulting from the FST-based
assessment methodology. Involvement of experts with the required knowledge,
competency, and proficiency added significant value to this dissertation when
interpreting and validating the results.
Before assessing the FST artifact, the experts were provided relevant information
about the organization, as well as the expectations from their evaluation and validation
tasks.
Table 24 shows the ISC for the Access Control information security area where
differences were identified after running the FST assessment methodology. For instance,
ISC 2, already implemented at the organization, should not be according to the FST
methodology, while ISC 3 was not in place by the organization, but should now be.
Tables 25 and 26 also show the ISC for the Compliance and Human Resource Security
areas, respectively, where similar differences were identified after running the FST
assessment methodology.
Experts were asked to compare the resulting set of ISC from the FST methodology
against the ISC already implemented by the organization in order to determine whether
the new set of ISC results in an enhancement to the information security of the
organization. Specifically, the experts were provided copies of the results shown in
Tables 24, 25, and 26, listing both, the ISC that were already implemented but identified
by the FST artifact as not to be implemented; as well as the ISC that were not already
implemented, but identified by the FST artifact as needed to be implemented (refer to
“Difference Noted” column within Tables 24, 25, and 26). The experts were requested to
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determine if additional information security risks within the three areas (Access Control,
Compliance, and Human Resources Security) were addressed by the new set of ISC. Or,
vice versa, whether information security risks were now not covered with the new set of
ISC. The evaluation exercise prompted the experts to ultimately determine if the new set
of ISC enhanced the information security of the organization.
Overall and based on numerous evaluation interviews and phone calls (captured and
summarized in Appendix B), the experts were pleased with the new methodology and
believed that the evaluation model could be useful for ISC assessment in practice,
particularly, to:
- assist Management in planning its evaluation of ISC by referencing rigorous
baseline manuals or best practice framework such as the ISO/IEC 27002 (2005);
- identify which ISC are of higher priority in relation to a specific, organizationaloriented assessment criteria; and
- communicate with other departments within the organization.
In a more detailed level (i.e., per information security area), the experts’ main points
as a result of their evaluation were as follows:
4.4.1 Access Control
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology, but had not been
implemented (i.e., ISC 3, ISC 5, ISC 16, ISC 19, and ISC 20) addressed other relevant
information security risks within the organization and, thus, added significant value and
protection to the organization’s financial information. Additional existing risks addressed
by the new set of ISC are described below:
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- Security parameters are not adequately configured, allowing for potential unauthorized
user access to financially significant systems, applications, or databases.
- Privileges are granted to users which are not consistent with their job functions. The
above allows unauthorized or incorrect modifications to financial data, resulting in
segregation of duties conflicts, unprevented or undetected errors, incorrect financials,
and/or management decisions based upon misleading information.
- Users with terminated accounts as well as other unauthorized users can gain access to
financial systems or data, and view and/or change critical, confidential, or sensitive
financial information.
- Users with unauthorized accounts can change configuration settings or execute system
administration activities to financial applications’ parameters, giving rise to potential
fraud, invalid data, failure to safeguard assets, or misled management.
On the contrary, the experts determined that those ISC that had been already
implemented by the organization but were not identified as to be selected under the FSTbased methodology (i.e., ISC 2, ISC 4, ISC 8, ISC 13, ISC 14, and ISC 18), did not
necessarily pose a significant impact to the organization’s financial information. In other
words, the absence of such ISC within the organization did not represent a major concern
to the financial information, as an adequate level of security was still in effect given the
various other already-implemented ISC plus the new ISC resulting from the Fuzzy
analysis (refer to Table 24), all of which mitigate access control risks and maintain proper
levels of security.
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4.4.2 Compliance
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology, but had not been
implemented (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 8, and ISC 9) addressed relevant information security risks
and, thus, added significant value and protection to the organization’s financial
information. Additional existing risks addressed by the new set of ISC are described
below:
- Breaches of any law, statutory, regulatory or contractual obligations, and of any security
requirements take place over the design, operation, use, and management of information
systems.
- Information systems are not in compliance with organizational security implementation
policies, standards, and documented security controls.
- Operational systems and audit tools are not adequately safeguarded to prevent their
misuse.
The experts determined that the ISC that had been already implemented but were not
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 2, ISC 4, ISC 6,
and ISC 7) did not pose a significant impact to the organization’s financial information.
That is, the absence of such ISC within the organization did not represent a major effect
to the financial information, as an adequate level of security would still be provided from
the other implemented ISC.
4.4.3 Human Resources Security
- For this information security area, the experts concluded that the ISC that were
identified as to be selected under the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 7, and ISC
9) were not sufficient in providing effective protection to financial information systems
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or addressing relevant information security risks related to the Human Resources area. As
seen, few ISC were selected by the FST-based methodology based on the actual data
collected from the organization. In looking back at such data collected, noted that the
EIC’s provided to assess the selection and implementation of these Human Resources
Security-related ISC were relatively high compared to the other two information security
areas. Such increase in EIC’s, as expected, impacted the ultimate selection of ISC within
the Human Resources Security area. The experts suggested that ISC per the new
methodology must be combined with the ISC originally implemented by the organization
to maintain an adequate level of security within the organization financial assets. Refer to
Appendix B, interview/call 25-32, 35-45, and 47. Given the above, the three experts
determined that the new assessment methodology did not necessarily provide significant
additional value to the Human Resources information security area, although it helped in
strengthening the area.
- The experts determined that the combination of ISC already implemented at the
organization plus the ones identified by the FST-based methodology (i.e., ISC 1, ISC 3,
ISC 4, ISC 5, ISC 6, ISC 7, and ISC 8) provide a solid level of protection to the Human
Resources Security area. For the organization, implementation of the above combined
ISC helps address the following existing risks, thereby maintaining an enhanced level of
information security.
- Employees, contractors, and third party users do not understand their responsibilities,
and are not suitable for the roles they are considered for.
- The risk of theft, fraud or misuse of facilities is not reduced.
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- Security responsibilities related to job descriptions and conditions of employment are
not necessarily addressed prior to employment.
- All candidates for employment, contractors, and third party are not adequately screened,
especially for sensitive jobs.
- Employees, contractors, and third party users are (1) not aware of information security
threats and concerns, their responsibilities and/or liabilities; and (2) not equipped to
support organizational security policy in the course of their normal work, and to reduce
the risk of human error.
- An adequate level of awareness, education, and training in security procedures and the
correct use of information processing facilities is not provided to all employees,
contractors and third party users to minimize possible security risks.
- A formal disciplinary process for handling security breaches is not established.
- The exit process for employees, contractors, and third party is not performed effectively
or in a timely or orderly manner. Responsibilities should be in place to ensure an
employee’s, contractor’s or third party user’s exit from the organization is managed, and
that the return of all equipment and the removal of all access rights are completed.
- Users with terminated accounts as well as other unauthorized users can gain access to
financial systems or data, and view and/or change critical, confidential, or sensitive
financial information.
As evidenced, the ISC assessment methodology developed using FST had a positive
impact on information security at the organization. The experts concurred that the
implementation of the new set of ISC significantly enhanced the information security at
the organization. Quotes and comments from the experts support the aforementioned
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statement. Based on the interviews and calls conducted, the experts agreed that additional
relevant information security risks within the three areas evaluated were addressed by the
new set of ISC. Appendix B captures detailed information regarding these interviews and
calls, including the date of the interview or call, relevant information security risk, expert
number, whether it was an interview or a call, its duration, and determination, per expert,
whether the relevant information security risk was addressed or not. After evaluation of
such information, it was clear that RQ2 and H2, stated under section “Research Questions
and Hypotheses” and prompting/posing whether an ISC assessment methodology that is
developed using FST can enhance information security at the organization, were
addressed and supported, respectively.
Consistent with the main goal of this dissertation, the assessment methodology
developed and presented in this dissertation not only addressed the weaknesses identified
in traditional methodologies, but also proved to improve information security at the
organization. This turned out to be of crucial interest to the organization, as well as
represented a valid contribution to the information security literature.
Equally significant, the methodology developed herein:
- can be easily implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote usage in
practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection may become
impractical;
- is easily extended to include additional evaluation criteria and features, and can
evaluate ISC in various domains; and
- most importantly, addressed the gaps and weaknesses identified in the academic
literature, as well as enhanced information security in organizations.
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Overall, the FST-based assessment methodology proved to be a feasible technique for
evaluating ISC in organizations.
4.5 Summary
This Chapter presented and discussed the results of this dissertation. Specifically,
detailed explanations of the data collection process were provided, followed by
descriptions of the development of the FST-based artifact and the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox
of MATLAB editors and viewers used.
The artifact was built with the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB, which is used for
solving problems with fuzzy logic. Such toolbox includes a collection of functions built
on the MATLAB computing environment that provides technologies to create and
modify fuzzy inference systems within the framework of MATLAB.
The toolbox comes with five editors and viewers defined to assist in building, editing,
and viewing fuzzy inference systems, and links most of human reasoning and concept
formation to fuzzy rules. In other words, the toolbox amplifies the power of human
reasoning through providing a systematic framework for computing with fuzzy rules.
Findings and results of the FST-based artifact were next identified and explained,
followed by evaluations of the artifact against other ISC assessment methodologies and
second, against the organization’s already implemented ISC. The second part of the
evaluation was performed through interviews and meetings with three field and subject
matter experts. The evaluation results provided responses to RQ 1 and RQ 2, and
supported the proposed H1 and H2. Finally, the evaluation results supported the main
contribution of this dissertation which was the development of an ISC assessment
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methodology that could address existing weaknesses in traditional methodologies and, in
turn, enhance information security in the organization.
The following chapter concludes this dissertation by providing the conclusions,
implications, recommendations, and a final summary of the investigation work
performed.
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Chapter 5
5. Conclusions

5. Introduction
This Chapter states the conclusions based on the analysis performed and results
achieved. The Chapter also delineates barriers, assumptions, limitations and delimitations
of this dissertation. Further, this Chapter discusses the implications of the work on the
field of study and its contributions to knowledge and professional practice.
Recommendations for future research are presented next, followed by an overall
summary of the work presented within this dissertation.
5.1 Conclusions
According to the DSR Guidelines in Hevner et al.’s (2004), and correspondent
Process Steps from Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) General Methodology of DSR,
conclusion is the final process step where research results are documented. Results are
also associated with clear and verifiable research contributions from the creation of the
artifact and either support the objectives and direction of the investigation or simply
evidence the opposite.
The goal of this dissertation was to develop an assessment methodology that (a)
considers all-inclusive scenarios when evaluating ISC; (b) adequately accounts for
organizations’ restrictions and constraints; (c) significantly minimizes subjectivity and
ambiguity (via providing precise evaluation values for ISC); and (d) prevents
unnecessary and random ISC selections. The aforementioned can better assist
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organizations when selecting ISC in order to mitigate information security risks,
ultimately enhancing the overall information security. Refer to Table 2 and Figure 3.
Consistent with the above, the following RQ’s were investigated:
RQ1: How does an ISC assessment methodology that is developed using FST
address the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional
assessment methodologies?
RQ2: To what extent does an ISC assessment methodology developed with FST
enhance information security in the organization?
Similarly, the following hypotheses (H) were proposed:
H1: An ISC assessment methodology that is constructed using FST contemplates
all-inclusive ISC scenarios; employs a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based
method; prevents or eliminates the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; and
considers organizations’ restrictions and constraints when assessing ISC.
H2: An ISC assessment methodology developed with FST that addresses the
weaknesses identified in traditional assessment methodologies enhances
information security in the organization.
To address and test the research questions and hypotheses, data were collected via a
questionnaire sent through email (see Appendix A) to an organization in Puerto Rico. The
organization was a small-to-medium size organization within the industry of schools,
universities, and not-for-profits. The questionnaire was emailed to the Information
Security Manager (ISM). First, the ISM provided the ISC already in place at the
organization that protect financial-related applications. The purpose of identifying the
ISC already in place was to compare them with the ones generated by the newly-
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developed methodology and evaluate, consistent with Hypothesis 2, whether the new set
of ISC enhances information security in the organization. Second, the ISM ranked, in
order of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best
practice framework and widely used in organizations to improve information and
processes (Step 2). The ISM identified only the three most relevant information security
areas based on the organization’s goals and objectives. These were in specific order:
Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security. Finally, for each ISC
within the three information security areas identified as relevant, and in order to start the
assessment process, the ISM provided specific data related to a literature-supported
criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks).
With the above data, the artifact was built using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of
MATLAB (“toolbox”). The artifact consisted of four fuzzy input variables, each
constituting a specific, literature-supported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated
Implementation Cost (EIC), Scope, Compliance, and Risks), and one output variable
named ISC_Selected. Next, membership functions were created for each particular input
considering the literature reviewed as well as input from decision makers within the
organization. Fuzzy “If-then” rules were then created considering all possible relevant
scenarios. The rule building process described above was created based on the academic
literature reviewed, as well as discussions with organization’s decision makers. Table 17
shows the input combination that result in the selection of an ISC according to the
experts.
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With the artifact developed, the fuzzy logic was executed over the actual data
collected, and results were produced. Only ISC with scores of nine and higher were
selected consistent with membership functions defined.
The artifact was next evaluated; first, against traditional ISC assessment
methodologies to determine whether the weaknesses identified in existing and traditional
ISC assessment methodologies (refer to Chapter two) have been addressed. Second, the
new set of ISC generated from the artifact were assessed by a group of experts against the
organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such new set
enhances the overall information security in the organization.
Based on the evaluations performed, the ISC assessment methodology developed
using FST addressed the weaknesses identified in the academic literature for traditional
assessment methodologies. In addition, the ISC assessment methodology had a positive
effect over the information security at the organization, according to the experts. Because
of the above, both, research questions RQ1 and RQ2, stated under section “Research
Questions and Hypotheses” and prompting whether an ISC assessment methodology that
is developed using FST address weaknesses in traditional ISC assessment methodologies,
as well as enhance overall information security at the organization, were successfully
addressed. The artifact developed herein, thus, represented a significant contribution to
the organization and to the information security literature.
5.2 Barriers and Issues
The research problem within this dissertation was inherently difficult to solve because
organizations are usually not willing to share data about their information security
environments (Straub, 1986). That is, a barrier of this dissertation was the reticence of the
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organization to have its environment evaluated for research purposes. Challenges were
also encountered when attempting to select an organization that was truly interested in
participating of this research. Given demanding schedules, organization’s personnel felt
reluctant in becoming part of this effort.
The creation of the FST-based ISC assessment solution within this dissertation was of
adequate difficulty, meriting significant attention (i.e., dissertation-level work) as it
attempted to correct weaknesses identified in traditional, highly practical ISC assessment
methodologies. Further challenges were identified when determining whether the new
methodology developed would indeed result in a more effective selection of ISC, thereby
enhancing information security in organizations. A last barrier or issue, was the relative
short period of time (i.e., three weeks) provided to the organization to complete the
questionnaire, which may have not been appropriate and, therefore, posed potential
concerns.
5.3 Assumptions
This dissertation assumed that an FST ISC assessment methodology can address the
weaknesses identified in the literature. This dissertation also assumed that an improved
ISC assessment methodology may have a positive impact on the information security of
the organization.
In terms of data collection, this study assumed that responses from participants were
true, reliable, and honest given that (a) the actual data collected was secured and available
only for investigation and analysis purposes; (b) no personal information was attached
nor disclosed to participants’ responses in order to increase their confidence; (c)
respondents were competent and directly affected by this research; and (d) the study’s
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research results were made available to interested participants, as recommended by Okoli
and Pawlowski (2004).
Another assumption was that the target audience, key information security
management personnel, is familiar with information security and, most importantly, has
the required knowledge and relevant experience necessary to be part of this investigation.
A last assumption within this dissertation was that the ISC assessment methodology built
herein can adequately evaluate ISC in organizations within the schools, universities, and
non-profit industry.
5.4 Implications for Research and Practice
The research presented in this dissertation developed an innovative approach for
evaluating ISC in organizations in a more precise and accurate manner by addressing
several weaknesses identified in the literature. Specifically, it presented a methodology
that used FST to create a unified measurement that represented how well ISC met
specific organization criteria. Through the evaluation performed in this dissertation for a
single organization, the methodology was proven successful in providing a way for
measuring the quality of ISC.
In terms of research implications, the ISC assessment methodology evidenced a more
accurate and precise evaluation and prioritization of ISC, which clearly advanced the
current information security literature. For practical purposes, the methodology is
expected to assist organizations’ management in: 1) correcting weaknesses and
inadequacies in existing ISC assessment methodologies, thereby, providing for a more
effective selection of ISC; 2) granting efficient investment of resources; and 3) enhancing
the overall information security in organizations.
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The main contribution of this research to the information security literature is the
development of a FST-based assessment methodology that provides for a thorough
evaluation of ISC in organizations. The methodology created addresses the weaknesses or
limitations identified in existing ISC assessment methodologies, resulting in an enhanced
information security in organizations.
An ISC assessment methodology based on FST provides benefits and advantages
over traditional methods, including a strict mathematical methodology that can precisely
and rigorously examine vague conceptual phenomena (Zimmermann, 2001).
Additionally, FST has been used as a modeling, problem solving, and data mining tool,
and has proven superior to existing methods, as well as attractive to enhance classical
approaches.
Klir and Yuan (1995) also point the significance of FST when handling uncertainty.
FST helps in understanding the phenomenon of reality by performing adequate
predictions or retrodictions; learning about controlling the phenomenon; and utilizing
such capabilities for various other ends. Furthermore, a FST-based framework leads to
more detailed and thorough assessments, while appropriately modeling human decisions
related to ISC evaluation, which are imprecise in nature (Petrovic-Lazarevic, 2001).
A suitable FST-based ISC assessment methodology accounts for imprecise
parameters and criteria when calculating the relevance of ISC. Such evaluation is also
focused on how well ISC address organization goals, objectives, restrictions, risks, laws,
and regulations. Results from this research supported that a FST-based methodology
assisted the organization in evaluating and, thus, determining and selecting only the most
effective ISC. The methodology presented also laid down the foundation for the
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development of a fuzzy expert system as a solution to the ISC existing evaluation and
ranking problem.
Other contributions from the methodology created in this dissertation include that it:
- is relatively simple, can be implemented in a spreadsheet or software tool, and promote
usage in practical scenarios where highly complex methodologies for ISC selection are
impractical.
- fuses multiple evaluation criteria to provide a holistic view of the overall quality of ISC.
- is easily extended to include additional evaluation criteria factor not considered within
this dissertation (this is possibly on of the most meaningful contribution from this
dissertation).
- provides a mechanism to evaluate the quality of ISC in various domains.
Overall, the methodology presented in this dissertation proved to be a feasible technique
for evaluating ISC in organizations.
5.5 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
A key advantage of using a FST-based decision support model for ISC evaluation is
that it provides a natural, effective way of handling problems in which the source of
imprecision is the absence of sharply defined criteria. Nevertheless, the solution requires
the specification of membership functions of fuzzy sets, definitions of linguistic
variables, and fuzzy operators in order to model the attitudes and assumptions of
organizations regarding the relevance of ISC. In other words, fuzzy sets must be specified
with regard to the objective function, constraints established, as well as terms and
membership functions of the linguistic variables. Further empirical work would
contribute to identify the aforementioned attitudes and assumptions of decision makers

112
within organizations. Despite the limitation stated above, it was argued throughout this
dissertation that a FST-based perspective of evaluating ISC is a valuable tool for
organizations when dealing with uncertainty and imprecision.
There were other limitations associated with this dissertation study. First, due to
convenience and availability, this dissertation involved a single, Puerto Rico-based,
small-to-medium size type organization within the schools, universities, and non-profit
industry. Therefore, findings can be generalized to similar size type and industry
organizations located in Puerto Rico. Further similar studies may be needed at
organizations outside of Puerto Rico, or from different sizes and industry types within
Puerto Rico in order to generalize the findings of this dissertation in a broader scope.
Second, the questionnaire used in this dissertation was completed by the organization
within a three week timeframe. A longitudinal study may add significant value as
organization goals, objectives, and laws and regulations, among others, shift over time
and, thus, the need to select and implement different ISC. Organizations must
periodically reassess their ISC implementation and adjust their selection criteria
consistent with new goals, objectives, laws, and regulations.
Third, Tichy (1998) as well as Zelkowitz and Wallace (1998), stressed that
implementing a DSR’s developed artifact in a single organization (as is the case in this
dissertation) represents a challenge, as results may not be generalizable to other
organizations or environments. Implementation of the DSR research method further
represents a limitation given the rapid advances in technology that can potentially upset
its results before they are implemented successfully in organizations, or before benefits
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can be obtained. DSR results can be outrun by technology before they even show up in
the research literature (Hevner et al., 2004).
Regarding future work, the following opportunities extend the research conducted
within this dissertation:


investigate whether it is reasonable to develop fuzzy rules and baselines of
membership functions for ISC in particular environments.



interview experts from organizations within similar industries in order to identify
fuzzy sets for ISC assessments that can potentially be utilized as
guidelines/standards across organizations within similar industries.



add criteria factors to evaluate ISC other than the ones included in this
dissertation. Refinement or the incorporation of additional assessment factors,
specifically targeting organization’s restrictions, goals, objectives, regulations,
etc., can certainly improve the current investigation.



examine results from this dissertation and compare them to other assessment
results from other similar organizations.

Another potential direction for future research considers utilizing a hybrid approach,
using FST and traditional methodologies, to assess ISC. As evidenced in this dissertation,
when assessing ISC within the Human Resources Security area, the FST-based
methodology did not output a better selection of ISC to protect financial information
systems or address relevant information security risks. Applying a hybrid approach to
assess ISC could not only extend the work performed in this dissertation, but can also
strengthen current ISC evaluation and selection processes in organizations.
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Future research can develop more interactive and more user friendly application
programs for ISC evaluation. Finally, more case studies should be conducted within the
industry evaluated in this study (i.e., schools, universities, and not-for-profits) and use
those results to construct the related norm database of evaluation model for the
establishment of industrial best practice examples.
5.6 Delimitations
A critical part of the scope of this dissertation is related to the information systems
that were involved. That is, the information systems and applications where ISC were
evaluated for comprised only financial-related systems and applications. All other
systems and/or applications within the selected organization (e.g., operational-purpose
applications, databases, operating systems, networks, etc.) were not in scope for purposes
of this dissertation, although the methodology is flexible enough to also consider other
systems and applications.
Additionally, the target audience comprised only key information security personnel
(i.e., Information Security Manager). Due to their knowledge and experience, the target
audience reflects an accurate representation of the population, allowing for results to be
generalizable and, thus, consistently applied to other small-to-medium size type
organizations, as considered herein (Salkind, 2009). Requests for participation were made
to small-to-medium size type organizations within a specific industry (i.e., schools,
universities, and non-profit). The targeted organization was located in the state of Puerto
Rico and was contacted based on convenience and availability.
Another delimitation used to constrain the scope of this dissertation referred to the
specific membership functions of fuzzy sets, linguistic variables, and fuzzy operators that
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were used to model the particular attitudes and assumptions of decision makers when
assessing ISC. That is, the membership functions used to represent fuzzy numbers within
this dissertation were restricted to some of the most common ones (i.e., triangular and
trapezoidal), which are preferred due to their combination of solid theoretical basis and
simplicity (Pedrycz, 1994). The linguistic variables or linguistic terms in this study were
limited to four factors: (1) Estimated Implementation Cost, (2) Scope, (3) Compliance,
and (4) Risks, which represent an accepted evaluation criteria for ISC assessments based
on the literature. Lastly, fuzzy operators were limited to ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ to assist fuzzy
rules when implying fuzzy relationships between antecedents and consequences. The
fuzzy operator ‘AND’ evaluated the intersection or conjunction of the rule antecedents,
while the fuzzy operator ‘OR’ assessed the union or disjunction of the rule antecedents.
The ‘NOT’ operator known as the fuzzy complement was not used in this dissertation.
Regarding the limitation stated earlier involving DSR’s results being potentially upset by
technology before they are implemented in organizations, or before they appear in the
research literature, Hevner et al. (2004) argue that the implementation of DSR results
from well-designed IT artifacts still impact organizations significantly, as they “enable
organizations to address important information-related tasks” (p. 98). Rapid advances in
technology can potentially overturn research results before their implementation, or
publishing in the literature, resulting in a common risk to all research methods. However,
DSR mitigated the aforementioned by engaging active technology in the creation of its
artifacts and by providing effective results and solutions to current organizational
problems.

116
5.7 Summary
Adequate evaluation of ISC is crucial to organizations in maintaining a sound
information security as well as in protecting their information assets. Nevertheless, the
literature points out several issues, gaps, weaknesses, and/or inadequacies within
traditional ISC assessment methodologies that prevent an effective assessment of ISC in
organizations. The goal or research problem addressed by this dissertation was the need
for development of an ISC assessment tool that could address weaknesses identified in
traditional ISC assessment methodologies, and potentially enhance ISC evaluations as
well as overall information security in the organization. Based on a comprehensive
review of relevant literature (see Table 2), there are evident weaknesses in existing
assessment methodologies for ISC in organizations that can preclude an effective
selection. Risks resulting from those weaknesses include inaccurate or incomplete
processing of data; unauthorized access to data that might destroy or manipulate data (or
report logic) in a fraudulently or unintentionally way; as well as the potential loss of data
or inability to access data as required (PCAOB).
Consistent with the above, the purpose of developing a FST-based ISC assessment
methodology was to enhance current evaluation processes by addressing weaknesses via
employing a less-subjective, precision/accuracy-based method; eliminating or preventing
the random and unnecessary selection of ISC; considering organizations’ restrictions and
constraints; and improving the overall information security in organizations. Similarly, it
was argued that a FST-based assessment methodology allows for the modeling of
imprecise parameters, resulting in a more accurate assessment, which was crucial to
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determine the best ISC. Surprisingly, such a methodology had not been proposed within
the information security literature based on the thorough review performed.
Research questions and hypotheses were raised based on the information, arguments,
and claims presented (refer to Figure 2), and related to whether an ISC assessment
methodology developed using FST addressed the weaknesses identified in the literature,
as well as whether it ultimately enhanced information security in organizations.
This dissertation followed the DSR method, which is fundamentally a problemsolving paradigm (Simon, 1996). DSR creates and evaluates IT artifacts intended to solve
identified organizational problems. Hevner et al. (2004) list seven guidelines that are
crucial in understanding the requirements for effective DSR. Similar to Hevner et al.’s
(2004) guidelines, Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) also developed a general method
underlying DSR. Their method included only five process steps, which represent a
summarized version of Hevner et al.’s (2004) seven DSR guidelines (see Table 4).
Vaishnavi and Kuechler (2004) further identified expected outputs for their five DSR
process steps. The Vaishnavi and Kuechler’s (2004) five-process-steps General
Methodology of DSR was followed in this dissertation.
To create the artifact (i.e., FST-based ISC assessment methodology), specific data
from the organization were collected via questionnaire. The questionnaire was provided
to the Information Security Manager from a small-to-medium size organization in Puerto
Rico within the schools, universities, and not-for-profit industry.
Upon receipt of the questionnaire, the ISM identified the ISC already in place at the
organization that protect financial-related applications. All other applications and/or
information systems within the organization (e.g., applications, databases, operating
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systems, networks in place for operational/non-financial purposes, etc.) were out of scope
for purposes of this dissertation. The purpose of identifying the ISC already in place was
to compare them with the ones generated by the newly-developed methodology and
evaluate, consistent with Hypothesis 2, whether the new set of ISC enhanced information
security in the organization. The ISC were selected from an all-inclusive list of ISC from
the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice framework.
Following identification of the ISC currently implemented, the ISM ranked, in order
of relevance, the 11 information security areas found in the ISO/IEC 27002 best practice
framework. As instructed, the ISM identified only the three most relevant information
security areas based on the organization’s goals and objectives. These were in sequential
order: Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security.
For each ISC within the three information security areas identified as relevant, and in
order to start the assessment process, the ISM provided specific data related to literaturesupported criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks).
With the specific information collected from the organization, the artifact was built
using the Fuzzy Logic Toolbox of MATLAB (“toolbox”). The toolbox is an instrument
for solving problems with fuzzy logic.
For purposes of the FST-based artifact being created, there were four fuzzy input
variables defined (also known as linguistic terms), each constituting specific, literaturesupported evaluation criteria (i.e., Estimated Implementation Cost (EIC), Scope,
Compliance, and Risks). Refer to Figure 9. Membership functions and relevant rules
were then created for each particular input considering the literature reviewed, and
decision makers within the organization. Experts were asked to assist in the creation and
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validation of every single fuzzy rule used for purposes of this dissertation given their
significant experience combined with their prior knowledge. Table 17 shows the input
combination that result in the selection of an ISC according to the experts. Once the
artifact was developed, the next steps were to execute fuzzy logic over the actual data
collected to prioritize ISC within the higher-ranked information security areas, as well as
evaluate the artifact.
As stated earlier, the ISM provided specific data related to literature-supported
criteria (i.e., EIC, Scope, Compliance, and Risks). The conclusions from fuzzy sets
executed by the Toolbox were converted into real numbers, or a single crisp values (i.e.,
Score) through defuzzification. Tables 18 through 20 showed defuzzification for the
Access Control, Compliance, and Human Resources Security areas after the FST-based
methodology was executed. ISC with scores of nine and higher were selected consistent
with membership functions defined for the ISC_Selected fuzzy output in Table 16 and
Figure 15.
With the generated scores, evaluation of the artifact was performed in two steps:
(1) by evaluating against other ISC assessment methodologies to determine whether
the weaknesses identified in existing and traditional ISC assessment methodologies have
been addressed; and
(2) the new set of ISC generated from the artifact are assessed by a group of experts
against the organization’s already-implemented ISC in order to determine whether such
new set improves or not the current ISC selection process, as well as whether the overall
information security in the organization is enhanced.
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Per evaluation results, the FST-based ISC assessment methodology addressed the
weaknesses in traditional methodologies, resulting in a more accurate assessment and
selection of ISC, thereby addressing and supporting RQ1 and H1, respectively.
Experts then assisted in determining whether the new set of ISC enhanced
information security at the organization. Overall, the experts concurred that the
implementation of the new artifact significantly enhanced the overall information security
at the organization. As a result, RQ2 and H2, stated under section “Research Questions
and Hypotheses” and prompting whether an ISC assessment methodology that is
developed using FST does enhance information security at the organization, were
addressed and supported.
The assessment methodology developed in this dissertation precisely evaluated and
prioritized ISC which, without a doubt, turned out to be of crucial interest to the
organization. Such methodology also represented a valid contribution to the information
security literature. Particularly, the methodology addressed gaps and weaknesses
identified in the academic literature, as well as resulted in a more accurate selection of
ISC which, in turn, enhanced information security in the organization.
Research studies continue to support the harmful effects of unsuccessful and/or weak
information security platforms which results in opportunities for fraud, manipulation of
information, and computer breaches, among others. Through a review of the literature,
various key weaknesses were identified when assessing ISC in organizations. The
methodology developed herein proved successful in assisting an organization selecting the
most appropriate ISC for implementation, while also maintaining a well-designed and
controlled information system security environment.
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Appendix A. Survey Questionnaire
Survey Questionnaire
An Information Security Control
Assessment Methodology for Organizations
Fort Lauderdale-Davie, Florida 33314

October 14, 2013

Dear Respondent:
I am a doctoral student conducting a survey to determine whether a newly-developed
methodology corrects weaknesses identified in existing and traditional information
security controls (ISC) assessment methodologies, and will result in a more effective
selection of ISC, ultimately enhancing the overall information security in the
organization. Please note that your feedback is valuable in addressing the aforementioned
investigation.
In order to ensure the utmost privacy, the completed survey will not be made available to
anyone other than the research team. Also, note that completing and submitting the
survey indicate your voluntary participation in the study.
Kindly respond on or before November 1, 2013. I appreciate your time and assistance in
furthering this research endeavor.
Cordially,
/s/ Angel R. Otero
Angel R. Otero
Doctoral Student
Graduate School of Computer and Information Sciences
Nova Southeastern University
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314
ao269@nova.edu
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STEP 1 - CURRENT INFORMATION SECURITY CONTROLS (ISC) AT THE
ORGANIZATION
INSTRUCTIONS: Below there is an all-inclusive list of information security controls
(ISC) based on the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) / International
Electro technical Commission (IEC) 27002:2005, considered a best practice framework.
Please mark with an "X" the ISC already in place (implemented) at your
Organization.
Select
with
an "X"

1

2

1
2
3
4

5
6
7

8

9
10

Information Security Area /
ISC Description
Security Policy
An information security policy document should be approved by management,
and published and communicated to all employees and relevant external parties.
The information security policy should be reviewed at planned intervals or if
significant changes occur to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy, and
effectiveness.
Organization of Information Security
Management should actively support security within the organization through
clear direction, demonstrated commitment, explicit assignment, and
acknowledgment of information security responsibilities.
Information security activities should be coordinated by representatives from
different parts of the organization with relevant roles and job functions.
All information security responsibilities should be clearly defined.
A management authorization process for new information processing facilities
should be defined and implemented.
Requirements for confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements reflecting the
organization’s needs for the protection of information should be identified and
regularly reviewed.
Appropriate contacts with relevant authorities should be maintained.
Appropriate contacts with special interest groups or other specialist security
forums and professional associations should be maintained.
The organization’s approach to managing information security and its
implementation (i.e. control objectives, controls, policies, processes, and
procedures for information security) should be reviewed independently at
planned intervals, or when significant changes to the security implementation
occur.
The risks to the organization’s information and information processing facilities
from business processes involving external parties should be identified and
appropriate controls implemented before granting access.
All identified security requirements should be addressed before giving customers
access to the organization’s information or assets.

Agreements with third parties involving accessing, processing, communicating or
11 managing the organization’s information or information processing facilities, or
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Select
with
an "X"

Information Security Area /
ISC Description
adding products or services to information processing facilities should cover all
relevant security requirements.

1
2

3
4

5

1

2

3

4

5
6
7

8

9

Asset Management
All assets should be clearly identified and an inventory of all important assets
drawn up and maintained.
All information and assets associated with information processing facilities should
be owned by a designated part of the organization.
Rules for the acceptable use of information and assets associated with
information processing facilities should be identified, documented, and
implemented.
Information should be classified in terms of its value, legal requirements,
sensitivity, and criticality to the organization.
An appropriate set of procedures for information labeling and handling should be
developed and implemented in accordance with the classification scheme
adopted by the organization.
Human Resources Security
Security roles and responsibilities of employees, contractors and third party users
should be defined and documented in accordance with the organization’s
information security policy.
Background verification checks on all candidates for employment, contractors,
and third party users should be carried out in accordance with relevant laws,
regulations and ethics, and proportional to the business requirements, the
classification of the information to be accessed, and the perceived risks.
As part of their contractual obligation, employees, contractors and third party
users should agree and sign the terms and conditions of their employment
contract, which should state their and the organization’s responsibilities for
information security.
Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to
apply security in accordance with established policies and procedures of the
organization.
All employees of the organization and, where relevant, contractors and third
party users should receive appropriate awareness training and regular updates in
organizational policies and procedures, as relevant for their job function.
There should be a formal disciplinary process for employees who have committed
a security breach.
Responsibilities for performing employment termination or change of
employment should be clearly defined and assigned.
All employees, contractors and third party users should return all of the
organization’s assets in their possession upon termination of their employment,
contract or agreement.
The access rights of all employees, contractors and third party users to
information and information processing facilities should be removed upon
termination of their employment, contract or agreement, or adjusted upon
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Physical And Environmental Security
Security perimeters (barriers such as walls, card controlled entry gates or manned
reception desks) should be used to protect areas that contain information and
information processing facilities.
Secure areas should be protected by appropriate entry controls to ensure that
only authorized personnel are allowed access.
Physical security for offices, rooms, and facilities should be designed and applied.
Physical protection against damage from fire, flood, earthquake, explosion, civil
unrest, and other forms of natural or man-made disaster should be designed and
applied.
Physical protection and guidelines for working in secure areas should be designed
and applied.
Access points such as delivery and loading areas and other points where
unauthorized persons may enter the premises should be controlled and, if
possible, isolated from information processing facilities to avoid unauthorized
access.
Equipment should be sited or protected to reduce the risks from environmental
threats and hazards, and opportunities for unauthorized access.
Equipment should be protected from power failures and other disruptions caused
by failures in supporting utilities.
Power and telecommunications cabling carrying data or supporting information
services should be protected from interception or damage.
Equipment should be correctly maintained to ensure its continued availability and
integrity.
Security should be applied to off-site equipment taking into account the different
risks of working outside the organization’s premises.
All items of equipment containing storage media should be checked to ensure
that any sensitive data and licensed software has been removed or securely
overwritten prior to disposal.
Equipment, information or software should not be taken off-site without prior
authorization.
Communications and Operations Management
Operating procedures should be documented, maintained, and made available to
all users who need them.
Changes to information processing facilities and systems should be controlled.
Duties and areas of responsibility should be segregated to reduce opportunities
for unauthorized or unintentional modification or misuse of the organization’s
assets.
Development, test, and operational facilities should be separated to reduce the
risks of unauthorized access or changes to the operational system.
It should be ensured that the security controls, service definitions and delivery
levels included in the third party service delivery agreement are implemented,
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ISC Description
operated, and maintained by the third party.
The services, reports and records provided by the third party should be regularly
6 monitored and reviewed, and audits should be carried out regularly.
Changes to the provision of services, including maintaining and improving existing
information security policies, procedures and controls, should be managed, taking
account of the criticality of business systems and processes involved and re7 assessment of risks.
The use of resources should be monitored, tuned, and projections made of future
8 capacity requirements to ensure the required system performance.
Acceptance criteria for new information systems, upgrades, and new versions
should be established and suitable tests of the system(s) carried out during
9 development and prior to acceptance.
Detection, prevention, and recovery controls to protect against malicious code
10 and appropriate user awareness procedures should be implemented.
Where the use of mobile code is authorized, the configuration should ensure that
the authorized mobile code operates according to a clearly defined security
11 policy, and unauthorized mobile code should be prevented from executing.
Back-up copies of information and software should be taken and tested regularly
12 in accordance with the agreed backup policy.
Networks should be adequately managed and controlled, in order to be protected
from threats, and to maintain security for the systems and applications using the
13 network, including information in transit.
Security features, service levels, and management requirements of all network
services should be identified and included in any network services agreement,
14 whether these services are provided in-house or outsourced.
15 There should be procedures in place for the management of removable media.
Media should be disposed of securely and safely when no longer required, using
16 formal procedures.
Procedures for the handling and storage of information should be established to
17 protect this information from unauthorized disclosure or misuse.
18 System documentation should be protected against unauthorized access.
Formal exchange policies, procedures, and controls should be in place to protect
the exchange of information through the use of all types of communication
19 facilities.
Agreements should be established for the exchange of information and software
20 between the organization and external parties.
Media containing information should be protected against unauthorized access,
misuse or corruption during transportation beyond an organization’s physical
21 boundaries.
22 Information involved in electronic messaging should be appropriately protected.
Policies and procedures should be developed and implemented to protect
23 information associated with the interconnection of business information systems.
24 Information involved in electronic commerce passing over public networks should
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ISC Description
be protected from fraudulent activity, contract dispute, and unauthorized
disclosure and modification.
Information involved in on-line transactions should be protected to prevent
incomplete transmission, mis-routing, unauthorized message alteration,
unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized message duplication or replay.
The integrity of information being made available on a publicly available system
should be protected to prevent unauthorized modification.
Audit logs recording user activities, exceptions, and information security events
should be produced and kept for an agreed period to assist in future
investigations and access control monitoring.
Procedures for monitoring use of information processing facilities should be
established and the results of the monitoring activities reviewed regularly.
Logging facilities and log information should be protected against tampering and
unauthorized access.
System administrator and system operator activities should be logged.
Faults should be logged, analyzed, and appropriate action taken.
The clocks of all relevant information processing systems within an organization
or security domain should be synchronized with an agreed accurate time source.
Access Control
An access control policy should be established, documented, and reviewed based
on business and security requirements for access.
There should be a formal user registration and de-registration procedure in place
for granting and revoking access to all information systems and services.
The allocation and use of privileges should be restricted and controlled.
The allocation of passwords should be controlled through a formal management
process.
Management should review users’ access rights at regular intervals using a formal
process.
Users should be required to follow good security practices in the selection and use
of passwords.
Users should ensure that unattended equipment has appropriate protection.
A clear desk policy for papers and removable storage media and a clear screen
policy for information processing facilities should be adopted.
Users should only be provided with access to the services that they have been
specifically authorized to use.
Appropriate authentication methods should be used to control access by remote
users.
Automatic equipment identification should be considered as a means to
authenticate connections from specific locations and equipment.
Physical and logical access to diagnostic and configuration ports should be
controlled.
Groups of information services, users, and information systems should be
segregated on networks.
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ISC Description
For shared networks, especially those extending across the organization’s
boundaries, the capability of users to connect to the network should be restricted,
in line with the access control policy and requirements of the business
applications.
Routing controls should be implemented for networks to ensure that computer
connections and information flows do not breach the access control policy of the
business applications.
Access to operating systems should be controlled by a secure log-on procedure.
All users should have a unique identifier (user ID) for their personal use only, and
a suitable authentication technique should be chosen to substantiate the claimed
identity of a user.
Systems for managing passwords should be interactive and should ensure quality
passwords.
The use of utility programs that might be capable of overriding system and
application controls should be restricted and tightly controlled.
Inactive sessions should shut down after a defined period of inactivity.
Restrictions on connection times should be used to provide additional security for
high-risk applications.
Access to information and application system functions by users and support
personnel should be restricted in accordance with the defined access control
policy.
Sensitive systems should have a dedicated (isolated) computing environment.
A formal policy should be in place, and appropriate security measures should be
adopted to protect against the risks of using mobile computing and
communication facilities.
A policy, operational plans and procedures should be developed and
implemented for teleworking activities.
Information Systems Acquisition, Development And Maintenance
Statements of business requirements for new information systems, or
enhancements to existing information systems should specify the requirements
for security controls.
Data input to applications should be validated to ensure that this data is correct
and appropriate.
Validation checks should be incorporated into applications to detect any
corruption of information through processing errors or deliberate acts.
Requirements for ensuring authenticity and protecting message integrity in
applications should be identified, and appropriate controls identified and
implemented.
Data output from an application should be validated to ensure that the processing
of stored information is correct and appropriate to the circumstances.
A policy on the use of cryptographic controls for protection of information should
be developed and implemented.
Key management should be in place to support the organization’s use of
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cryptographic techniques.
There should be procedures in place to control the installation of software on
operational systems.
Test data should be selected carefully, and protected and controlled.
Access to program source code should be restricted.
The implementation of changes should be controlled by the use of formal change
control procedures.
When operating systems are changed, business critical applications should be
reviewed and tested to ensure there is no adverse impact on organizational
operations or security.
Modifications to software packages should be discouraged, limited to necessary
changes, and all changes should be strictly controlled.
Opportunities for information leakage should be prevented.
Outsourced software development should be supervised and monitored by the
organization.
Timely information about technical vulnerabilities of information systems being
used should be obtained, the organization's exposure to such vulnerabilities
evaluated, and appropriate measures taken to address the associated risk.
Information Security Incident Management
Information security events should be reported through appropriate management
channels as quickly as possible.
All employees, contractors and third party users of information systems and
services should be required to note and report any observed or suspected security
weaknesses in systems or services.
Management responsibilities and procedures should be established to ensure a
quick, effective, and orderly response to information security incidents.
There should be mechanisms in place to enable the types, volumes, and costs of
information security incidents to be quantified and monitored.
Where a follow-up action against a person or organization after an information
security incident involves legal action (either civil or criminal), evidence should be
collected, retained, and presented to conform to the rules for evidence laid down
in the relevant jurisdiction(s).
Business Continuity Management
A managed process should be developed and maintained for business continuity
throughout the organization that addresses the information security
requirements needed for the organization’s business continuity.
Events that can cause interruptions to business processes should be identified,
along with the probability and impact of such interruptions and their
consequences for information security.
Plans should be developed and implemented to maintain or restore operations
and ensure availability of information at the required level and in the required
time scales following interruption to, or failure of, critical business processes.
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A single framework of business continuity plans should be maintained to ensure
all plans are consistent, to consistently address information security
requirements, and to identify priorities for testing and maintenance.
Business continuity plans should be tested and updated regularly to ensure that
they are up to date and effective.
Compliance
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and contractual requirements and the
organization’s approach to meet these requirements should be explicitly defined,
documented, and kept up to date for each information system and the
organization.
Appropriate procedures should be implemented to ensure compliance with
legislative, regulatory, and contractual requirements on the use of material in
respect of which there may be intellectual property rights and on the use of
proprietary software products.
Important records should be protected from loss, destruction, and falsification, in
accordance with statutory, regulatory, contractual, and business requirements.
Data protection and privacy should be ensured as required in relevant legislation,
regulations, and, if applicable, contractual clauses.
Users should be deterred from using information processing facilities for
unauthorized purposes.
Cryptographic controls should be used in compliance with all relevant
agreements, laws, and regulations.
Managers should ensure that all security procedures within their area of
responsibility are carried out correctly to achieve compliance with security
policies and standards.
Information systems should be regularly checked for compliance with security
implementation standards.
Audit requirements and activities involving checks on operational systems should
be carefully planned and agreed to minimize the risk of disruptions to business
processes.
Access to information systems audit tools should be protected to prevent any
possible misuse or compromise.

STEP 2 - RANKING ISO/IEC 27002:2005 INFORMATION SECURITY AREAS
INSTRUCTIONS: Below there is a list of the ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information
Security Areas. Please rank these areas in order of relevance in relation to your
organization from 1 - 11 ("1" representing the most important). For example, Access
Management may be "1", Compliance "2", Business Continuity Management "3", and so
forth.
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Rank in order of
relevance from 1 11.

ISO/IEC 27002:2005 Information Security Area
Security Policy
Organization of Information Security
Asset Management
Human Resources Security
Physical And Environmental Security
Communications and Operations Management
Access Control
Information Systems Acquisition, Development and Maintenance
Information Security Incident Management
Business Continuity Management
Compliance

STEP 3 - EVALUATION OF LITERATURE-SUPPORTED CRITERIA
Please assess the four-criteria below for each ISC listed. Note: As instructed and for
purposes of this investigation, please perform the evaluation below for only the first three
ranked information security areas identified in STEP 2.
Security Policy

ISC Description - Security Policy
An information security policy
document should be approved by
management, and published and
communicated to all employees and
1 relevant external parties.
The information security policy
should be reviewed at planned
intervals or if significant changes
occur to ensure its continuing
suitability, adequacy, and
2 effectiveness.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
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resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Organization of Information Security
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ISC Description - Organization of
Information Security
Management should actively support
security within the organization
through clear direction,
demonstrated commitment, explicit
assignment, and acknowledgment of
information security responsibilities.
Information security activities should
be coordinated by representatives
from different parts of the
organization with relevant roles and
job functions.
Allocation of information security
responsibilities: All information
security responsibilities should be
clearly defined.
A management authorization process
for new information processing
facilities should be defined and
implemented.
Requirements for confidentiality or
non-disclosure agreements reflecting
the organization’s needs for the
protection of information should be
identified and regularly reviewed.
Appropriate contacts with relevant
authorities should be maintained.
Appropriate contacts with special
interest groups or other specialist
security forums and professional
associations should be maintained.
The organization’s approach to
managing information security and
its implementation (i.e. control
objectives, controls, policies,
processes, and procedures for
information security) should be

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Organization of
Information Security
reviewed independently at planned
intervals, or when significant changes
to the security implementation occur.
The risks to the organization’s
information and information
processing facilities from business
processes involving external parties
should be identified and appropriate
controls implemented before
9 granting access.
All identified security requirements
should be addressed before giving
customers access to the
10 organization’s information or assets.
Agreements with third parties
involving accessing, processing,
communicating or managing the
organization’s information or
information processing facilities, or
adding products or services to
information processing facilities
should cover all relevant security
11 requirements.
**

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Asset Management

ISC Description - Asset Management
All assets should be clearly identified
and an inventory of all important
1 assets drawn up and maintained.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Asset Management
All information and assets associated
with information processing facilities
should be owned by a designated
part of the organization.
Rules for the acceptable use of
information and assets associated
with information processing facilities
should be identified, documented,
and implemented.
Information should be classified in
terms of its value, legal requirements,
sensitivity, and criticality to the
organization.
An appropriate set of procedures for
information labeling and handling
should be developed and
implemented in accordance with the
classification scheme adopted by the
organization.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Human Resources Security

ISC Description - Human Resources
Security
Security roles and responsibilities of
employees, contractors and third
party users should be defined and
documented in accordance with the
organization’s information security
1 policy.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Human Resources
Security
Background verification checks on all
candidates for employment,
contractors, and third party users
should be carried out in accordance
with relevant laws, regulations and
ethics, and proportional to the
business requirements, the
classification of the information to be
accessed, and the perceived risks.
As part of their contractual
obligation, employees, contractors
and third party users should agree
and sign the terms and conditions of
their employment contract, which
should state their and the
organization’s responsibilities for
information security.
Management should require
employees, contractors and third
party users to apply security in
accordance with established policies
and procedures of the organization.
All employees of the organization
and, where relevant, contractors and
third party users should receive
appropriate awareness training and
regular updates in organizational
policies and procedures, as relevant
for their job function.
There should be a formal disciplinary
process for employees who have
committed a security breach.
Responsibilities for performing
employment termination or change
of employment should be clearly
defined and assigned.
All employees, contractors and third
party users should return all of the
organization’s assets in their
possession upon termination of their

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Human Resources
Security
employment, contract or agreement.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

The access rights of all employees,
contractors and third party users to
information and information
processing facilities should be
removed upon termination of their
employment, contract or agreement,
9 or adjusted upon change.
** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Physical and Environmental Security

1

2

3

4

ISC Description - Physical And
Environmental Security
Security perimeters (barriers such as
walls, card controlled entry gates or
manned reception desks) should be
used to protect areas that contain
information and information
processing facilities.
Secure areas should be protected by
appropriate entry controls to ensure
that only authorized personnel are
allowed access.
Physical security for offices, rooms,
and facilities should be designed and
applied.
Physical protection against damage
from fire, flood, earthquake,
explosion, civil unrest, and other forms

Estimated
Implementatio
n Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulation
s
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Physical And
Environmental Security
of natural or man-made disaster
should be designed and applied.

5

6

7

8

9
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Physical protection and guidelines for
working in secure areas should be
designed and applied.
Access points such as delivery and
loading areas and other points where
unauthorized persons may enter the
premises should be controlled and, if
possible, isolated from information
processing facilities to avoid
unauthorized access.
Equipment should be sited or
protected to reduce the risks from
environmental threats and hazards,
and opportunities for unauthorized
access.
Equipment should be protected from
power failures and other disruptions
caused by failures in supporting
utilities.
Power and telecommunications
cabling carrying data or supporting
information services should be
protected from interception or
damage.
Equipment should be correctly
maintained to ensure its continued
availability and integrity.
Security should be applied to off-site
equipment taking into account the
different risks of working outside the
organization’s premises.
All items of equipment containing
storage media should be checked to
ensure that any sensitive data and
licensed software has been removed
or securely overwritten prior to
disposal.

Estimated
Implementatio
n Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulation
s
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Physical And
Environmental Security
Equipment, information or software
1 should not be taken off-site without
3 prior authorization.

Estimated
Implementatio
n Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulation
s
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Communications and Operations Management

1

2

3

4

5

ISC Description - Communications
and Operations Management
Operating procedures should be
documented, maintained, and made
available to all users who need them.
Changes to information processing
facilities and systems should be
controlled.
Duties and areas of responsibility
should be segregated to reduce
opportunities for unauthorized or
unintentional modification or misuse
of the organization’s assets.
Development, test, and operational
facilities should be separated to
reduce the risks of unauthorised
access or changes to the operational
system.
It should be ensured that the security
controls, service definitions and
delivery levels included in the third
party service delivery agreement are
implemented, operated, and
maintained by the third party.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Communications
and Operations Management
The services, reports and records
provided by the third party should be
regularly monitored and reviewed,
and audits should be carried out
regularly.
Changes to the provision of services,
including maintaining and improving
existing information security policies,
procedures and controls, should be
managed, taking account of the
criticality of business systems and
processes involved and reassessment of risks.
The use of resources should be
monitored, tuned, and projections
made of future capacity
requirements to ensure the required
system performance.
Acceptance criteria for new
information systems, upgrades, and
new versions should be established
and suitable tests of the system(s)
carried out during development and
prior to acceptance.
Detection, prevention, and recovery
controls to protect against malicious
code and appropriate user awareness
procedures should be implemented.
Where the use of mobile code is
authorized, the configuration should
ensure that the authorized mobile
code operates according to a clearly
defined security policy, and
unauthorized mobile code should be
prevented from executing.
Back-up copies of information and
software should be taken and tested
regularly in accordance with the
agreed backup policy.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Communications
and Operations Management
Networks should be adequately
managed and controlled, in order to
be protected from threats, and to
maintain security for the systems and
applications using the network,
including information in transit.
Security features, service levels, and
management requirements of all
network services should be identified
and included in any network services
agreement, whether these services
are provided in-house or outsourced.
There should be procedures in place
for the management of removable
media.
Media should be disposed of securely
and safely when no longer required,
using formal procedures.
Procedures for the handling and
storage of information should be
established to protect this
information from unauthorized
disclosure or misuse.
System documentation should be
protected against unauthorized
access.
Formal exchange policies,
procedures, and controls should be in
place to protect the exchange of
information through the use of all
types of communication facilities.
Agreements should be established for
the exchange of information and
software between the organization
and external parties.
Media containing information should
be protected against unauthorized
access, misuse or corruption during
transportation beyond an
organization’s physical boundaries.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Communications
and Operations Management
Information involved in electronic
messaging should be appropriately
protected.
Policies and procedures should be
developed and implemented to
protect information associated with
the interconnection of business
information systems.
Information involved in electronic
commerce passing over public
networks should be protected from
fraudulent activity, contract dispute,
and unauthorized disclosure and
modification.
Information involved in on-line
transactions should be protected to
prevent incomplete transmission,
mis-routing, unauthorized message
alteration, unauthorized disclosure,
unauthorized message duplication or
replay.
Publicly available information: The
integrity of information being made
available on a publicly available
system should be protected to
prevent unauthorized modification.
Audit logs recording user activities,
exceptions, and information security
events should be produced and kept
for an agreed period to assist in
future investigations and access
control monitoring.
Procedures for monitoring use of
information processing facilities
should be established and the results
of the monitoring activities reviewed
regularly.
Logging facilities and log information
should be protected against
tampering and unauthorized access.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Communications
and Operations Management
System administrator and system
30 operator activities should be logged.
Faults should be logged, analyzed,
31 and appropriate action taken.
The clocks of all relevant information
processing systems within an
organization or security domain
should be synchronized with an
32 agreed accurate time source.
**

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Access Control

1

2
3

4

5

ISC Description - Access Control
An access control policy should be
established, documented, and
reviewed based on business and
security requirements for access.
There should be a formal user
registration and de-registration
procedure in place for granting and
revoking access to all information
systems and services.
The allocation and use of privileges
should be restricted and controlled.
The allocation of passwords should
be controlled through a formal
management process.
Management should review users’
access rights at regular intervals using
a formal process.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

ISC Description - Access Control
Users should be required to follow
good security practices in the
selection and use of passwords.
Users should ensure that unattended
equipment has appropriate
protection.
A clear desk policy for papers and
removable storage media and a clear
screen policy for information
processing facilities should be
adopted.
Users should only be provided with
access to the services that they have
been specifically authorized to use.
Appropriate authentication methods
should be used to control access by
remote users.
Automatic equipment identification
should be considered as a means to
authenticate connections from
specific locations and equipment.
Physical and logical access to
diagnostic and configuration ports
should be controlled.
Groups of information services, users,
and information systems should be
segregated on networks.
For shared networks, especially those
extending across the organization’s
boundaries, the capability of users to
connect to the network should be
restricted, in line with the access
control policy and requirements of
the business applications.
Routing controls should be
implemented for networks to ensure
that computer connections and
information flows do not breach the
access control policy of the business
applications.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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16

17

18

19
20

21

22

23

24

25

ISC Description - Access Control
Access to operating systems should
be controlled by a secure log-on
procedure.
All users should have a unique
identifier (user ID) for their personal
use only, and a suitable
authentication technique should be
chosen to substantiate the claimed
identity of a user.
Systems for managing passwords
should be interactive and should
ensure quality passwords.
The use of utility programs that might
be capable of overriding system and
application controls should be
restricted and tightly controlled.
Inactive sessions should shut down
after a defined period of inactivity.
Restrictions on connection times
should be used to provide additional
security for high-risk applications.
Access to information and application
system functions by users and
support personnel should be
restricted in accordance with the
defined access control policy.
Sensitive systems should have a
dedicated (isolated) computing
environment.
A formal policy should be in place,
and appropriate security measures
should be adopted to protect against
the risks of using mobile computing
and communication facilities.
A policy, operational plans, and
procedures should be developed and
implemented for teleworking
activities.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.

Information Systems Acquisition, Development, and Maintenance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
9

ISC Description - Information
Systems Acquisition, Development,
And Maintenance
Statements of business requirements
for new information systems, or
enhancements to existing
information systems should specify
the requirements for security
controls.
Data input to applications should be
validated to ensure that this data is
correct and appropriate.
Validation checks should be
incorporated into applications to
detect any corruption of information
through processing errors or
deliberate acts.
Requirements for ensuring
authenticity and protecting message
integrity in applications should be
identified, and appropriate controls
identified and implemented.
Data output from an application
should be validated to ensure that
the processing of stored information
is correct and appropriate to the
circumstances.
A policy on the use of cryptographic
controls for protection of information
should be developed and
implemented.
Key management should be in place
to support the organization’s use of
cryptographic techniques.
There should be procedures in place
to control the installation of software
on operational systems.
Test data should be selected

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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10

11

12

13
14

15

16
**

ISC Description - Information
Systems Acquisition, Development,
And Maintenance
carefully, and protected and
controlled.
Access to program source code
should be restricted.
The implementation of changes
should be controlled by the use of
formal change control procedures.
When operating systems are
changed, business critical
applications should be reviewed and
tested to ensure there is no adverse
impact on organizational operations
or security.
Modifications to software packages
should be discouraged, limited to
necessary changes, and all changes
should be strictly controlled.
Opportunities for information
leakage should be prevented.
Outsourced software development
should be supervised and monitored
by the organization.
Timely information about technical
vulnerabilities of information systems
being used should be obtained, the
organization's exposure to such
vulnerabilities evaluated, and
appropriate measures taken to
address the associated risk.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.
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Information Security Incident Management

1

2

3

4

5

ISC Description - Information
Security Incident Management
Information security events should be
reported through appropriate
management channels as quickly as
possible.
All employees, contractors and third
party users of information systems
and services should be required to
note and report any observed or
suspected security weaknesses in
systems or services.
Management responsibilities and
procedures should be established to
ensure a quick, effective, and orderly
response to information security
incidents.
There should be mechanisms in place
to enable the types, volumes, and
costs of information security
incidents to be quantified and
monitored.
Where a follow-up action against a
person or organization after an
information security incident involves
legal action (either civil or criminal),
evidence should be collected,
retained, and presented to conform
to the rules for evidence laid down in
the relevant jurisdiction(s).

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.
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Business Continuity Management

1

2

3

4

5

ISC Description - Business Continuity
Management
A managed process should be
developed and maintained for
business continuity throughout the
organization that addresses the
information security requirements
needed for the organization’s
business continuity.
Events that can cause interruptions
to business processes should be
identified, along with the probability
and impact of such interruptions and
their consequences for information
security.
Plans should be developed and
implemented to maintain or restore
operations and ensure availability of
information at the required level and
in the required time scales following
interruption to, or failure of, critical
business processes.
A single framework of business
continuity plans should be
maintained to ensure all plans are
consistent, to consistently address
information security requirements,
and to identify priorities for testing
and maintenance.
Business continuity plans should be
tested and updated regularly to
ensure that they are up to date and
effective.

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

** An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.
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Compliance

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

ISC Description - Compliance
All relevant statutory, regulatory, and
contractual requirements and the
organization’s approach to meet
these requirements should be
explicitly defined, documented, and
kept up to date for each information
system and the organization.
Appropriate procedures should be
implemented to ensure compliance
with legislative, regulatory, and
contractual requirements on the use
of material in respect of which there
may be intellectual property rights
and on the use of proprietary
software products.
Important records should be
protected from loss, destruction, and
falsification, in accordance with
statutory, regulatory, contractual,
and business requirements.
Data protection and privacy should
be ensured as required in relevant
legislation, regulations, and, if
applicable, contractual clauses.
Users should be deterred from using
information processing facilities for
unauthorized purposes.
Cryptographic controls should be
used in compliance with all relevant
agreements, laws, and regulations.
Managers should ensure that all
security procedures within their area
of responsibility are carried out
correctly to achieve compliance with
security policies and standards.
Information systems should be
regularly checked for compliance
with security implementation

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]
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ISC Description - Compliance
standards.
Audit requirements and activities
involving checks on operational
systems should be carefully planned
and agreed to minimize the risk of
9 disruptions to business processes.
Access to information systems audit
tools should be protected to prevent
10 any possible misuse or compromise.
**

Estimated
Implementation
Cost
(in thousands)
**

Scope - Number of
systems/applications
protected by ISC.
[1, More than 1]

Extent to
which the
ISC
Complies
with
required,
external
laws and
regulations
[0 - 100%]

Extent to
which the
ISC
addresses
information
security
risks
[0 - 100%]

An EIC of $0 implies that the ISC can be performed by existing system resources or existing
resource personnel as part of their daily responsibilities.
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Appendix B. Experts’ Interviews and Calls
Legend:
AC - Access Control
C - Compliance
HRS - Human Resource Security
P.I. - Personal Interview
P.C. - Phone Call

1

Date
11/7/2013

2

11/7/2013

3

11/8/2013

4

11/11/2013

5

11/11/2013

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
AC-1 Security
parameters are not
adequately configured,
allowing for potential
unauthorized user
access to financially
significant systems,
applications, or
databases.
AC-1 Security
parameters are not
adequately configured,
allowing for potential
unauthorized user
access to financially
significant systems,
applications, or
databases.
AC-1 Security
parameters are not
adequately configured,
allowing for potential
unauthorized user
access to financially
significant systems,
applications, or
databases.
AC-2 Privileges are
granted to users which
are not consistent with
their job functions.
The above allows
unauthorized or
incorrect modifications
to financial data,
resulting in
segregation of duties
conflicts, unprevented
or undetected errors,
incorrect financials,
and/or management
decisions based upon
misleading
information.
AC-2 Privileges are
granted to users which
are not consistent with
their job functions.
The above allows
unauthorized or
incorrect modifications
to financial data,
resulting in
segregation of duties
conflicts, unprevented
or undetected errors,
incorrect financials,
and/or management

Expert
#
1

P.I.

√

2

3

P.C.
√

√

Time
Start
8:00
AM

Time
End
8:30
AM

Duration
0:30

Risk
Addressed?
Yes

5:00
PM

6:00
PM

1:00

Yes

10:00
AM

11:00
AM

1:00

Yes

1

√

8:00
AM

8:45
AM

0:45

Yes

2

√

2:00
PM

3:00
PM

1:00

Yes

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"FST generated ISC 6,
which prompts users to
select and use good
passwords, as well as
ISC 16 to control
access to systems via
secure logons. Both of
these controls address
this risk."
"To prevent
unauthorized access,
the new methodology
resulted in ISC 3, ISC
5, and ISC 9, all
relating to the control,
review, and assignment
of adequate access."
"The controls ISC 6,
ISC 10, and ISC 17
selected by the FST
methodology help in
mitigating this risk.
Also, there are other
selected controls like
ISC 5 that can deal
with the issue of
unauthorized access."
"ISC 3 calls for the
control and restriction
of privileges, while
ISC 5 reviews user
access. ISC 9 further
states that users should
only be provided
access to the services
they are responsible for
and have been
authorized to use. The
combination of these
three controls
addresses this risk."

"The FST methodology
prompted the selection
of ISC 3 and ISC 9.
ISC 3 restricts access
and ISC 9 ensures that
access must be
authorized and granted
only to the services and
responsibilities users
need. Both of these
controls address the
RISR."
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Date

6

11/11/2013

7

11/11/2013

8

11/13/2013

9

11/13/2013

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
decisions based upon
misleading
information.

Expert
#

P.I.

P.C.

Time
Start

Time
End

Duration

Risk
Addressed?

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination

AC-3 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.
AC-3 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.

1

√

9:00
AM

9:30
AM

0:30

Yes

"Selection of ISC 5
takes care of this risk."

2

√

3:00
PM

4:00
PM

1:00

Yes

AC-2 Privileges are
granted to users which
are not consistent with
their job functions.
The above allows
unauthorized or
incorrect modifications
to financial data,
resulting in
segregation of duties
conflicts, unprevented
or undetected errors,
incorrect financials,
and/or management
decisions based upon
misleading
information.
AC-3 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.

3

√

6:00
PM

6:30
PM

0:30

Yes

"ISC 5 relates to the
periodic reviews of
user access rights by
Management. Frequent
reviews of user access
ensure, for example,
that terminated user
accounts do not gain
access to financial
systems or data.
Additionally, ISC 1
(also selected by FST)
prompts for the
establishment of a
policy to guide access
control."
"Controls ISC 3, ISC 5,
and ISC 9 address this
RISR. These controls
were selected by the
FST methodology. In
addition, ISC 1, which
talks about the need of
an access control
policy, is also a good
control to address this
risk since
implementation of such
type of control sets the
right tone at the top."

3

√

6:30
PM

7:00
PM

0:30

Yes

"The combination of
ISC5 and ISC 20, both
selected by the FST
methodology, in my
opinion, help address
this RISR. ISC 5
requires management
reviews of access to be
performed at regular
intervals. This will
most likely detect
accounts (terminated,
for example) that
should not be active.
At the same time, ISC
20 relates to shutting
down inactive sessions,
which is also required
for terminated
accounts."
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10

Date
11/13/2013

11

11/15/2013

12

11/15/2013

13

14

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
AC-4 Users with
unauthorized accounts
can change
configuration settings
or execute system
administration
activities to financial
applications’
parameters, giving rise
to potential fraud,
invalid data, failure to
safeguard assets, or
misled management.

Expert
#
3

P.I.
√

P.C.

Time
Start
7:00
PM

Time
End
8:00
PM

Duration
1:00

Risk
Addressed?
Yes

AC-4 Users with
unauthorized accounts
can change
configuration settings
or execute system
administration
activities to financial
applications’
parameters, giving rise
to potential fraud,
invalid data, failure to
safeguard assets, or
misled management.
C-1 Breaches of any
law, statutory,
regulatory or
contractual
obligations, and of any
security requirements
take place over the
design, operation, use,
and management of
information systems.

1

√

8:00
AM

8:20
AM

0:20

Yes

1

√

8:20
AM

9:10
AM

0:50

Yes

11/18/2013

AC-4 Users with
unauthorized accounts
can change
configuration settings
or execute system
administration
activities to financial
applications’
parameters, giving rise
to potential fraud,
invalid data, failure to
safeguard assets, or
misled management.

2

√

10:30
AM

11:15
AM

0:45

Yes

11/20/2013

C-1 Breaches of any
law, statutory,
regulatory or
contractual
obligations, and of any
security requirements
take place over the

2

√

4:00
PM

4:30
PM

0:30

Yes

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"The FST methodology
suggested the selection
of ISC 16, which
requires secure log-on
procedures to access
operating systems
(including access to
their system functions,
configuration settings,
etc.). Moreover, ISC
19 (also suggested for
selection) restricts
access to utility
programs which can
impact, in a negative
way, current systems
and application
settings, controls, etc.
Lastly, an access
control policy should
be established to
include the controls
and procedures just
mentioned. All these
controls put in place
address the RISR."
"The selected control
ISC 22 restricts access
to system functions,
including,
configuration settings,
systems' and
applications’
parameters within
applications, thereby,
taking care of this
risk."

"The tool selected ISC
1, which requires
explicit definitions of
'all relevant statutory,
regulatory, and
contractual
requirements and the
organization’s
approach to meet these
requirements'.
Establishment of these
requirements will serve
well in addressing this
risk."
"Utility programs that
can override system
and application
controls should be
restricted and
controlled, which is the
purposes of ISC 19. A
defined access control
policy, as required by
ISC 22, will further
restrict access to
system functions
within applications.
The 2 controls just
mentioned address this
RISR."
"Verifying systems and
applications regularly
for compliance (ISC 8),
as well as having a
clear definition of all
relevant statutory,
regulatory, and
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Date

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
design, operation, use,
and management of
information systems.

Expert
#

P.I.

P.C.

Time
Start

Time
End

Duration

Risk
Addressed?

15

11/23/2013

C-1 Breaches of any
law, statutory,
regulatory or
contractual
obligations, and of any
security requirements
take place over the
design, operation, use,
and management of
information systems.

3

√

4:00
PM

4:40
PM

0:40

Yes

16

11/23/2013

C-2 Information
systems are not in
compliance with
organizational security
implementation
policies, standards, and
documented security
controls.

3

√

4:50
PM

5:20
PM

0:30

Yes

17

11/23/2013

C-3 Operational
systems and audit tools
are not adequately
safeguarded to prevent
their misuse.

3

√

5:25
PM

6:05
PM

0:40

Yes

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
contractual
requirements (ISC 1),
both, should address
the RISR in question."
"The FST methodology
suggested the selection
of ISC 1 ('All relevant
statutory, regulatory,
and contractual
requirements and the
organization’s
approach to meet these
requirements should be
explicitly defined,
documented, and kept
up to date for each
information system and
the organization.'), a
critical step in
addressing this RISR.
Further, and combined
with the above,
checking information
systems, applications,
etc. periodically for
compliance with
obligations (regulatory,
statutory, contractual,
etc.) (control ISC 8)
will also address the
risk, as well as
strengthen current
compliance procedures
at the Organization."
"The selection of
controls ISC 1 and ISC
8 by the new
methodology ensures
the RISR in question is
addressed. ISC 1, for
instance, mandates that
significant
requirements
(statutory, regulatory,
and contractual) be
defined and
documented so that
they can be complied
with. Equally
important and to add to
ISC 1, periodic checks
for compliance with
statutory, regulatory,
and contractual
requirements must
occur consistent with
control ISC 8."
"The FST methodology
suggested the selection
of ISC 9 to monitor
operational systems'
activities to reduce
disruptions to business
processes. ISC 10, also
selected by the
methodology, calls for
access protection of
information systems
audit tools, again, to
avoid any possible
misuse, compromise,
etc. These two ISC's
address the RISR."
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Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
C-2 Information
systems are not in
compliance with
organizational security
implementation
policies, standards, and
documented security
controls.

Expert
#
2

P.I.

P.C.
√

Time
Start
9:00
AM

Time
End
9:35
AM

Duration
0:35

Risk
Addressed?
Yes

10:30
AM

0:55

Yes

8:00
AM

8:35
AM

0:35

Yes

8:35
AM

9:00
AM

0:25

Yes

3:00
PM

4:00
PM

1:00

Undecided

18

Date
11/25/2013

19

11/25/2013

C-3 Operational
systems and audit tools
are not adequately
safeguarded to prevent
their misuse.

2

√

9:35
AM

20

11/26/2013

C-2 Information
systems are not in
compliance with
organizational security
implementation
policies, standards, and
documented security
controls.

1

√

21

11/26/2013

C-3 Operational
systems and audit tools
are not adequately
safeguarded to prevent
their misuse.

1

√

22

11/30/2013

3

23

12/3/2013

24

12/3/2013

25

12/6/2013

HRS-1 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users do not
understand their
responsibilities, and
are not suitable for the
roles they are
considered for.
HRS-1 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users do not
understand their
responsibilities, and
are not suitable for the
roles they are
considered for.
HRS-1 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users do not
understand their
responsibilities, and
are not suitable for the
roles they are
considered for.
HRS-2 The risk of
theft, fraud or misuse
of facilities is not
reduced.

√

1

√

8:00
AM

8:55
AM

0:55

Yes

2

√

11:00
AM

11:55
AM

0:55

Undecided

1

√

7:30
AM

8:20
AM

0:50

No

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"ISC 1 calls for the
establishment,
definition, and
compliance of
information systems
with 'all relevant
statutory, regulatory,
and contractual
requirements...',
thereby, addressing this
RISR."
"The requirement for
protection of
information systems
and audit tools to avoid
misuses, etc., stated by
the selected ISC 10,
addresses the RISR."
"ISC 8, selected, states
that information
systems should be
regularly checked for
compliance with
security
implementation
standards. Such
control, on its own,
addresses this risk."
"ISC 9 and ISC 10
require procedures to
be performed on
operating systems and
audit tools to keep
them functional and
protected, respectively.
Both address this risk
directly."
N/A

"ISC 1 responds solidly
to this risk by defining
all security roles and
responsibilities of
employees, etc."

N/A

"To reduce the risk of
theft, fraud or misuse
of facilities, ISC 6
(enforcement of a
'formal disciplinary
process for employees
who have committed a
security breach') should
have been selected, but
it wasn't. Luckily, this
ISC was already
implemented by the
Organization."
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Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
HRS-2 The risk of
theft, fraud or misuse
of facilities is not
reduced.

Expert
#
2

P.I.

√

26

Date
12/6/2013

27

12/7/2013

HRS-2 The risk of
theft, fraud or misuse
of facilities is not
reduced.

3

28

12/7/2013

HRS-3 Security
responsibilities related
to job descriptions and
conditions of
employment are not
necessarily addressed
prior to employment.

1

√

29

12/11/2013

HRS-1 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users do not
understand their
responsibilities, and
are not suitable for the
roles they are
considered for.

2

√

30

12/12/2013

HRS-1 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users do not
understand their
responsibilities, and
are not suitable for the
roles they are
considered for.

3

√

P.C.
√

Time
Start
1:00
PM

Time
End
1:40
PM

Duration
0:40

Risk
Addressed?
No

10:00
AM

11:00
AM

1:00

No

4:00
PM

4:30
PM

0:30

No

11:30
AM

12:30
PM

1:00

No

6:00
PM

7:00
PM

1:00

No

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"There is no current
process for
reprimanding users
when faulting or
committing security
breaches (required by
ISC 6). Because of
that, ISC 6 should have
been selected."
"The FST methodology
did not select ISC 6,
which targets this
RISR via the
establishment of a
disciplinary process."
"ISC 3 should have
been selected to
properly address
employees'
understanding of
security
responsibilities, which
refers to the risk here."
Undecided on
12/3/2013. "To address
this RISR, users should
receive appropriate
training, relevant for
their job function, as
well as agree by
signing the terms,
conditions, and
responsibilities they
were hired for. The
requirements just
mentioned are stated in
ISC 3 and ISC 5,
respectively, both
controls not selected by
the tool. The RISR is
not addressed."
Refer to previous
meeting held on
11/30/2013. "Even
though ISC 1 was
selected by the FST
methodology
prompting for the
definition and
documentation of
security roles and
responsibilities for all
employees, ISC 3 and
ISC 5, both dealing
directly with this RISR,
were not selected.
Awareness trainings
represent a critical step
for organizations to
provide new and
existing employees
relevant information
regarding
organizational policies,
procedures, and
responsibilities of the
job function (ISC 5).
Proof of training
participation and
understanding of the
material covered must
be obtained and
evidenced through
formal, signed
agreements from
employees, contractors,
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Date

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")

Expert
#

P.I.

P.C.

Time
Start

Time
End

Duration

Risk
Addressed?

31

12/14/2013

HRS-3 Security
responsibilities related
to job descriptions and
conditions of
employment are not
necessarily addressed
prior to employment.

3

√

10:30
AM

10:55
AM

0:25

No

32

12/14/2013

HRS-4 All candidates
for employment,
contractors, and third
party are not
adequately screened,
especially for sensitive
jobs.

3

√

11:00
AM

11:50
AM

0:50

No

33

12/14/2013

HRS-5 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users are (1) not
aware of information
security threats and
concerns, their
responsibilities and/or
liabilities; and (2) not
equipped to support
organizational security
policy in the course of
their normal work, and

3

√

1:20
PM

2:00
PM

0:40

No

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
and third party users."

"The FST methodology
did not select ISC 3,
which requires formal
agreement of the
employee and his or
her new contractual
obligation, as well as
organization’s
responsibilities specific
to information security.
In addition, prior to
employment,
background
verification checks
should be enforced and
performed on all
potential employees
consistent with relevant
laws, regulations, and
ethics (said control
refers to the unselected
ISC 2). I understand
that the RISR was not
addressed."
"ISC 2 deals with
performing background
verification checks as
part of the screening
process on potential
employees. Such
control was not
selected. ISC 3, on the
other hand, and similar
to my previous
comment, was also not
selected by the FST
methodology. ISC 3
requires agreement
between the
organization and the
employee in terms of
their understanding of
information security
prior to employment.
The absence of these 2
controls renders the
RISR, in my opinion,
not addressed."
"The already-selected
ISC 1 talks about
defining security roles
and responsibilities for
employees, contractors,
third party, etc. to
assist them in
understanding
information security
threats and concerns,
etc. However, such
understanding should
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Date

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
to reduce the risk of
human error.

Expert
#

P.I.

P.C.

Time
Start

Time
End

Duration

Risk
Addressed?

34

12/17/2013

HRS-3 Security
responsibilities related
to job descriptions and
conditions of
employment are not
necessarily addressed
prior to employment.

2

√

9:00
AM

9:30
AM

0:30

No

35

12/17/2013

HRS-4 All candidates
for employment,
contractors, and third
party are not
adequately screened,
especially for sensitive
jobs.

1

√

3:30
PM

4:00
PM

0:30

No

36

12/18/2013

HRS-4 All candidates
for employment,
contractors, and third
party are not
adequately screened,
especially for sensitive
jobs.

2

√

9:45
AM

10:20
AM

0:35

No

37

1/3/2014

1

√

7:30
AM

8:40
AM

1:10

No

38

1/3/2014

HRS-5 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users are (1) not
aware of information
security threats and
concerns, their
responsibilities and/or
liabilities; and (2) not
equipped to support
organizational security
policy in the course of
their normal work, and
to reduce the risk of
human error.
HRS-6 An adequate
level of awareness,
education, and training
in security procedures
and the correct use of
information processing
facilities is not
provided to all
employees, contractors
and third party users to
minimize possible
security risks.

1

√

8:40
AM

9:20
AM

0:40

No

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
be refreshed
periodically via
awareness trainings
(purpose of ISC 5).
Having awareness
trainings and regular
updates in
organizational policies
and procedures, for
example, was not one
of the controls selected
by the FST tool. As
such, the RISR is not
addressed."
"ISC 3 requires formal
agreement (evidenced
by a signoff) between
employees and the
organization in regards
to the terms and
conditions of the
employment contract,
including and, more
importantly, their
responsibilities in
terms of information
security. The selection
of this control alone
should have addressed
the RISR."
"Screenings of
candidates via
background
verification checks, for
instance, are required
by ISC 2, which was
not one of the controls
selected. Thus, this risk
is not mitigated."
"The methodology did
not prompt ISC 2 for
selection. ISC 2
requires background
checks, screenings to
be performed on
potential employees,
particularly when
considered for critical
and sensitive jobs."
"Even though control
ISC 1 (definition of
security roles and
responsibilities) was
selected, ISC 5
(awareness trainings)
was not. The
organization should
implement both, ISC1
and ISC5, to strengthen
its security."

"Control ISC 5 was not
selected; risk is not
addressed."

158

39

Date
1/6/2014

40

1/6/2014

41

1/8/2014

42

1/8/2014

43

1/10/2014

44

1/10/2014

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
HRS-5 Employees,
contractors, and third
party users are (1) not
aware of information
security threats and
concerns, their
responsibilities and/or
liabilities; and (2) not
equipped to support
organizational security
policy in the course of
their normal work, and
to reduce the risk of
human error.
HRS-6 An adequate
level of awareness,
education, and training
in security procedures
and the correct use of
information processing
facilities is not
provided to all
employees, contractors
and third party users to
minimize possible
security risks.
HRS-7 A formal
disciplinary process
for handling security
breaches is not
established.
HRS-8 The exit
process for employees,
contractors, and third
party is not performed
effectively or in a
timely or orderly
manner.
Responsibilities should
be in place to ensure
an employee’s,
contractor’s or third
party user’s exit from
the organization is
managed, and that the
return of all equipment
and the removal of all
access rights are
completed.
HRS-7 A formal
disciplinary process
for handling security
breaches is not
established.
HRS-8 The exit
process for employees,
contractors, and third
party is not performed
effectively or in a
timely or orderly
manner.
Responsibilities should
be in place to ensure
an employee’s,
contractor’s or third
party user’s exit from
the organization is
managed, and that the
return of all equipment
and the removal of all
access rights are
completed.

Expert
#
2

P.I.
√

2

√

P.C.

Time
Start
3:00
PM

Time
End
4:05
PM

Duration
1:05

Risk
Addressed?
No

5:00
PM

6:00
PM

1:00

No

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"Awareness of security
threats, concerns,
responsibilities, etc. at
organizations comes
from having an
adequate training or
seminar program in
place. This is suggested
by ISC 5, which was
not selected by the
tool. As a result, the
RISR is not
addressed."
"ISC 5 deals with this
RISR directly and such
control was not
selected by the tool,
leaving the RISR
unaddressed.
Fortunately, this
control had been in
place by the
organization. The
organization should
continue performing
this control."
"Control ISC 6 was not
selected; risk is not
addressed."

1

√

7:30
AM

8:00
AM

0:30

No

1

√

8:00
AM

8:40
AM

0:40

Yes

"Selection of controls
ISC 7 and ISC 9, both
related to termination
access and procedures,
will address this risk."

2

√

4:00
PM

4:40
PM

0:40

No

2

√

4:45
PM

5:25
PM

0:40

Undecided

"ISC 6 was not
selected, so no formal
disciplinary process is
required to be in place
at the organization."
N/A
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Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
HRS-6 An adequate
level of awareness,
education, and training
in security procedures
and the correct use of
information processing
facilities is not
provided to all
employees, contractors
and third party users to
minimize possible
security risks.

Expert
#
3

P.I.
√

P.C.

Time
Start
11:00
AM

Time
End
11:40
AM

Duration
0:40

Risk
Addressed?
No

1:50
PM

0:35

No

2:00
PM

2:25
PM

0:25

No

2:25
PM

3:00
PM

0:35

Yes

45

Date
1/11/2014

46

1/11/2014

HRS-7 A formal
disciplinary process
for handling security
breaches is not
established.

3

√

1:15
PM

47

1/11/2014

3

√

48

1/11/2014

HRS-8 The exit
process for employees,
contractors, and third
party is not performed
effectively or in a
timely or orderly
manner.
Responsibilities should
be in place to ensure
an employee’s,
contractor’s or third
party user’s exit from
the organization is
managed, and that the
return of all equipment
and the removal of all
access rights are
completed.
HRS-9 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.

3

√

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"Again, ISC 5 was not
selected by the new
methodology;
therefore, the RISR is
not addressed.
Nevertheless, control
ISC 5 was already part
of the ISC's in place at
the organization. This
is an example where
controls already
implemented at the
organization plus the
ones selected by FST,
when combined, can
strengthen information
security."
"The methodology did
not select ISC 6, which
deals specifically with
having a disciplinary
process in case of
security breaches, etc.
Although the RISR is
not addressed, the
organization had this
control in place prior to
running the FST
methodology. This is
another example where
the organization should
continue with its
previous control to
continue having a
proper level of security
around this area."
"To address the RISR
of not performing an
effective, timely, and
ordered exit meeting
process, control ISC 8
(requiring employees
to return all
organization’s
equipment upon
termination) should
have been chosen by
the FST methodology."

"The methodology
chose ISC 7, which
requires all
responsibilities related
to employment
termination to be
clearly defined and
assigned. In addition,
ISC 9, requires the
removal of access for
all accounts upon
termination. Both
selected controls
address the RISR."

160

49

Date
1/15/2014

50

1/15/2014

51

1/16/2014

Relevant Information
Security Risk
("RISR")
HRS-8 The exit
process for employees,
contractors, and third
party is not performed
effectively or in a
timely or orderly
manner.
Responsibilities should
be in place to ensure
an employee’s,
contractor’s or third
party user’s exit from
the organization is
managed, and that the
return of all equipment
and the removal of all
access rights are
completed.
HRS-9 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.
HRS-9 Users with
terminated accounts as
well as other
unauthorized users can
gain access to financial
systems or data, and
view and/or change
critical, confidential, or
sensitive financial
information.
Total Personal
Interviews, Phone
Calls, and Duration

Expert
#
2

P.I.

P.C.
√

Time
Start
10:00
AM

Time
End
11:05
AM

Duration
1:05

Risk
Addressed?
Yes

2

√

11:15
AM

11:50
AM

0:35

Yes

1

√

8:00
AM

8:45
AM

0:45

Yes

19

32

12:55

Comments
Summarizing Risk
Determination
"Undecided at
1/10/2014 given that
ISC 8 had not been
selected by the tool.
However, the
combination of
selected controls ISC 7
and ISC 9, both stating
responsibilities when
dealing with
terminations, in my
opinion, address the
RISR."

"ISC 9 prevents
terminated users from
gaining unauthorized
access to financial
systems (which refers
to this RISR) by
prompting the removal
of access of all such
terminated employees,
contractors, and third
party users."
"Control ISC 9,
selected, addresses this
risk."
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